Why the Gore-Lieberman ticket came up a dud --or how the Transpacific avant-guarde outdid the Transatlantic old guard in the last US Presidential election....
"European Common Foreign, Security and Defense Policies -- Implications for the United States and the Atlantic Alliance"
Statement of
John R. Bolton
Senior Vice President
American Enterprise Institute
Before the
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives
November 10, 1999
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I want to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this morning to testify on the "European Common Foreign, Security, and Defense Policies -- Implications for the United States and the Atlantic Alliance." I will summarize my written statement, and I ask that its full text be received into the record.
SUMMARY
Although I speak as a strong supporter of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, I believe that we would be blinking at reality if we did not agree that the Alliance was at a critical point in its history. Although the causes are complex, and obviously related to recent policy decisions by NATO and its members, two salient points emerge:
First, contrary to the conventional wisdom that the post-Cold War mood in America is inward-looking and isolationist, it is not the United States that is the principal cause of NATO’s dilemma. Instead, it is the ongoing process of the European Union’s political and economic integration -- and the not-so-hidden agendas of many leading European politicians -- that have brought us to this point. We should openly acknowledge that the aim to align the foreign and defense policies of the EU’s members into one shared and uniform policy is at times motivated either by a desire to distance themselves from U.S. influence, or in some cases by openly anti-American intentions.
Second, although we have attempted in recent years to treat the emerging "European Security and Defense Identity" as entirely consistent with and supportive of the Atlantic Alliance, we can no longer realistically accept this analysis. A true ESDI would mean the end of NATO as we know it as a military organization, a fragmentation of trans-Atlantic political cooperation, and could quite possibly spill over into harmful economic conflict as well.
These conclusions are not happy, but neither are they inevitable if the United States, in the very near future, is prepared to step off the slippery slope we have been on for most of the 1990’s. Continuing our present policy of passively acquiescing in the European enterprise for very much longer may make this result inevitable, which is why today’s hearing is so timely and so important. Our upcoming presidential election gives us an excellent opportunity to debate these issues, and we should take full advantage of it.
THE ORIGINS OF THE PROBLEM
To begin, we should recognize the inherent, although long-ignored, conceptual difference between the Marshall Plan and NATO. Although both were launched to resist Soviet expansionism at the Cold War’s outset, and received overwhelming bipartisan support in the U.S., they were perceived differently by many Europeans. While all mainstream European political leaders enthusiastically supported NATO publicly (and still do), many silently objected to the "hegemonistic" role of the United States in the Alliance. While hoping to maintain the American presence, they also desired an independent military capability, manifested initially in the Western European Union, an organization that existed only on paper for most of its history.
For some European theorists, the Marshall Plan was very different. Already seized with the notion of integrating Europe economically to prevent future Continental wars, they saw the massive amounts of American economic assistance as a powerful tool to advance their objectives. Significantly, and without fully understanding the implications, American leaders encouraged -- indeed, insisted -- on close cooperation among the European states. George Marshall himself drove this policy, seeing the benefits to the United States if the Europeans themselves had a major role in allocating aid levels among the recipients. By appearing to defer to European recommendations, Marshall believed that Washington would lessen the inevitable resentment towards it caused by aid levels that never quite matched recipient expectations, and also enhance the efficient use of the
assistance throughout Western Europe.
Inside the Department of State, Marshall’s logic became embedded in the institutional culture. From the 1950’s on, whenever Europeans proposed a new agreement to deepen or broaden their economic cooperation, State was warmly receptive. During the Cold War, at least, one could argue that closer economic integration paralleled and buttressed the political-military cooperation that was simultaneously deepening NATO. Moreover, a "larger" European market produced undoubted economic benefits which were, early on, available to American as well as European businesses. Even today, the official United States view remains entirely supportive, for example, of European Monetary Union, the latest iteration of the "European" vision.
