Good questions. Trying to give simple answers, to the extent to which my knowledge of the situation - and I don't follow it as closely as I once did - permits.
1) Salamat denies the MILF is receiving any assistance from Bin Laden. Do you believe him? Is it possible that the Filipino government is concocting a Bin Laden Threat to win sympathy from the U.S. for its cause (as the Russians have done with regard to Chechnya)?
The Bin Laden allegations are denied, but they also say this:
Knowing, however the necessity of material factor in winning the objectives, the civilians are encouraged to buy their own arms, while the MILF as an organization exerts all possible means to acquire some of the modern war machines, especially anti tanks, mortars, machine guns and anti air crafts.
I have no doubt that material aid is being received from outside the country. It is possible that it is not coming from the Bin Laden group, and it is certainly true that the Philippine Government would have an incentive to attribute the external assistance to Bin Laden. It is well established that a brother-in-law of Bin Laden visits Mindanao regularly, has a wife in the area, and dispenses considerable sums of money. The brother-in-law claims to be operating an Islamic charity with no connection to the terrorist group. The government claims that the money is supplied by Bin Laden, and buys arms. Truth is hard to determine.
Many public officials in the area also divert government funds to the purchase of arms, possibly out of devotion to the struggle for independence, but more likely to beef up their own personal forces. Guns are very expensive in Mindanao; as much as 3 times the market price elsewhere. Definitely a seller's market.
2) A quick ramble through the site did not turn up any questions about/references to kidnapping or ransom payments. Has Salamat ever gone on record about that?
I don't know of any public statement. This is closely involved with the answer to the next question.
3) To what extent does Salamat/his ideology actually determine what goes on? You wrote earlier that the "rebel
movement" is actually a loose alliance of sorts between revolutionaries, bandits, etc.
Conflicting loyalties are numerous, and the MILF's leadership is by no means as complete as the website would have you believe. Salamat's power base is in Maguindanao, and his influence is stronger there, but even there, the average fighter owes allegiance to his clan, and the clan leaders vary considerably in the extent of their allegiance to the MILF. Just recently the MILF has been forced to disclaim responsibility for massacre/robbery incidents within Maguindanao, saying that the commanders involved were renegades operating without MILF sanction (though their troops are doubtless counted in MILF estimates of military strength). I would say that the MILF per se probably does not sanction kidnapping, but that many commanders of individual units engage in it freely. Most of these units are also autonomous, and their affiliation with the MILF is less a consequence of ideology than of the MILF's access to foreign assistance.
The MILF is also the acknowledged leader of the revolt among the Maranao, who live north of the Maguindanao, but its influence is even less there. The third major group the Tausug, look more to the Abu Sayyaf, which, in keeping with Tausug tradition, is more extreme than the MILF. The Abu Sayyaf are openly engaged in kidnap for ransom; it was they who snatched the tourists from Sipadan. They have their own interpretation of Islam; prominent Islamic clerics from other countries have tried to secure the release of the hostages, but have gotten nowhere.
4) What is the general educational level of the Moro? How much does the Muslim population of Mindanao support the idea of jihad?
General educational level is almost nil: outside of the prominent families, the average is a few years of perfunctory primary schooling. The average Moro probably does support the jihad - they all know the Christians are the enemy - but their understanding of the larger forces at work is very low.
The situation with the European hostages is starting to look pretty grim. The Philippine military feels a little more confident about fighting the Abu Sayyaf, which is smaller than the MILF and operates in an island chain, making them easier to isolate. Negotiations have pretty much failed; the Abu Sayyaf will not release without ransom, and the Governments won't pay, for the usual reasons. Local sentiment runs toward considering the hostages dead and opening a full-scale assault (as full a scale as the antedeluvian logistic capabilities of the Philippine armed forces permit, that is) on the Abu Sayyaf. There is considerable pressure against this from the governments of the hostages' home countries. Sovereignty is becoming an issue.
We'll see how it works out.
I'd like to look at the Chechen sites... are they in English? |
