Thanks for that. Did you see this? CIA Director Tenet Outlines Threats to National Security
Actually, I've been wondering what is going on regarding the Deutch (or not as is probably the case..this Administration seems to be so good at stalling)..found this while out gathering....
washingtonbrief.com
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US Department of State
International Information Programs
Washington File
_________________________________
21 March 2000
CIA Director Tenet Outlines Threats to National Security
(U.S. power makes it a major target, he tells Senate panel) (7,460)
U.S. citizens and leaders must not assume that the nation's power makes it impervious to a wide range of threats to its security from other countries and terrorist groups alike, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet told members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee March 21.
Tenet was the first witness as the committee opened a planned series of hearings on non-proliferation.
"The fact that we are arguably the world's most powerful nation does not bestow invulnerability; in fact, it may make us a larger target for those who don't share our interests, values or beliefs," the intelligence chief said in a prepared opening statement. "We must take care to be on guard, watching our every step, and looking far ahead." But Tenet assured committee members that "our intelligence community is well prepared to do that."
Presenting a country-by-country rundown of possible problem areas, Tenet expressed serious concern about North Korea. "Sudden, radical, and possibly dangerous change remains a real possibility in North Korea, and that change could come at any time," he said.
Following is the text of Tenet's statement, as prepared for delivery:
(begin text)
Statement by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Washington, DC
March 21, 2000
The Worldwide Threat in 2000: Global Realities of Our National
Security
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, as we face a new century, we face a new world. A world
where technology, especially information technology, develops and
spreads at lightning speed -- and becomes obsolete just as fast. A
world of increasing economic integration, where a U.S. company designs
a product in Des Moines, makes it in Mumbai, and sells it in Sydney. A
world where nation-states remain the most important and powerful
players, but where multinational corporations, nongovernment
organizations, and even individuals can have a dramatic impact.
This new world harbors the residual effects of the Cold War -- which
had frozen many traditional ethnic hatreds and conflicts within the
global competition between two superpowers. Over the past 10 years
they began to thaw in Africa, the Caucasus, and the Balkans, and we
continue to see the results today.
It is against this backdrop that I want to describe the realities of
our national security environment in the first year of the 21st
century: where technology has enabled, driven, or magnified the threat
to us; where age-old resentments threaten to spill-over into open
violence; and where a growing perception of our so-called "hegemony"
has become a lightning rod for the disaffected. Moreover, this
environment of rapid change makes us even more vulnerable to sudden
surprise.
TRANSNATIONAL ISSUES
Mr. Chairman, bearing these themes in mind, I would like to start with
a survey of those issues that cross national borders. Let me begin
with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (or WMD) -- an
issue of particular concern to this Committee today.
We have witnessed continued missile development in Iran, North Korea,
Pakistan, and India. Add to this the broader availability of
technologies relevant to biological and chemical warfare, nuclear
tests in South Asia, as well as continuing concerns about other
nuclear programs and the possibility of shortcuts to acquiring fissile
material. We are also worried about the security of Russian WMD
materials, increased cooperation among rogue states, more effective
efforts by proliferants to conceal illicit activities, and growing
interest by terrorists in acquiring WMD capabilities.
Our efforts to halt proliferation are complicated by the fact that
most WMD programs are based on dual-use technologies and materials
that have civil as well as military applications. In addition, a
growing trend toward indigenous production of weapons of mass
destruction-related equipment decreases, to some extent, the
effectiveness of sanctions, interdictions, and other tools designed to
counter proliferation.
Although U.S. intelligence is increasing its emphasis and resources on
many of these issues, there is continued and growing risk of surprise.
We focus much of our intelligence collection and analysis on some ten
states, but even concerning those states, there are important gaps in
our knowledge. Our analytical and collection coverage against most of
these states is stretched, and many of the trends that I just noted
make it harder to track some key developments, even in the states of
greatest intelligence focus.
Moreover, we have identified well over 50 states that are of concern
as suppliers, conduits, or potential proliferants.
The Missile Threat
Let's look first at the growing missile threat. We are all familiar
with Russian and Chinese capabilities to strike at military and
civilian targets throughout the United States. To a large degree, we
expect our mutual deterrent and diplomacy to help protect us from
this, as they have for much of the last century.
