(con't) CIA Tenet Outlines Threats to National Security...INDIA-PAKISTAN
Mr. Chairman, let us now move from the China-Taiwan rivalry to the
deep-seated competition between India and Pakistan. Mr. Chairman, last
spring, the two countries narrowly averted a full-scale war in
Kashmir, which could have escalated to the nuclear level.
-- Since then, changes in government in both countries have added new
tensions to the picture. The October coup in Pakistan that brought to
power Gen. Musharraf -- who served as Army chief during the Kargil
conflict with India last summer -- has reinforced New Delhi's
suspicion about Islamabad's intentions.
-- Pakistanis are equally suspicious of India's newly elected
coalition government in which Hindu nationalists hold significant
sway.
Clearly, the dispute over Kashmir remains a potential flashpoint.
-- We are particularly concerned that heavy fighting continued through
the winter, unlike in the past.
-- Both sides are postured in a way that could lead to more intense
engagements later this year.
-- Thus, Mr. Chairman, our concern persists that antagonisms in South
Asia could still produce a more dangerous conflict on the
subcontinent.
RUSSIA
Now moving to Russia: as you know, we are now in the post-Yeltsin era,
and difficult choices loom for the new president Russians will choose
on Sunday (26 March):
He will face three fundamental questions:
-- First, will he keep Russia moving toward further consolidation of
its new democracy or will growing public sentiment in favor of a
strong hand and a yearning for order tempt him to Slow down or even
reverse course?
-- Second, will he try to build a consensus on quickening the pace of
economic reform and expanding efforts to integrate into global markets
-- some Russian officials favor this -- or will he rely on heavy state
intervention to advance economic goals?
-- Finally, will Moscow give priority to a cooperative relationship
with the West or will anti-US sentiments take root, leading to a
Russia that is isolated, frustrated, and hostile? This would increase
the risk of an unintended confrontation, which would be particularly
dangerous as Russia increasingly relies on nuclear weapons for its
defense -- an emphasis reflected most recently in its new national
security concept.
-- As these questions indicate, a new Russian President will inherit a
country in which much has been accomplished -- but in which much still
needs to be done to fully transform its economy, ensure that democracy
is deeply rooted, and establish a clear future direction for it in the
world outside Russia.
Russian polls suggest that Acting President Putin will win the 26
March election; the only possible wrinkle is voter turnout, since a 50
percent turnout is needed to validate the election. Putin appears
tough and pragmatic, but it is far from clear what he would do as
president. If he can continue to consolidate elite and popular
support, as president he may gain political capital that he could
choose to spend on moving Russia further along the path toward
economic recovery and democratic stability.
At least two factors will be pivotal in determining Russia's near-term
trajectory:
-- The conflict in Chechnya: Even though public support for the war
remains high, a protracted guerrilla war could diminish Putin's
popularity over time, and further complicate relations with the US and
Europe.
-- The economy: The devalued ruble, increased world oil prices, and a
favorable trade balance fueled by steeply reduced import levels have
allowed Moscow to actually show some economic growth in the wake of
the August 1998 financial crash. Nonetheless, Russia faces $8 billion
in foreign debt coming due this year. Absent a new IMF deal to
reschedule, Moscow would have to redirect recent gains from economic
growth to pay it down, or run the risk of default.
Over the longer term, the new Russian president must be able to
stabilize the political situation sufficiently to address structural
problems in the Russian economy. He must also be willing to take on
the crime and corruption problem-both of which impede foreign
investment.
In the foreign policy arena, US-Russian relations will be tested on a
number of fronts. Most immediately, Western criticism of the Chechen
war has heightened Russian suspicions about US and Western activity in
neighboring areas, be it energy pipeline decisions involving the
Caucasus and Central Asia, NATO's continuing role in the Balkans, or
NATO's relations with the Baltic states. Moscow's ties to Iran also
will continue to complicate US-Russian relations, as will Russian
objections to US plans for a National Missile Defense. There are,
nonetheless, some issues that could move things in a more positive
direction.
-- For example, Putin and others have voiced support for finalizing
the START II agreement and moving toward further arms cuts in START
III -- though the Russians will want US reaffirmation of the 1972 ABM
treaty in return for start endorsements.
-- Similarly, many Russian officials express a desire to more deeply
integrate Russia into the world economy. The recent deal with the
London Club on Soviet-era debt suggests Putin wants to keep Russia
engaged with key international financial institutions.
