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Strategies & Market Trends : Investment in Russia and Eastern Europe

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To: Paul Berliner who wrote (1074)8/2/2000 12:08:02 AM
From: CIMA  Read Replies (1) of 1301
 
Russian Military Quarrel Winds Down

Summary

In what seems to be the first step toward a reformation of Russia's
military, President Vladimir Putin fired six high-ranking Defense
Ministry officials on July 31. The move signals not only a behind-
the-scenes change in the military command, but also hints at an
answer to the question troubling Moscow's inner circle of late: Is
the goal of military reform to maintain the nuclear capability of a
superpower, or to amass conventional forces worthy of a great
regional power?

Analysis

Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed six generals from their
posts on July 31. The order seems to be the first hint of what the
future holds for Russia's military. A heated battle is winding down
- a battle over the reformation of the Russian army, symbolized by
the bitter personal relationship between the military's highest
commanders - Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev and Gen.
Anatoly Kvashnin, Army Chief of Staff. Putin seems prepared to
minimize Sergeyev's influence over military decision-making and
begin directing the administration's efforts toward a modernized
conventional military.

On July 31 the Kremlin announced that six generals, appointed by
Sergeyev himself, would be "reassigned to other posts." They were:
Gen. Anatoly Sitnov, Defense Ministry's chief of Armaments; Maj.
Gen. Anatoly Shatalov, chief of the Defense Ministry's press
service; Gen. Nikolai Karaulov, chief of the rocket and artillery
directorate; Lt. Gen. Alexadner Zobnin, chief of the military's
foreign economic relations; Col. Gen. Stanislav Petrov, chief of
biological, chemical and radiation defense; and Col. Gen. Boris
Dukhov, chief of anti-missile defense. Sergeyev chose the generals;
their dismissal suggests the likelihood of Sergeyev's decreased
authority.

A longstanding dispute among Russia's military leaders on the
future of the armed forces has leaked into the public forum.
Sergeyev, former commander of the Strategic Rocket Forces, has
always wanted to channel military spending directly to the nuclear
arsenal. A Cold War general, he believes that Russia is threatened
by other superpowers, and that the competition between superpowers
is expressed through nuclear threat. Kvashnin, his subordinate, has
called for the marginalization of Russia's once mighty nuclear
forces in favor of a modernized, more professional conventional
army. He sees Russia's most immediate security threat as coming
from Russia's immediate neighbors.
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Putin will, in effect, strive to meet both Kvashnin's and
Sergeyev's demands. His military doctrine, published in April,
jolted the Western world when it openly granted Russia permission
for a nuclear first strike. The doctrine, however, claims to be a
transitional solution to Russia's defense policy. And, for several
reasons, Putin probably plans to use it as such.

The president can rely on the country's nuclear weapons to back up
Moscow's military assertions for some years to come, which will
provide time to bring the conventional forces up to par. Most of
Russia's aging warheads will not survive the next decade intact.
Russia's threat of a nuclear strike is effective in bolstering
Russian nationalism, forcing the West to consider its actions and
reminding Russia's neighbors of their relative military
inferiority. It does not, however, work against regional terrorists
and domestic separatist groups. Nor does it enable Russia to deploy
peacekeepers or wield any practical regional control in an
emergency.

All Russia needs in order for it to cling to the superpower title
it used to enjoy is parity with the United States. Putin can use
the Soviet nuclear cache as a security umbrella for the next decade
until Russia's conventional forces have received a desperately
needed refurbishment. By then the START III treaty could be in
effect, putting Russia on equal terms with the United States, with
each country allowed between 2,000 and 2,500 warheads.
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In the meantime, Putin has already begun restructuring the
military. The military recently announced that it would increase
the number of elite airborne troops by 5,000 by the end of 2001.
And it has shifted the Strategic Rocket Forces under the control of
the air force, reallocating some of its funding in the process.

The debate may continue in rhetoric, but Putin seems to have chosen
a course by reassigning six of Sergeyev's generals. Sergeyev, whose
term ends next May, may hold his title until then, but his
influence in Moscow is dwindling. After almost three years of
wrangling between Kvashnin and Sergeyev, Kvashnin seems to have
secured his place at the ear of the president.
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