What the State Department has missed, however, is that deeper European economic integration has advanced so far beyond its Marshall Plan roots that U.S. interests are now challenged rather than advanced by "ever-closer union." Indeed, "ever closer union" already threatens NATO. Not only do the political objectives of some EU states increasingly diverge from the United States, but continuing expansion of NATO membership risks making it a less effective military alliance, and more like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Unfortunately, official American policy has either completely missed or consciously ignored these developments.
Broadly speaking, pre-Maastricht, the United States dealt with Europe in a series of bilateral relations, some stronger and closer than others, but all conduction in traditional state-to-state fashion. Some groupings (such as the Nordics and the Benelux countries) on some issues required non-bilateral attention, but multilateral diplomacy was conducted almost exclusively in the NATO context. There, through years of hard bargaining and extensive consultations, a decision-making process developed that
served the members’ needs quite well. (France’s withdrawal from NATO’s command structure and the expulsion of NATO headquarters from Paris, while seemingly aberrant at the time, are now more obviously understood as basic to the Euro-integrationist strategy.)
In virtually all cases in pre-Maastricht days, decision making in the European Communities had very little real impact on the United States. Beginning approximately with the signing of the Maastricht Treaty (and in some cases before), this situation began to change dramatically, and has continued to evolve rapidly since. Through "correspondance européenne" at staff levels, and through seemingly endless consultative meetings at higher levels (including among Ministers), EC members came
increasingly to unified positions before consultations or bargaining began with non-EC members. While now commonplace for Europeans, this practice was initially hard for Americans to understand, and harder still to accept.
Consider the following examples from outside of NATO, but which in the American perspective, nonetheless constitute important changes in the fabric of the Atlantic Alliance:
In G-7 consultations, the four European governments increasingly co-ordinate their positions beforehand, leaving, Canada, Japan and the United States to be confronted with a united front by the European members of the group. Indeed, in trade matters, the G-7 now functions as a G-4, with an EU representative literally and figuratively sitting in the vacant places of the Europeans.
Within the United Nations Security Council, consultations among the United Kingdom, France and the United States reflect less the views of three nation-states, and more frequently the views of the EU and the U.S. Although British diplomats may have been less "communautaires" than their French colleagues earlier on, that difference has narrowed substantially in the last decade.
In other UN organizations, political consensus-building often occurs in discussions within the regional groupings, with the U.S. belonging to the "Western European and Others Group," or "WEOG." In the late 1980’s, EU members of this group unhesitatingly offered their individual national opinions on any topic under discussion. While the country holding the EC presidency might purport to offer the views of the Community as a whole, no other member ever seemed inhibited thereby. By 1992, however, the EU presidency always spoke alone, and indeed, increasingly first as the WEOG’s rotating national chairmen, often EU members themselves (or applicants), invariably deferred to the presidency. After the presidency announces the EU position, other EU members dutifully sit on their hands, while non-EU states debate in front of the silent, brooding EU. At times, the discussion reaches a point beyond the consensus previously established by intra-EU consultations, so the EU asks to suspend the WEOG meeting in order to caucus, and the EU members leave the room to await the next statement of the EU position. Thus, for many Americans, "European Political Cooperation" came increasingly to be understood as "American
exclusion."
To be sure, these developments were not entirely uniform, and some rogue EU states, such as the United Kingdom, actually consulted much more closely with the United States throughout many diplomatic endeavors. But the overall pattern is unmistakable.
THE COMMON FOREIGN, SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY
With the EU’s passage to the stage of a "common foreign, security and defense policy," the split between Europe and the United States became harder for Europeans to deny and harder for Americans to ignore. Americans in particular wonder what makes a policy "European" as opposed to "Western" or "Atlanticist"? Do "European" interests from Greece to Ireland, and from Finland to Portugal, really have more in common than interests stretching across the Atlantic? And what is to happen to Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and other industrialized democracies whose geography makes them forever outsiders to the European Club? Many Europeans, especially those already predisposed by a strain of anti-Americanism, tend to dismiss such questions as the disappointed complaints of a deposed hegemon. If Americans feel "left out" of the European enterprise,
so much the better in this exclusionary view.