One of my biggest concerns -- regardless of the path that Russia
chooses -- remains the security of its nuclear weapons and materials.
Moscow appears to recognize some of its vulnerabilities; indeed,
security seemed to have been tightened somewhat during the Chechen
conflict. But economic difficulties and pervasive criminality and
corruption throughout Russia potentially weaken the reliability of
nuclear personnel.
With regard to its nuclear weapons, Moscow appears to be maintaining
adequate security and control, but we remain concerned by reports of
lax discipline, labor strikes, poor morale, and criminal activities.
-- An unauthorized launch or accidental use of a Russian nuclear
weapon is unlikely as long as current technical and procedural
safeguards built into the command and control system remain in place.
With regard to its nuclear material: Russia's nuclear material is
dispersed among many facilities involved in the nuclear fuel cycle --
more than 700 buildings at more than 100 known facilities. Its
physical security and personnel reliability vary greatly Security at
weapons production facilities is better than at most research
laboratories and buildings at fuel fabrication facilities that have
not received physical security upgrades.
-- There are few known cases of seizures of weapons-usable nuclear
material since 1994. This may be due to several factors: US assistance
to improve security at Russian facilities, a possible decrease in
smuggling, or smugglers becoming more knowledgeable about evading
detection. Our analysts assess that undetected smuggling has occurred,
although we don't know the extent or magnitude of the undetected
thefts.
Iran
Turning now to Iran -- the recent landslide victory for reformers in
parliamentary elections, Mr. Chairman, tell us that further change in
Iran is inevitable. The election of President Khatami in 1997 was the
first dramatic sign of the popular desire for change in Iran. Khatami
has used this mandate to put Iran on a path to a more open society.
This path will be volatile at times as the factions struggle to
control the pace and direction of political change.
A key indicator that the battle over change is heating up came last
July when student protests erupted in 18 Iranian cities for several
days. The coming year promises to be just as contentious with a new
pro-reform Majles (Parliament) convening in late May or early June.
-- The first round of the Majles elections in February gave resounding
endorsement to the reformists who gained an absolute majority of the
148 seats in the 290 seat Majles, with 65 more seats to be decided in
April runoffs. Many Iranians, particularly the large cohort of restive
youth, will demand that the reformers carry out their mandate for
change.
-- The reformists' success in advancing their agenda will depend on
their ability to keep their center-left coalition together and to
maintain party discipline in the Majles; historically, Iranian parties
have tended to splinter and dissipate their strength.
-- The course of political change in Iran will also depend on what
lessons the Iranian conservatives take from their electoral defeat.
Some claim to have gotten the message that they must change with the
times, but the recent assassination attempt on a prominent reformist
politician in Tehran suggests some elements are still wedded to the
politics of terror.
-- We worry that conservatives also might try to reverse their losses
by invalidating some election results. In fact, they have already done
so in three cities already. The isolated protests that this caused
suggests that any further effort to overturn the Majles elections
nationwide would be sure to send people into the streets.
With control of the Majles and a mandate for change, the reformists
are likely to introduce an ambitious slate of reform legislation. But
all legislation must be approved by the conservative-dominated Council
of Guardians before it can become law, providing hardliners an
opportunity to water down many of the reforms. Supreme Leader Khamenei
and key institutions such as the Revolutionary Guard Corps and the
large parastatal foundations also are outside the authority of the
Majles and in a position to fight a stubborn rearguard against
political change.
-- Moreover, even as the Iranians digest the results of the Majles
elections, the factions will begin preliminary maneuvering for the
presidential election scheduled for mid-2001, which is almost certain
to keep the domestic political scene unsettled.
-- The conservatives will have to be careful, however, because if they
overplay their hand they run a risk of radicalizing young Iranians
already impatient at the pace of political and social change.
Iraq
With regard to Iraq, Saddam faced a difficult start in 1999 --
including the most serious Shia unrest since 1991 and significant
economic difficulties.
-- The Shia unrest was not confined to the south but also affected
some areas of Baghdad itself, presenting Saddam's regime with a major
security problem. On the economic side, to rein in inflation,
stabilize the dinar, and reduce the budget deficit, Saddam was forced
to raise taxes, ease foreign exchange controls, and cut non-wage
public spending.
Saddam has, however, shown himself to be politically agile enough to
weather these challenges. He brutally suppressed the Shia uprisings of
last spring and early summer. The regime is still gaining some revenue
from illegal oil sales. Increased access to food and medical supplies
through the oil for food program has improved living conditions in
Baghdad.
