<<what you do is calculate the net present value of the likely future value of
the free cash flow streams and then do one monster debt for equity swap.Clean as a whistle, the public
bondholders can get appraisal rights and do not need to participate. I am confident the required majority of
debtholders is in place to effect the transaction. Then you do a rights offering at the same price as the
"intrinsic value" of the common to get you to cash flow breakeven, Q,VOD backstops it and waala, we are
onto the next phase.>>
This is a scenario that makes sense to me, but I have a few questions:
First, what do you mean by "the public
bondholders can get appraisal rights and do not need to participate"?
Second, what, in your understanding is the "required majority of
debtholders?" 51%? 67%? or what? and does that percentage of bondholders have to agree, or that percentage of all debt? As you probably know, Loal + Qualcomm are debt holders to the tune of 1.3B$ or so, that ranks, I believe "pari pasu" with the bonds. btw, there was an interesting, somewhat related, article in a recent WSJ about Reliance Holdings (which BLS is also involved in as an active board member.) Gist of the article was that Carl Icahn, who currently owns about 30% of the firm's bonds is trying to round up another 3%. According to the article, it only takes 1/3 of the bond to veto rights over a reorg.
Finally, how do you see the G* preferred (of which Loral owns 150M$ face amount) being treated in this scenario? |
