Isreal's military lobby is pre-eminent and uses the state of war as a convenient spur to bind up the Israeli fabric:
ahram.org.eg
Excerpt:
Israeli intellectuals have always said that the only difference between political parties in Israel is the extent to which each is willing to give precedence to pragmatism over ideology at a given period of time. Otherwise, all the parties are unanimous in their dedication to the ultimate Zionist goal of establishing a greater Israel. The parties also agree that the course they must follow is arduous, and strewn with the thorns of war and peace negotiations, all of which are costly and burdensome. That is why, over the years, both the Israeli left and right have dealt with the Arabs in the same way: waging war, entering into negotiations and conceding territory they had occupied and intended to annex to Israel. In this respect, there is no difference between the right and left in Israel. It was the right which signed Camp David and took part in the Madrid peace conference, while the left signed the Oslo Accords -- the same accords that so infuriated the right it was able to galvanise a consensus and win the following round of elections. It did so, however, only to sign the Hebron agreement and then the Wye Plantation Memorandum.
The issue in Israeli elections, thus, is not one of war versus peace, but, again, the extent to which pragmatism can hold sway over ideology. Already this polarity has marked the electoral campaign. As fear in Israel over failing to fulfil the Zionist dream is stronger than ever, we can expect political discourse on both the right and the left to drift increasingly rightward, toward a specific and unequivocal commitment to restrict the margin of pragmatism and ensure the salvation of the Israeli dream. In other words, the primary thrust of the political candidates will be to reassure Israelis that what they "gave" the Arabs in concession to the pressures of realism -- i.e., the pressure of the international community, Arab popular anger, attacks carried out by freedom fighters, the growing tide of religious extremism in the Arab world and the Iranian factor -- can be retrieved in the shortest possible time and at the least possible human cost.
The second reason we should concern ourselves with the Israeli elections is that these are the first such elections to witness a free-for-all among military men vying for the position of prime minister. This phenomenon does not portend the advent of a military regime of the type all too familiar to the Arab world, Africa and Turkey. Israel is different. It is a militarist society in that every ordinary citizen, with the exception of a few hundred or so belonging to certain religious sects who are exempt from military service, is a soldier. The primary allegiance of every engineer, doctor, thief, government official or street sweeper is to the military establishment in which they must serve for part of every year until they reach the age of 55 or 60. While no army officer has the right to undertake a political career until he or she retires, Israeli army officers retire young.
So what are the implications of the fact that three nominees for the leadership of the state of Israel are retired officers: Barak, Shahak and Mordechai? It can hardly be a coincidence. Israel is passing through a very odd phase. In addition to undergoing structural economic transformations, Israeli society also suffers from increasingly sharp cleavages between religious and secular Jews and between Ashkenazi and Sephardic Jews. Other issues have brought to the fore one of the most serious conundrums facing Israeli society: the redefinition of Israeli identity. When the breaches between political parties begin to yawn so starkly and when relations between and within the parties deteriorate so drastically as to hint at social disintegration, the only institution historically and ideologically charged with ensuring harmony between the diverse elements must logically begin to worry. The army is the only such institution, because the religious establishment in Israel is both divided within itself and a driving force in fostering social divisions, while the political establishment is in disarray. The military establishment, through the former army officers now running for political office, is on the ascendant.
Further increasing the importance of these elections is the fact that the US appears intent on encouraging them by declaring its preference for one of these candidates: the current minister of defence, Yitzhak Mordechai. This preference reveals a certain long-range perspicacity. It means that the US is aware that Israel, contrary to Europe, is drifting toward the right, that the social situation in Israel inspires no hope, the Israeli military establishment is troubled and the Israeli electorate will cast their votes for the candidate they feel can ward off the danger of sectarian division, not merely terrorist attacks .
The Russian factor is the third reason why it is important to keep close tabs on the Israeli elections. Arab analysts have not paid sufficient attention to this variable. Israel, according to most of its intellectuals' analyses, is heading towards "Russification". In other words, the ideas, orientations and Zionism of the Jewish immigrants from Russia are gaining preeminence. There are approximately a million Israelis of Russian origin and the majority of these are of voting age. The Russian Jews are a set apart. They are culturally, historically, religiously and intellectually different from both Oriental Jews and the first wave of Russian Jews who emigrated from Europe in the first half of the century. They are, for the most part, extremely ambitious, arrogant and often racist. The first task of any government formed after the elections will be to mobilise the energies of Israel to absorb another million Russian Jews and to control the most serious demographic transformation and perhaps culture clash in the history of the state.
[snip]
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Israeli Foreign Policy:
Weapons Manufacturing Industry
excerpted from the book
Israeli Foreign Policy
by Jane Hunter
South End Press, 1987
... By the end of the 1970s, the Israeli military industry was supplying 40 percent of Israel's military needs. But production runs solely for the domestic market resulted in high costs per item. The longer production runs necessary to lower unit costs created an imperative to export.
The government began a concerted marketing campaign, through diplomatic and military contacts, as well as news releases and exhibits at fairs. In later years a sales force of retired military officers eager for commissions fanned out over the globe. While the secrecy of the Israeli government makes it impossible to exactly calculate the volume of Israel's weapons sales abroad, the general consensus of analysts of the international arms trade indicates that between 1972 and 1980 Israel's arms exports soared, particularly in the latter part of that span, rising from $50 million to top $1 billion, and, with the possible exception of 1983, have remained over $1 billion annually. A 1986 estimate puts annual sales at "more than $ 1.25 billion. Since 1982 Israel has been ranked among the world's top ten arms producers.
[snip]
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Indeed, war seems to be Israel's main business.... |
