In favor of politics? I don't care about politics. China had ICBM's starting in 1981- their targeting systems have been greatly improved with new technology- but with nuclear weapons I'm not sure how much that matters- at least to ME- considering the ecological disaster that even a limited nuclear war would have.
And of course the Chinese were getting technology under the Bush and Reagan administrations too- and the french and Germans give technology to anyone. So I still don't see Clinton as the boogeyman here.
Chinese ICBM Capabilities
The most widely circulated estimate is that China maintains four to ten
operational DF-5/5A ICBMs. However, this estimate may be dated. Recent
credible reports from U.S. sources suggest that China actually fields 17-20
DF-5/5As. This ICBM is capable of carrying a nuclear warhead with a very
high explosive yield of 4 to 5 megatons up to 13,000 km/8,060 miles. This
missile was initially designed to target the continental United States, but it
could be used to cover targets in Europe and the former Soviet Union, as
well as North America.
Only two Chinese ICBM silos have been identified, both near Luoning in
Henan Province in central China. Other Chinese land based strategic missile
forces are known to be well dispersed and either road-mobile or located in
hardened sites. Such deployments make China's missile forces hard for an
opponent to target and thus highly survivable in the event of an attack,
increasing China's potential political and military leverage in the event of war.
Chinese ICBM Development Programmes
China's ICBM programme has lagged that of the Former Soviet Union by
almost 20 years. The CSS-4/DF-5 did not achieve full operational status
until 1981, some ten years after its first successful flight test, and until the
early 1990s, China's ICBM programme appeared to be stalled in the
liquid-fuel stage. But China is now developing at least three new
nuclear-armed ICBMs as part of its ongoing programme of military
modernisation: the combined ICBM and SLBM DF-31/JL-2 programme,
and the land-based DF-41. Significantly, these ICBMs differ only in detail
from China's Changzhen (Long March) series of Space Launch Vehicles.
Unlike the older CSS-4/DF-5 ICBM, the DF-31/JL-2, and the DF-41
are solid-fuelled systems, and indicate a significant advance in Chinese
technical capabilities. The DF-31, one of which was test fired in land-based
configuration in May 1995, is a road-mobile, three-stage ICBM with an
anticipated range of 8,000 km. It is expected to be ready for service in the
1998-2000 timeframe. According to a classified U.S. Air Force assessment
obtained in May 1997 by the Washington Times, the DF-31 "will give China
a major strike capability that will be difficult to counterattacks at any stage of
its operation, from pre-flight mobile operations through terminal flight
phases." The DF-31 will likely incorporate "design aspects similar to those of
current generation Russian missiles," according to this assessment. Such
improvements include "upgraded mobility for the
transporter-erector-launcher; advanced materials for the booster and
payload, use of penetration aids such as decoys or chaff, and an improved
solid propellant." US sources also suggest that the 1995 DF-31 test included
deployment of MIRV. The DF-41, also a three-stage missile, will have a
range of some 12,000 km and is scheduled to replace existing CSS-4/DF-5
ICBMs after 2000.
Sea-Based Systems
China has one operational Xia-class nuclear-powered submarine (SSBN)
armed with twelve CSS-N-3 (JL-1) SLBMs and one Golf-class
conventionally-powered submarine, used initially as a test platform but now
apparently deployed as an operational system and armed with two JL-1
SLBMs (the JL-1's range is 1,700 km/1,054 miles). The JL-1 SLBM, and
its land-based counterpart the DF-21 MRBM, are China's first solid-fuel
missiles, an important advance indicating China's growing technological
capabilities. These Chinese SLBMs make it even more difficult for a
potential adversary to neutralise China's strategic nuclear force.
China is also developing a new class of SSBN, the Type 094, as well as
a follow-on SLBM, the JL-2, with an anticipated range of 8,000 km/4,960
miles. According to a 1997 report by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence
(ONI), the Type 094 SSBN will be "the largest submarine ever constructed
in China." It will have improved quieting and sensor systems, and a more
reliable propulsion system than the Xia. The initial Type 094 SSBN will be
launched early in the next decade, and three boats may be operational by
2010. The Type 094 will carry 16 JL-2s. According to ONI, these SLBMs
will enable China to "target portions of the United States for the first time
from operating areas located near the Chinese coast."
Threats to Taiwan
The Chinese missile force is growing and provides Beijing with regional
predominance. The Chinese can use this force as a deterrent, to exact
bargaining leverage, or for intimidation purposes, as with their "missile tests"
against Taiwan. China's high visibility missile threats directed at Taiwan
involved a total of 10 launches, six in 1995 and four in 1996, demonstrating
the serious impact ballistic missiles will have on the future regional security
environment.
Between 21-23 July 1995, the Chinese fired some six nuclear-capable
DF-15 SRBMs from Fujian province to an East China Sea impact site 90
miles north of Taipei (one missile reportedly crashed in China due to a
guidance system failure). Theses firings, conducted during a period of
tensions in U.S.-China-Taiwan relations, had an initial adverse impact on
Taiwan's economy, including a one-day 4.2 percent drop in the stock
market, until calm was restored.
China launched its second set of "missile tests" on the eve of Taiwan's
first democratic presidential election, firing another four DF-15s (two on 8
March and two on 13 March 1996) into two ocean impact zones that
bracketed the island. Three missiles were fired into a closure zone that was
30 nm miles from the southern port of Kaohsiung and the other missile into a
zone that was just 19 nm east of near the northern port of Keelung. The
Chinese fired the missiles from the Huanan Mountain area.
However, for Taiwan, these "missile tests" and related Chinese military
manoeuvres caused serious concern and inspired more short-term economic
panic. They also seriously impacted air and sea traffic flowing to and from
Taiwan producing a virtual blockade. Indeed, subsequent analyses reveal
that the March 1996 exercises, including the "missile tests", constituted the
largest multi-service exercise ever conducted in the Taiwan Strait. The
exercises were codenamed "Exercise Strait 961" and involved a full-scale
contingency scenario for an invasion of Taiwan. These Chinese designed the
exercise to show their resolve on the Taiwan sovereignty issue. According to
a 1996 unclassified report by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, the
Chinese forces taking part in this exercise were:
...forces from all three Chinese fleets, ground units, elements of the
Second Artillery..., and at least one component of air defense missile
troops equipped with the SA-10B [S-300/Grumble] surface-to-air
missile.
The SA-10B's presence [Naval Intelligence concluded] was 'both
for exercise play and as a precautionary, defensive measure. The
Chinese may have been concerned that Taiwan might miscalculate the
nature and intent of the exercise.
U.S. analyst Richard Fisher of Washington's Heritage Foundation has
also learned from sources in Washington and Taipei that Beijing was
prepared to launch between 20-30 DF-15s, which would have contributed
to a serious escalation in regional tensions. |
