Correct. I was about to make this comment, but decided not to in order to limit the issue to that of MSO v. overbuilder.
Granted RCN is also is CLEC. Similarly, ADLAC holds a majority interest in ABIZ, also a CLEC. In contrast, TWX owns a slew of businesses beyond cable pipes, which I think I don't have to describe for you. Nevertheless, it is apparent that reviewing the comment regarding the price of RCN vs. that of other MSOs, the price performance of TWX exemplifies what the poster was commenting on. To further complicate the issue, we can look at T. Try and compare T's performance with that of other MSOs, on an apples with apples basis. The bottom line here is that each major MSO has its own particular characteristic. But what distinguishes RCN from these MSOs is the fact that they presently hold non-exclusive licenses that have historically, but not prospectively, permitted them to operate virtual monopolies. Their existing customer base is their's to lose; it is RCN's to win, regardless of RCN's CLEC status.
I don't think RCN's business model is based upon operating as a CLEC; it is based upon operating on the cable platform. If one were to argue that telephony over cable qualifies as a CLEC, which I would question and likely challenge, then COX, CMCSA and T, via UMG, are all CLECs as well. But, CLECs, for regulatory purposes, are limited to those carriers that operate over twisted pair facilities under the exclusive ownership and regulated control of the incumbent carriers (SBC, VZ, Q & BLS).
Sorry for the long response to a simple question. |