Over the next 15 years, however, our cities will face ballistic
missile threats from a wider variety of actors -- North Korea,
probably Iran, and possibly Iraq. In some cases, this is because of
indigenous technological development, and in other cases, because of
direct foreign assistance. And while the missile arsenals of these
countries will be fewer in number, constrained to smaller payloads,
and less reliable than those of the Russians and Chinese, they will
still pose a lethal and less predictable threat.
-- North Korea already has tested a space launch vehicle, the Taepo
Dong-1, which it could theoretically convert into an ICBM capable of
delivering a small biological or chemical weapon to the United States,
although with significant inaccuracies. It is currently observing a
moratorium on such launches, but North Korea has the ability to test
its Taepo Dong-2 with little warning; this missile may be capable of
delivering a nuclear payload to the United States.
-- Most analysts believe that Iran, following the North Korean
pattern, could test an ICBM capable of delivering a light payload to
the United States in the next few years.
-- Given the likelihood that Iraq continues its missile development --
we think it too could develop an ICBM capability sometime in the next
decade with the kind of foreign assistance I've already discussed.
These countries calculate that possession of ICBMs would enable them
to complicate and increase the cost of U.S. planning and intervention,
enhance deterrence, build prestige, and improve their abilities to
engage in coercive diplomacy.
-- As alarming as the long-range missile threat is, it should not
overshadow the immediacy and seriousness of the threat that U.S.
forces, interests, and allies already face overseas from short- and
medium-range missiles. The proliferation of medium-range ballistic
missiles (MRBMs) -- driven primarily by North Korean No Dong sales --
is significantly altering strategic balances in the Middle East and
Asia.
The Biological and Chemical Threat
Against the backdrop of this increasing missile threat, the
proliferation of biological and chemical weapons takes on more
alarming dimensions. Biological and chemical weapons pose, arguably,
the most daunting challenge for intelligence collectors and analysts.
Conveying to you an understanding of the work we do to combat this
threat is best dealt with in closed session, but there are some
observations and trends that I can highlight in this unclassified
setting.
-- First, the preparation and effective use of biological weapons (BW)
by both potentially hostile states and by non-state actors, including
terrorists, is harder than some popular literature seems to suggest.
That said, potential adversaries are pursuing such programs, and the
threat that the United States and our allies face is growing in
breadth and sophistication.
-- Second, we are trying to get ahead of those challenges by
increasing the resources devoted to biological and chemical weapons
and by forging new partnerships with experts outside the national
security community.
-- Third, many of our efforts may not have substantial impact on our
intelligence capabilities for months or even years. There are, and
there will remain, significant gaps in our knowledge. As I have said
before, there is continued and growing risk of surprise.
About a dozen states, including several hostile to Western democracies
-- Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria -- now either possess or
are actively pursuing offensive biological and chemical capabilities
for use against their perceived enemies, whether internal or external.
Some countries are pursuing an asymmetric warfare capability and see
biological and chemical weapons as a viable means to counter
overwhelming U.S. conventional military superiority. Other states are
pursuing BW programs for counterinsurgency use and tactical
applications in regional conflicts, increasing the probability that
such conflicts will be deadly and destabilizing.
Beyond state actors, there are a number of terrorist groups seeking to
develop or acquire biological and chemical weapons capabilities. Some
such groups -- like Usama bin Ladin's -- have international networks,
adding to uncertainty and the danger of a surprise attack. There are
fewer constraints on non-state actors than on state actors. Adding to
the unpredictability are the "lone militants," or the ad hoc groups
here at home and abroad who may try to conduct a biological and
chemical weapons attack. Nor should we forget that biological weapons
attacks need not be directed only at humans. Plant and animal
pathogens may be used against agricultural targets, creating both
potential economic devastation and the possibility that a criminal
group might seek to exploit such an attack for economic advantage.
One disturbing trend that numbers alone do not reveal is that BW
programs in particular are becoming more dangerous in a number of
ways.
-- First: As deadly as they now are, BW agents could become even more
sophisticated. Rapid advances in biotechnology present the prospect of
a new array of toxins or live agents that require new detection
methods, preventative measures, and treatments. And on the chemical
side, there is a growing risk that new and difficult-to-combat agents
will become available to hostile countries or sub-national groups.
