Political landscape in Indonesia
mad2
Jakarta’s Evolving Political Landscape
15 February 2001
Summary
Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid continues to face a barrage of calls for his resignation or a reduction in his power. The ongoing political infighting is symptomatic of the plethora of parties and agendas among Indonesia’s elite. The latest series of demonstrations, however, have heightened the rivalry among various Islamic factions. This may spur the Indonesian military to take action in order to avoid widespread social unrest and offer an opportunity for nationalist forces to gain greater power.
Analysis
Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid visited the national police headquarters in Java and the Indonesian Military Academy in Magelang Feb. 14 amid continued public and political calls for his resignation. During the visits, Wahid suggested changes in the structure of the national police and called for a strong and professional military to ensure against national disintegration. With potential impeachment procedures looming, Wahid is looking to demonstrate he still has the support of the Indonesian armed forces.
As Wahid clearly understands, support of the Indonesian armed forces remains the key to formulating a stable national government. Indonesia’s political spectrum is a mix of various Islamic and nationalist forces, most circling around populist figures. It is the military alone, however, that retains a nationwide organizational network. Further, while the military has determined to remain on the fringe of Indonesian politics, it has also chosen to ensure the stability and security of the Indonesian Republic as primary on its agenda.
While Indonesia has dozens of political parties, four key parties are at the center of Indonesia’s politics – in addition to the military. The two key Islamic parties are Wahid’s National Awakening Party (PKB) and National Assembly Speaker Amien Rais’ National Mandate Party (PAN). The top nationalist secular parties are Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri’s Indonesian Democratic Struggle Party (PDI-P) and lower house speaker Akbar Tandjung’s Golkar Party.
On Feb. 1, Indonesia’s parliament met to determine what action to take over a special committee report that said Wahid “could be suspected of involvement” in two multimillion-dollar scandals. While the parliament overwhelmingly voted to censure the president, the military and PDI-P quickly struck down attempts by Wahid’s rival Rais to accelerate impeachment proceedings. Both the military and PDI-P identified the gambit as destabilizing and unconstitutional.
National Assembly Speaker Amien Rais, President Abdurrahman Wahid and Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri pose for journalists in Jakarta, Aug. 7, 2000.
The parliamentary debate, which sparked massive public demonstrations from supporters and opponents of Wahid, exemplified the factional makeup of Indonesia’s political system. These latest attempts to oust Wahid, however, reveal that beyond the split between Islamic and secular forces lies a deep-seated split within the Islamic community itself.
Wahid, on one hand, is a conservative Islamic scholar and the former leader of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia’s largest Islamic organization. Wahid’s support lies within the NU ranks, many of whom have taken to the streets recently to show support for their aging mentor. Moreover, Wahid’s conservative attitudes have allowed him to deal with all sectors of the Indonesian elite.
Rais, on the other hand, is the former leader of the Muhammadiyah, Indonesia’s second-largest Islamic organization, from whence he still draws his support. Rais has long played second fiddle to the more moderate Wahid and represents a more fundamentalist form of Islam. He has tacitly supported the Laskar Jihad, an Islamic militia taking part in secular fighting in Indonesia’s Maluku province. In addition, Muhammadiyah has taken steps to move away from the Indonesian principle of Pancasila – a national principle of unity irrespective of religion.
Rais has also been at the center of loose coalitions of Islamic parties in the parliament. His “Central Axis” was instrumental in gaining Wahid the presidency, while the “Reform Faction,” comprising PAN, the Justice Party (PK) and the Umat Sovereignty Party (PDU), has led the calls for an accelerated impeachment process against Wahid.
Between these two extremes lies a third faction of the Islamic community, nominally represented by the United Development Party (PPP), one of just three legal Indonesian parties under former President Suharto. According to sources in Indonesia, membership of the NU is split between diehard supporters of Wahid and those who prefer a less erratic Islamic leadership.
During the run-up to Indonesia’s first democratic elections in 1999, members of the PPP often clashed with supporters of PKB and PAN. The PPP was one of the five top political parties in the 1999 general election and an initial partner in a power-sharing deal brokered by Wahid. Just months after taking office, however, Wahid fired PPP leader Hamzah Haz from his position as coordinating minister of social welfare and poverty alleviation.
With the current struggle in Indonesia’s politics a battle between Islamic factions, more secular parties are taking a cautious approach. While most parliamentary factions voted in favor of censure, few have supported calls for the president’s early impeachment. Citing the constitution, they argue Wahid has three months to respond to the initial censure and if his response is deemed inadequate another censure can be issued. One month later, if Wahid’s response is still found unsatisfactory, impeachment proceedings can ensue.