A major worry is Iraqi repair of facilities damaged during Operation
Desert Fox that could be associated with WMD programs. Without
inspections, it is harder to gauge Saddam's programs, but we assume he
continues to attach high priority to preserving a WMD infrastructure.
And Iraq's conventional military remains one of the largest in the
Middle East, even though it is now less than half the size during the
Gulf War.
-- He can still hurt coalition forces, but his military options are
sharply limited to actions like sporadically challenging no-fly-zone
enforcement.
In sum, to the extent that Saddam has had any successes in the last
year, they have been largely tactical. In a strategic sense, he is
still on a downward path. His economic infrastructure continues to
deteriorate, the Kurdish-inhabited northern tier remains outside the
grip of his army, and although many governments are sympathetic to the
plight of the Iraqi people, few if any are willing to call Saddam an
ally.
THE BALKANS
Mr. Chairman, looking briefly at the Balkans --
There are a few signs of positive long-term change are beginning to
emerge there as a new, more liberal government takes the reins of
power in Croatia. Political alternatives to the dominant ethnic
parties in Bosnia also are beginning to develop, capitalizing on the
vulnerability of old-line leaders to charges of corruption and
economic mismanagement. Despite this progress, there is still a long
way to go before the Balkans move beyond the ethnic hatreds and
depressed economies that have produced so much turmoil and tragedy. Of
the many threats to peace and stability in the-year ahead, the
greatest remains Slobodan Milosevic -- the world's only sitting
president indicted for crimes against humanity.
Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, I must tell you that Milosevic's hold on
power has not been seriously shaken in the past few months. He retains
control of the security forces, military commands, and an effective
media machine. His inner circle remains loyal or at least cowed. The
political opposition has not yet developed a strategy to capitalize on
public anger with Milosevic.
Milosevic is still struggling, however, with serious economic
problems. The Serbian economy is in a virtual state of collapse, and
Serbia is now the poorest country in Europe. Inflation and
unemployment are rising, and the country is struggling to repair the
damage to its infrastructure from NATO air strikes. The average wage
is only $48 a month and even these salaries typically are several
months in arrears. Basic subsistence is guaranteed only by unofficial
economic activity and the traditional lifeline between urban dwellers
and their relatives on the farms.
-- Milosevic's captive media are trying -- with some success -- to
blame these troubles on the air strikes and on international
sanctions. Nonetheless, as time passes, we believe the people will
increasingly hold Milosevic responsible. Moreover, a sudden,
unforeseen economic catastrophe, such as hyperinflation or a breakdown
of the patched-up electric grid, could lead to mass demonstrations
that would pose a real threat to him.
Tensions are escalating, meanwhile, between Milosevic and Montenegrin
President Djukanovic, who has taken a variety of steps that break ties
to the federal government. Milosevic has used Yugoslav forces to block
Djukanovic's actions and to implement a strategy of gradual economic
strangulation, cutting off many of Montenegro's trading routes to
Serbia and the outside world, with the aim of forcing Djukanovic to
back down or take confrontational action that would justify FRY
military intervention.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, Milosevic wants to crush Djukanovic because
he serves as an important symbol to the democratic opposition in
Serbia and to the Serbian people that the regime can be successfully
challenged. Djukanovic controls the largest independent media
operation in Yugoslavia, which has strongly criticized the Milosevic
regime over the past several years for the Kosovo conflict, political
repression and official corruption. Both Milosevic and Djukanovic will
try to avoid serious confrontation for now, but a final showdown will
be difficult to avoid.
Kosovo
Regarding Kosovo, Mr. Chairman, the international presence has managed
to restore a semblance of peace, but it is brittle. The UN Mission in
Kosovo and KFOR accomplished much but have been unable to stop daily
small-scale attacks, mostly by Kosovar Albanians against ethnic Serbs.
This chronic violence has caused most of the remaining 80,000-100,000
Serbs to congregate in enclaves in northern and eastern Kosovo, and
they are organizing self defense forces.
The campaign to disarm and disband the former Kosovo Liberation Army
has had success, but both sides continue to cache small arms and other
ordnance. There is even a chance that fighting between 'Belgrade's
security forces and ethnic Albanians will reignite should Belgrade
continue to harass and intimidate the Albanian minority in southern
Serbia, and should Kosovo Albanian extremists attempt to launch an
insurgency aimed at annexing southern Serbia into a greater Kosovo.