-- Second: BW programs are becoming more self-sufficient, challenging
our detection and deterrence efforts, and limiting our interdiction
opportunities. Iran, for example -- driven in part by stringent
international export controls -- is acquiring the ability to
domestically produce raw materials and equipment to support indigenous
biological agent production.
-- Third: Countries are taking advantage of denial and deception
techniques, concealing and protecting BW and CW programs. BW in
particular lends itself to concealment because of its overlap with
legitimate research and commercial biotechnology. The technologies
used to prolong our lives and improve our standard of living can quite
easily be adapted to cause mass casualties. Even supposedly
"legitimate" facilities can readily conduct clandestine BW research
and can convert rapidly to agent production, providing a mobilization
or "breakout" capability.
-- Fourth: Advances are occurring in dissemination techniques,
delivery options, and strategies for BW and CW use. We are concerned
that countries are acquiring advanced technologies to design, test,
and produce highly effective munitions and sophisticated delivery
systems.
Nuclear Proliferation
Turning now to nuclear proliferation, the growing threat is
underscored by developments in South Asia, where both India and
Pakistan are developing more advanced nuclear weapons and moving
towards deployment of significant nuclear arsenals.
Iran also aspires to have nuclear weapons and Iraq probably has not
given up its unclear ambitions despite a decade of sanctions and
inspections.
Nor dare we assume that North Korea is out of the business just
because the Agreed Framework froze Pyongyang's ability to produce
additional plutonium at Yongbang.
Nuclear Security and Smuggling
I would like to turn now to a discussion of the problem of nuclear
security and smuggling. We are concerned about the potential for
states and terrorists to acquire plutonium, highly-enriched uranium,
other fissile materials, and even complete nuclear weapons.
Acquisition of any of the critical components of a nuclear weapons
development program -- weapons technology, engineering know-how, and
weapons-usable material -- would seriously shorten the time needed to
produce a viable weapon.
-- Iran or Iraq could quickly advance their nuclear aspirations
through covert acquisition of fissile material or relevant technology.
The list of potential proliferators with nuclear weapons ambitions is
not limited to states, however. Some non-state actors, such as
separatist and terrorist groups, have expressed an interest in
acquiring nuclear or radiological weapons.
Fortunately, despite press reports claiming numerous instances of
nuclear materials trafficking, we have no evidence that any fissile
materials have actually been acquired by a terrorist organization. We
also have no indication of state-sponsored attempts to arm terrorist
organizations with the capability to use any type of nuclear materials
in a terrorist attack. That said, there is a high risk that some such
transfers could escape detection and we must remain vigilant.
Similarly, we have no evidence that large, organized crime groups with
established structures and international connections are -- as yet --
involved in the smuggling of nuclear materials. It is the potential
that such involvement may occur, or may be ongoing -- yet undetected
-- that continues to be a concern.
Suppliers Of WMD Technology
Let us now look at the countries who are the suppliers of WMD-related
weapons technology.
Russian and Chinese assistance to proliferant countries has merited
particular attention for several years. Last year, Russia announced
new controls on transfers of missile-related technology. There have
been some positive signs in Russia's performance, especially in regard
to transfers of missile technology to Iran. Still, expertise and
materiel from Russia has continued to assist the progress of several
states.
The China story is a mixed picture. China has taken steps to improve
its nonproliferation posture over the last few years through its
commitments to multilateral arms control regimes and promulgation of
export controls, but it remains a key supplier of WMD-related
technologies to developing countries.
There is little positive that can be said about North Korea, the third
major global proliferator, whose incentive to engage in such behavior
increases as its economy continues to decline. Successes in the
control of missile technology -- for example, through the Missile
Technology Control Regime -- have created a market for countries like
North Korea to exploit illicit avenues for conducting sales activities
in this area. Missiles, and related technology and know-how, are North
Korean products for which there is a real market. North Korea's sales
of such products over the years have dramatically heightened the
missile capabilities of countries such as Iran and Pakistan.
While Russia, China, and North Korea continue to be the main suppliers
of ballistic missiles and related technology, long-standing recipients
-- such as Iran -- might become suppliers in their own right as they
develop domestic production capabilities. Other countries that today
import missile-related technology, such as Syria and Iraq, also may
emerge in the next few years as suppliers.
