Pcstel, this is a good discussion you have started, but my read of the bond indenture is that the rights of the nolders of the Series A and B senior notes (these are the bonds, not be confused with other senior debt) to force bankruptcy is independent of the rights to force BK of other holders of senior debt. Pari passu relates to the equal priority of all senior debt holders in the distribution of assets in the event of BK.
My take on the end game is a bit different. As you have identified, in terms of controlling the creditors committe, Q and LOR will call the shots, with the bondholders (Series A and B Senior Note holders) getting the same pro-rata share as Q and LOR do with respect to Q and LOR senior debt.
To me this means that the likely scenario is that all the equity partners of GLP will be reduced to de minimus value. This means GSTRF equity, LOR equity, Q equity, and all the elephant turd SP's who invested in equity.
The senior debt holders, Q, LOR, and the bondholders will accept some combination of equity and debt in the reorganization plan, or, if the system is sold, will pro-rata share in the proceeds. Again, as the drivers of the creditors committee, Q and LOR will have a great deal of power in getting the rest of the creditors to go along.
Blackstone is trying to do pro-formas to show the future bankruptcy judge why GLP should be reorganized versus liquidated.
All of course simply my considered opinion. The light bulb came on the day LOR bot the BoA loan to GLP. I've read the bond indentures also. <snooze> |