NORTH KOREA
Mr. Chairman, let me now turn to North Korea. North Korea's propaganda
declares 1999 the "year of the great turnaround." This is a view not
supported by my analysts, however. Indeed, we see a North Korea
continuing to suffer from serious economic problems, and we see a
population, perhaps now including the elite, that is losing confidence
in the regime. Mr. Chairman, sudden, radical, and possibly dangerous
change remains a real possibility in North Korea, and that change
could come at any time.
The North Korean economy is in dire straits. Industrial operations
remain low. The future outlook is clouded by industrial facilities
that are nearly beyond repair after years of underinvestment, spare
parts shortages, and poor maintenance.
-- This year's harvest is more than 1 million tons short of minimum
grain needs. International food aid has again been critical in meeting
the population's minimum food needs.
-- Trade is also down. Exports to Japan -- the North's most important
market -- fell by 17 percent from $111 million to $92 million. Trade
with China -- the North's largest source of imports -- declined from
nearly $200 million to about $160 million, primarily because China
delivered less grain.
Kim Chong-il does not appear to have an effective long-term strategy
for reversing his country's economic fortunes. Kim's inability to meet
the basic needs of his people and his reliance on coercion makes his
regime more brittle because even minor instances of defiance have
greater potential to snowball into wider anti-regime actions.
-- Instead of real reform, North Korea's strategy is to garner as much
aid as possible from overseas, and the North has reenergized its
global diplomacy to this end. It is negotiating for a high-level visit
to reciprocate Dr. Perry's trip to P'yongyang. It has agreed to
diplomatic talks with Japan for the first time in several years. It
has unprecedented commercial contacts with South Korea, including a
tourism deal with a South Korean firm that will provide almost $1
billion over six years.
-- But P'yongyang's maneuvering room will be constrained by Kim's
perception that openness threatens his control and by the
contradictions inherent in his overall strategy -- a strategy based on
hinting at concessions on the very weapons programs that he has
increasingly come to depend on for leverage in the international
arena.
Squaring these circles will require more diplomatic agility than Kim
has yet to demonstrate in either the domestic or international arenas.
COLOMBIA
Mr. Chairman, let me now return to our own hemisphere to discuss one
final area: Colombia.
Of President Pastrana's many challenges, one of the most daunting is
how to end the decades- old war with the FARC insurgents. There is
some good news here. The FARC lacks the military strength and popular
support needed to topple the government. And since last year, the
Colombian armed forces have begun to improve their performance, making
better use of air power to foil large-scale insurgent attacks.
-- The bad news is that the hundreds of millions of dollars the FARC
earns annually through its involvement in the illicit drug trade and
other criminal activity make the group an enduring and potent security
threat. It has greatly expanded its control in rural areas in recent
years and steadily improved its battlefield performance. In many parts
of Colombia the military remains in a defensive posture, as hardline
insurgents and illegal paramilitary groups struggle for control of the
hinterlands.
Meanwhile, the long-standing pattern in which Colombian guerrillas
both talk and fight is continuing.
-- The peace process with the FARC -- to which the Pastrana government
is firmly committed -- is proceeding, albeit slowly. The two sides
recently agreed on a negotiating agenda, but most observers expect
progress to be difficult. The FARC has refused to disarm or halt its
attacks while negotiations are underway.
-- Pastrana must also contend with other armed groups, such as the
smaller ELN insurgency and illegal paramilitary groups. Each of these
insist on a role in any final settlement. A dialogue with the ELN
appears to be setting the stage for substantive talks, but the
government continues to refuse to negotiate with the paramilitaries.
Colombia is starting to recover from an economic recession -- its
worst ever -- but still suffers from record unemployment and a fiscal
deficit that constrains spending on the military and development
programs aimed at pacifying the countryside and weaning farmers from
coca cultivation. Opinion polls indicate that the Colombian public
worries most about the economy and disapproves of the government's
austerity program.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, this has been a long briefing, and I'd like to get to
your specific questions on these and other subjects. Before doing so,
I would just sum it up this way: the fact that we are arguably the
world's most powerful nation does not bestow invulnerability; in fact,
it may make us a larger target for those who don't share our
interests, values, or beliefs. We must take care to be on guard,
watching our every step, and looking far ahead. Let me assure you that
our Intelligence Community is well prepared to do that.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Now, I'd welcome any questions from you and
your colleagues.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: usinfo.state.gov)
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