Over the near term, we expect that most of their exports will be of
shorter range ballistic missile-related equipment, components, and
materials. But, as their domestic infrastructures and expertise
develop, they will be able to offer a broader range of technologies
that could include longer-range missiles and related technology.
-- Iran in the next few years may be able to supply not only complete
Scuds, but also Shahab-3s and related technology, and perhaps even
more-advanced technologies if Tehran continues to receive assistance
from Russia, China, and North Korea.
Mr. Chairman, the problem may not be limited to missile sales; we also
remain very concerned that new or nontraditional nuclear suppliers
could emerge from this same pool.
Potential for Surprise
This brings me to a new area of discussion: that more than ever we
risk substantial surprise. This is not for a lack of effort on the
part of the Intelligence Community; it results from significant effort
on the part of proliferators.
There are four main reasons. First and most important, proliferators
are showing greater proficiency in the use of denial and deception.
Second, the growing availability of dual-use technologies is making it
easier for proliferators to obtain the materials they need.
Third, the potential for surprise is exacerbated by the growing
capacity of countries seeking WMD to import talent that can help them
make dramatic leaps on things like new chemical and biological agents
and delivery systems. In short, they can buy the expertise that
confers the advantage of technological surprise.
-- Scientists with transferable know-how continue to leave the former
Soviet Union, some potentially for destinations of proliferation
concern.
-- As you know, plugging this "brain drain" and helping provide
alternative work for the former Soviet Union's WMD infrastructure and
key scientists are key goals of US nonproliferation policy, as well as
a variety of US and international cooperation programs with Russia and
other former Soviet states.
Finally, the accelerating pace of technological progress makes
information and technology easier to obtain and in more advanced forms
than when the weapons were initially developed.
We are making progress against these problems, Mr. Chairman, but I
must tell you that the hill is getting steeper every year.
TERRORISM
Let me now turn to another threat with worldwide reach -- terrorism.
Since July 1998, working with foreign governments worldwide, we have
helped to render more than two dozen terrorists to justice. More than
half were associates of Usama Bin Ladin's Al-Qa'ida organization.
These renditions have shattered terrorist cells and networks, thwarted
terrorist plans, and in some cases even prevented attacks from
occurring.
Although 1999 did not witness the dramatic terrorist attacks that
punctuated 1998, our profile in the world and thus our attraction as a
terrorist target will not diminish any time soon.
We are learning more about the perpetrators every day, Mr. Chairman,
and I can tell you that they are a diverse lot motivated by many
causes.
Usama Bin Ladin is still foremost among these terrorists, because of
the immediacy and seriousness of the threat he poses. The connections
between Bin Ladin and the threats uncovered in Jordan, Canada and the
United States during the holidays are still being investigated, but
everything we have learned recently confirms our conviction that he
wants to strike further blows against America. Despite these and other
well-publicized disruptions, we believe he could still strike without
additional warning. Indeed, Usama Bin Ladin's organization and other
terrorist groups are placing increased emphasis on developing
surrogates to carry out attacks in an effort to avoid detection. For
example, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) is linked closely to Bin
Ladin's organization and has operatives located around the world --
including in Europe, Yemen, Pakistan, Lebanon, and Afghanistan. And,
there is now an intricate web of alliances among Sunni extremists
worldwide, including North Africans, radical Palestinians, Pakistanis,
and Central Asians.
I am also very concerned about the continued threat Islamic extremist
groups pose to the Middle East Peace Process. The Palestinian
rejectionist groups, HAMAS (Islamic Resistance Movement) and PIJ
(Palestine Islamic Jihad), as well as Lebanese Hizballah continue to
plan attacks against Israel aimed at blocking progress in the
negotiations. HAMAS and PIJ have been weakened by Israeli and
Palestinian Authority crackdowns, but remain capable of conducting
large scale attacks. Recent Israeli arrests of HAMAS terrorist
operatives revealed that the group had plans under way for major
operations inside Israel.
Some of these terrorist groups are actively sponsored by national
governments that harbor great antipathy toward the United States.
Although we have seen some dramatic public pressure for liberalization
in Iran, which I will address later, and even some public criticism of
the security apparatus, the fact remains we have yet to find evidence
that the use of terrorism as a political tool by official Iranian
organs has changed since President Khatami took office in August 1997.
