I agree, of course, on the vulnerability of the canal - anybody with the capacity to scuttle a ship in one of the locks could shut the whole operation down for a long time. It is also pretty obvious that the impact of a closed canal on a conflict in the far east would not be so drastic as some would have us believe. The US Pacific fleet outguns the Chinese Navy - or, for that matter, the combined navies of all Asian nations - by an enormous margin, and the logical avenue for reinforcement would be to move units from the Indian Ocean, not the Atlantic. The Pacific is rather a large ocean, and Panama is a long way from China.
I'm not convinced that the departure of the US military from Panama really left a void in the region. The US remains the dominant regional power in both military and economic terms; I'm sure the Chinese have a fair business and banking presence there, but I suspect that the US does too. And I think most Panamanians, especially in Government, remember what happened to Mr. Noriega; if push comes to shove they will follow the US line. It's not very likely that the Chinese could build up enough of a presence to defend them from the consequences of doing anything else.
My own feeling is that the security considerations here are pretty farfetched, and are outweighed by the free trade considerations. If the US adopts the position that allowing Chinese-owned companies to do business anywhere in our hemisphere constitutes a threat to our security, what is to stop the Chinese or any other government from doing the same to our companies? Our most potent weapon against communism, IMO, is not military force, but free trade and the economic benefits it brings. If we set free trade back without an overpowering reason, we are the ones that lose. |