Parties like Megawati’s PDI-P fear setting a precedent of extraconstitutional changes in Indonesia’s fledgling democracy. While Megawati and Indonesia’s military, which also opposed the early impeachment, are dissatisfied with Wahid's apparently random ruling style, they are not prepared for or capable of taking power from him.
This is not to say Megawati or Indonesia’s military will sit back and allow the street protests to evolve into something more dangerous. Rather, they are waiting for conditions to ripen for a smooth transition of power. While Rais is leading the charge to rapidly oust Wahid, Megawati needs Wahid’s support for her own presidential ambitions. As the ongoing pro-Wahid demonstrations in East Java indicate, supporters of the president have little aversion to taking their case to the streets.
Since Suharto’s fall, the Indonesian elite have struggled between more secular nationalist forces, like Megawati, the military and Golkar, and the Islamic factions. Wahid’s attempts at a national reconciliation Cabinet were quickly dashed, as internal squabbles kept the government from accomplishing anything. Wahid’s later attempts to consolidate power around himself were met with stiff resistance from other political leaders, and without their support, he was unable to take on a more autocratic style of rule that had guaranteed Indonesia’s territorial integrity for decades.
Wahid’s failure to consolidate the elite around his rule has left the political elite shifting alliances and vying for power. While each faction looks for ways to pull Wahid down and replace him, none fully trusts the other, allowing Wahid to dodge bullet after bullet. Ultimately though, Indonesia’s armed forces will determine the balance of power.
The military remains the only relatively cohesive nationwide entity in Indonesia. Most of the political factions in parliament have geographically limited support bases, nearly exclusively on Indonesia’s central islands: Bali, Java and Lombok. Further, if the demonstrations get out of hand, it is the police and military that will be responsible for order.
The military faction in Indonesia’s parliament, while supporting the Feb. 1 censure, was quick to say Wahid should be given his full three months to respond. It has regularly reiterated its staunch position to defend the territorial integrity of the republic and the office of the president. This is not a blanket statement of support for Wahid, however. Rather it clearly lays out the armed forces’ key issues of concern – national stability under civilian rule if at all possible.
The military’s priority is stability. In addition, political squabbling in Jakarta may offer an opportunity for separatists in outlying provinces to advance their cause by taking advantage of the confusion. The military, then, must ensure peace in whatever transition of power occurs. At the same time, it must play a careful hand, lest it appear the military is sponsoring a palace coup, something that would trigger more widespread demonstrations and riots as well as the condemnation of the international community.
The military sees a Megawati presidency as the best way to fulfill these goals. While the military has a broad reach across the archipelago and Megawati remains a populist figure, the military and Megawati need an ally from the Muslim community to balance their support base. Neither trusts Rais, whose own presidential ambitions have been apparent for some time. Further, his past support for a referendum in the separatist province of Aceh and tacit support of internal Islamic jihad makes him an unreliable partner for a unified government.
Drawing support from the center Islamic factions, including PPP, may not be a tenable position either. The PPP was long seen as a tool of the Golkar regime to co-opt Indonesia’s Muslims into supporting Suharto. While PPP quickly distanced itself from Golkar in the 1999 elections, its leader Hamzah Haz joined Rais as a speaker at a rally in January 2000 that spawned the Laskar Jihad.
This leaves cooperation with Wahid as the best option for the military and Megawati. Wahid’s age and health offer face-saving ways for the president to step aside and transfer power to Megawati. This will avoid a potential backlash from his supporters who may perceive his actions as coerced.
While Wahid has persevered in the presidency despite coup rumors, scandals and several parliamentary moves to weaken his power or remove him from office, his ability to counter opposition forces may be waning. Cabinet reshuffles and offers of greater responsibility to the vice president have only resulted in temporary reprieves. If the street clashes grow between Wahid supporters and other Islamic and political factions, the military may be forced to intervene.
During his recent visit to the military academy, Wahid said, "People in my generation who have been around 60 years should have to take a rest," according to The Associated Press. Such statements, while clarified by his spokesman as a call to the youth to rise to future challenges, suggest Wahid may be considering his options to avoid a possible confrontation with the military.
Already several ideas have been floated in Indonesian political circles for Wahid to either transfer active government power to Megawati while retaining the presidency or take up the role of “senior minister,” similar to Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew.
Wahid may fulfill his pledge to serve out his term, which ends in 2004, but it will require greater coordination and cooperation with Megawati and the armed forces. Ultimately, however, fractures among the Islamic leaders have triggered the end of their days in power in Indonesia. Nationalist forces, led by Megawati and the military, will once again take control. Megawati will harness Indonesian nationalism – as her father President Sukarno did – to balance patronage of the Islamic elite and Indonesia’s minorities, calling on the unifying structure of the armed forces for support.
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