Mr. Chairman, we remain concerned that terrorist groups worldwide
continue to explore how rapidly evolving and spreading technologies
might enhance the lethality of their operations. Although terrorists
we've preempted still appear to be relying on conventional weapons, we
know that a number of these groups are seeking chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) agents. We are aware of several
instances in which terrorists have contemplated using these materials.
-- Among them is Bin Ladin, who has shown a strong interest in
chemical weapons. His operatives have trained to conduct attacks with
toxic chemicals or biological toxins.
-- HAMAS is also pursuing a capability to conduct attacks with toxic
chemicals.
Terrorists also are embracing the opportunities offered by recent
leaps in information technology. To a greater and greater degree,
terrorist groups, including Hizballah, HAMAS, the Abu Nidal
organization, and Bin Ladin's al Qa'ida organization are using
computerized files, e-mail, and encryption to support their
operations.
Mr. Chairman, to sum up this part of my briefing, we have had our
share of successes, but I must be frank in saying that this has only
succeeded in buying time against an increasingly dangerous threat. The
difficulty in destroying this threat lies in the fact that our efforts
will not be enough to overcome the fundamental causes of the
phenomenon -- poverty, alienation, disaffection, and ethnic hatreds
deeply rooted in history. In the meantime, constant vigilance and
timely intelligence are our best weapons.
REGIONAL ISSUES
At this point, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to leave the transnational
issues and turn briefly to some of the regions and critical states in
the world.
CHINA
Mr. Chairman, let us begin with China, which has entered the new
century as the world's fastest rising power.
The leadership there is continuing its bold, 20-year-old effort to
propel the nation's economy into the modem world, shedding the
constraints of the old Communist central command system. The economy
is the engine by which China seeks world prestige, global economic
clout, and the funding for new military strength, thereby redressing
what it often proclaims as a hundred years of humiliation at the hands
of Western powers. Domestically, it also was the engine that Deng
Xiaoping and his successors calculated would enable the Party to
deliver on its unspoken social contract with the Chinese people:
monopoly of political power in exchange for a strong China with a
higher standard of living for its citizens.
But events conspired last year to tarnish Beijing's achievements and
to make the leadership generally ill-at-ease:
-- China put on an impressive display of military might at its 50th
anniversary parade in Beijing, but the leadership today sees a growing
technological gap with the West.
-- Inside China, the image of domestic tranquillity was tarnished by
last April's appearance of the Falungong spiritual movement. Their
audacious, surprise demonstration outside the leadership compound
called into question the Communist Party's ability to keep all
"unapproved" civic organizations at bay.
-- Even the return of Macau in late December -- the fall of another
symbol of a divided China -- was overshadowed by the actions of Taiwan
President Lee Tenghui and the continuing controversy over his
assertion that his island's relations with the mainland should be
conducted under the rubric of "state to state" rather than "one
China".
Lee's statement led China to worry that Taiwan's return to Beijing
rule is less likely than before and Beijing remains unwilling to
renounce the use of force.
As you know, last Saturday Chen Shui-bian was elected President on
Taiwan in a closely fought contest. Beijing issued a White Paper a
month before the election to press the new President into retreating
from Lee's statement and return to a mutually agreeable consensus on
one-China. The Chinese also wanted to try to warn him against
extending the political distance from reunification. So far Beijing's
reaction has been restrained. Chinese leaders have stated since Chen's
election that they have a "wait and see" attitude and both sides have
traded public statements regarding their own views of the basis for
resuming the cross-strait dialogue.
Although Beijing today still lacks the air and sealift capability to
successfully invade Taiwan:
-- China has been increasing the size and sophistication of its forces
arrayed along the Strait, most notably by deploying short-range
ballistic missiles.
-- China received the first of two modern, Russian-built Sovremennyy
destroyers last month. The ship joined the East Sea Fleet, which
regularly conducts operations near Taiwan.
In the coming year, we expect to see an uncertain Chinese leadership
launching the nation deeper into the uncharted waters of economic
reform while trying to retain tight political control. Thus far,
Beijing's approach has largely succeeded. But the question remains
open whether, in the long run, a market economy and an authoritarian
regime can co-exist successfully.
(will be con't) |