Many other Europeans, and the State Department’s devoted EU supporters, argue, however, that nothing has really changed:
an ever-more-fully integrated Europe is not invariably adverse to U.S. interests, and is, indeed, completely consistent with NATO politico-military decision making. All of the Central and Eastern European nations striving to join both the EU and NATO believe this to be true even today, as have many Americans. Nonetheless, a cursory review of current policy concerns shows just how extensively the EU machinery is undercutting not just NATO, but the entire Atlantic Alliance.
The Breakup of Yugoslavia. At the start of Yugoslavia’s disintegration in 1991-92, the EU demanded and received the policy lead from a willing Department of State. Jacques Delors, then President of the European Commission, said confidently (and arrogantly) "We do not interfere in American affairs. We hope they will have enough respect not to interfere in ours." Unfortunately, however, EU deliberations on the Balkans have been dominated throughout this decade not by close cooperation, but by a kind of internal bullying that has become increasingly common and successful in EU policy circles.
Initially, Germany, based largely on its historical interests in the region, insisted that EU members recognize the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. While this precipitous change alone was not enough to cause the ensuing carnage and ethnic cleansing in the region, Bosnia-Herzegovina unquestionably saw a declaration of independence as the only way to extricate itself from Serbia’s grasp, hoping thereby to find security in a united European front against Serbian force. Having thus induced the Slovenes and Croats to jump ship, and having pushed the Bosnians, Germany then concluded that it was constitutionally barred from undertaking any military activities that might actually stop the Serbian (or Croat) war machine. Content first to rely on hapless UN peacekeeping efforts, substantially staffed on the dangerous ground of former Yugoslavia by its European NATO allies, Germany subsequently decided that the Serbs could be kept at bay only by the threat -- or actual use -- of force, if
somebody else was doing it. Ultimately, Croat military advances, NATO’s limited air strikes, and the diplomatic intervention of the United States brought about the Dayton Accords. So much for the EU.1
Relations with Turkey and the Cyprus Question. The phenomenon of EU bullying also prevails in other areas, such as dealings with Turkey in general and Cyprus in particular. We view Turkey as a NATO ally and a legitimate member of the Atlantic community. It, along with Greece, was one of the first beneficiaries of the Truman Doctrine, and it has stood fast with the United States in many disputes and crises. Turkey’s outstanding role in the Persian Gulf War, and its efforts to form close and stable relations with Israel are only two of many examples of Turkey’s ongoing efforts to achieve its Atlanticist aspirations and obligations.
It comes, therefore, as a considerable surprise to Americans to learn that Europeans, including particularly the conservative European political parties, seem to consider that Turks are somehow not entirely worthy of being considered full Europeans. Common NATO membership for Greece and Turkey, while it has neither solved the Cyprus question, nor even prevented armed conflict, has at least confined the problem for many years. Now, however, with the EU as another forum, the Cyprus issue has broken loose into a wider and potentially more troublesome context. One need not agree with the Turkish position on Cyprus or other issues to acknowledge that EU politics have made the European relationship with Turkey far more difficult than it ever was before, as well as complicating the American role in leading the Atlantic alliance.
The Middle East. Nor is the EU prepared to confine itself to "in area" as some of its members argue with religious fervor in the case of NATO. Perhaps the most visible, if least constructive, example of an activist "out of area" role is the Middle East. There, the Western democracies face the common problems posed by the imperative of supporting security for the State of Israel, preventing the spread of government-directed international terrorism, and protecting vital supplies of petroleum and natural gas. Since the Six Day War at least, the United States has been the principal external power attempting to achieve these objectives, largely because of the Cold War dimensions which also enveloped the region during and even before the Suez Crisis of 1956.
