I think I'm going to jump into this one for the same "value related" reasons alluded to here. Supposedly there is a nearly finished mine ready to produce 60,000/yr @ 169. In normal times that's a valuable asset. In today's climate, deposits and projects (most) fitting this cost profile have very little if any value. The play is of course a rerating (from nearly zero to somewhere north of zero) of this asset class. The San Francisco mine is probably a negative in the valuation.
Another data point worth evaluating is the "leg breaker" financing GEO got from the Rothschilds on the $3.5 million bridge loan:
The loan facility has an interest rate of 5% per annum, and a prepayment option at any time
prior to expiry on September 30, 2002 is provided. Fees payable to RCF are an establishment
fee of one million common share purchase warrants exercisable at Cdn$0.28 until September
30, 2002; and $0.825 million on each of September 30, 2001 and September 30, 2002, payable
in cash or common shares at RCF?s option. Should RCF elect to receive common shares, the
price will be based on the 20-day average of the market price at that time. RCF is entitled to
nominate a representative to the Board of Directors for the period of the loan.
My goodness, mining appears to be the wrong business to invest in, finance is the way to go. Does this deal illustrate that 1. Capital is nonexistent for small company mining startups? 2. Bankers consider the risk to be extremely high? 3. GEO management makes bad deals?
In the final analysis this financing is probably a small part of the story, but it signals in my mind a need for these companies to combine into larger entities. I am seriously questioning the small producer model period, even with very low cost deposits. The concern is that they need to keep going back (a la Greenstone) for more of this Vito and Guido money. |
