Putting Korea on Hold
From The Washington Post
"Engagement offers the North the chance to avert economic collapse
by opening its economy to outside investments and free market reforms,
as China did; for South Korea and the United States, it holds the possibility
that one of the world's oldest and most dangerous military standoffs
could be peacefully defused, along with a ballistic missile threat to the United States."
Friday, March 9, 2001; Page A26
THE BUSH administration has applied the brakes to what had been an accelerating effort by the
United States and South Korea to engage with the reclusive Communist government of North Korea.
Over the past two years South Korean President Kim Dae Jung has brought about a breakthrough in relations
with the North and recently had been laying the groundwork for a possible peace declaration by the two Koreas.
Meanwhile, in its last weeks in office the Clinton administration came close to
striking a deal under which North Korea would have given up its production and export of
ballistic missiles in exchange for economic aid and improved relations with the United States.
On Wednesday, President Bush told a disappointed Mr. Kim that he would not, as the Koreans clearly
hoped, pick up the diplomatic process where Mr. Clinton left it. Though he said he supported Mr. Kim's initiatives, Mr. Bush said he was skeptical that verifiable agreements could be made with a state
as secretive and Stalinist as North Korea.
Behind the scenes, his briefers told reporters that a policy review was underway and that no
negotiations with the North would be arranged soon.
The administration has some good reasons for the diplomatic pause. Though there is no evidence
that North Korea has violated the accords it has so far signed, it is unquestionably hard to know
what its military establishment is doing, or even to verify relatively simple questions such as whether
food aid is really delivered to the nation's hungry.
The detente between the two Koreas has not yet led to any change in the North's massive military
deployments along the border, or any apparent relaxation in Pyongyang's repressive rule of its population.
And the Clinton administration's rush to embrace a regime guilty of some of the
world's worst human rights violations and acts of terrorism offered it unprecedented political
recognition, including a visit by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, without sufficient returns.
Still, Kim Dae Jung made a forceful argument here this week for continuing some form of engagement policy.
For years North Korea's relations with the West were limited to extorting aid in exchange for curbing weapons programs; now, Kim Jong Il seems interested in leading a broader opening of his country to the world,
signaled in a recent trip to Shanghai and planned visits to Moscow and Seoul.
Engagement offers the North the chance to avert economic collapse
by opening its economy to outside investments and free market reforms,
as China did; for South Korea and the United States, it holds the possibility that one of the world's
oldest and most dangerous military standoffs could be peacefully defused, along with a ballistic
missile threat to the United States.
The fact that the Bush administration has not yet settled on a policy was evident from the somewhat mixed messages it sent this week. The day before Mr. Bush's downbeat remarks, Secretary of State Colin Powell had said that "some promising elements were left on the table" by the Clinton administration and that "we do plan to engage with North Korea." In fact, there seems no reasonable alternative to a policy that would continue to explore, if more deliberately and cautiously, whether North Korea can be induced to drop its missile programs
while opening itself to the extensive outside inspections that would be needed to ensure compliance.
To reject that path would be to abandon the most hopeful scenario for change on the Korean peninsula, and undercut an initiative by South Korea's president that has already justly earned him the Nobel Peace Prize. It would leave military deterrence, including as-yet undetermined and unproven missile defense systems,
as the only U.S. tool for managing the transformation, or collapse, of the world's last Stalinist state.
Those military means are still needed; BUT SO IS AN ACTIVE DIPLOMACY.
© 2001 The Washington Post Company
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