However, the "dimpled chad" standard was just irresponsible and completely arbitrary in
nature. And assessing votes for one candidate or the other based upon such arbitrary
analysis of the ballots dilutes and subverts the votes of those individuals who did follow
instructions and properly cast legal votes.
Had there been an existing precedent and standard for counting dimpled chads in Florida,
then I might have looked differently on the issue. But there wasn't, and to create such a
standard on flimsy evidence that Illinois once ruled and then rejected dimpled chads, is just
beyond comprehension.
See, Ron, there's a kernel of explanation in what you wrote. If the USSC had said what you said, I could accept that. But the closest thing to an explanation in the decision was this:
The question before the Court is not whether local entities,
in the exercise of their expertise, may develop different
systems for implementing elections. Instead, we are
presented with a situation where a state court with the
power to assure uniformity has ordered a statewide recount
with minimal procedural safeguards. When a court orders a
statewide remedy, there must be at least some assurance
that the rudimentary requirements of equal treatment and
fundamental fairness are satisfied...
The contest provision, as it was
mandated by the State Supreme Court, is not well
calculated to sustain the confidence that all citizens must
have in the outcome of elections. The State has not shown
that its procedures include the necessary safeguards.
What that sounds like to me is "Don't ask me to draw a bright line for equal protection. I know it when I see it and this ain't it." Well, that's not good enough! If they're going to overturn a state supreme court in a matter as important as this, particularly when they're supposed to be, by conservative judicial philosophy, disinclined to second-guess, they ought to be quite specific about why they chose to do so.
One of the things I do for a living is write national policy which is then implemented locally. Sometimes I write it in broad, philosophic terms with general objectives and leave it to the localities to figure out how to implement. Sometimes I write very specific procedures, timetables, forms, reporting requirements, etc. It just depends on how much latitude is appropriate for that particular matter. That's a conscious strategy.
When the Florida legislature wrote the standard of "intent of the voter" with no specifics, I presume that they intended, or at least expected, that they would get a lot of variety of interpretation from county to county. Since the USSC says that what the Florida legislature says, goes, then the USSC is compelled to accept the variety that results from legislation that is very general. If the legislature wanted to specify how chad would be handled, they could have done so. But they didn't, so I infer that the legislature intended for counties to do their own thing.
Particularly given that our USSC prides itself on its aversion to judicial activism, I think we're entitled to a better explanation from them of why what Florida did was beyond the pale. I appreciate your efforts to explain it, and I expect lots of talking heads to do the same, but I'm very disappointed in the USSC for not doing it. It's their job to express themselves so that people like me, who are reasonably bright and willing to listen, are clear on why they felt compelled to do what they did.
Karen |