Despite the progress made first at Camp David and then at the Madrid Conference, many Europeans have both resented the
U.S. role and the direction of the peace process. Convinced that we tilted too palpably toward Israel, and that our role
enhanced the American position in the region at the expense of Europe, these Europeans encouraged an independent
diplomatic role for the EU in the peace process. Oslo, although conducted under Norwegian auspices (Norway not being an EU member), was thus seen as a significant breakthrough more by Europeans than by many Americans or Israelis. It is essentially indisputable that the Arab nations agree that the U.S. leans too far in Israel’s direction, but there is also no reason to believe that -- precisely for this reason -- the U.S. is somehow gaining a larger-than-deserved place in the Arab world. Paradoxically, Israel’s greater political trust in the United States than in Europe is in no way impairing the extensive development of European-Israeli commerce and investment. [Europe is indeed Israel's largest trade partner]
If, therefore, EU commercial interests are not impaired by the high-profile U.S. role in the peace process (and may in fact benefit from it), and if its political role is necessarily limited, what motivates persistent EU efforts to be taken seriously in the peace process? The real impact of EU efforts can only be concretely understood as an effort in anti-Americanism. Prior to Suez, and even in the immediate aftermath of decolonization, France in particular saw itself as one of (if not the) leading external powers, and it longs again for those heady days. But nostalgia and envy are not policies. To the extent the EU is so driven, the major consequence will not be a peaceful settlement in the Middle East, but the exacerbation of trans-Atlantic tensions.
Economic Issues. Trade and finance disputes between the EU and the U.S. are no less important than politico-military ones, and here the future is equally uncertain. Monetary union, as economists like Allan Meltzer and Martin Feldstein have argued, could well move the EU to even more economic autarky, adopting exclusionary and protectionist trade policies and acting as a trading bloc hostile to U.S. interests. Many American businesses with interests in Central and Eastern Europe already hear from customers and partners there implicit threats emanating from the EU that excessively close economic ties with the United States will impair their prospects in the ever-larger European Union.
On currency questions alone, the euro is so much more a political experiment than an economic imperative that the health of the euro will likely obsess EU leaders well into the next decade. If the euro were simply a currency rather than a political statement, the U.S. would not likely be gravely concerned with the euro’s impact on the global role of the dollar. But in fact the euro carries with it considerable political baggage, and its value against the dollar has already been seen by many Europeans as much as a political indicator as an economic one. This spells nothing but trouble ahead. Moreover, such examples as the introduction of the German mark as the new currency in Kosovo, and its proposed use in Montenegro, should be understood not simply as alternatives to the Yugoslav currency, but as the covert introduction of the euro even outside the EU.
From an economic viewpoint, the isolationist impulse to exclude the United States from EU territory, over the long term, can only harm Europe. This is particularly true in the area of defense-industry consolidation, where the EU’s focus on the political rather than the economic aspects of restructuring can only harm Europe in the long term. More generally, if frustrated in creating a North Atlantic free trade zone of some kind, American attentions will inevitably turn to the huge markets of Latin America, Asia and the Pacific. By its persistent inward focus on "deepening," the EU may well find in a few years that its concentration
and success in this area has actually caused it to play a smaller role in the world at large.
Monetary union and deeper economic integration will also have a profoundly important political impact, one that is almost certainly adverse to American interests. Cuba, for example, is not fundamentally an economic problem, despite the uproar over the Helms-Burton sanctions, but a political problem. Similarly, rogue states such as North Korea, Iran and Libya, to which Congress has also applied economic sanctions and other constraints, are fundamentally political-military problems over which the West is deeply divided. Unfortunately, closer European Union makes these political problems harder to resolve, not easier, by making the divergent positions a test of EU machismo.
KOSOVO – LESSONS OF THE MOST RECENT TEST CASE
It is yet another Balkans crisis, however, where we have most recently seen the adverse effects of the common European security and defense identity. Although NATO leaders have indulged in considerable self-congratulatory rhetoric following the air campaign over Yugoslavia, Kosovo’s long-term consequences for the Alliance are very troubling. Although it seems counterintuitive to say so after a military success, and despite the technically sophisticated display of American weaponry, NATO’s political unity is still crumbling. It will inevitably fall to the next President, fourteen months from now, to try to repair
the damage.
Kosovo tells us that the United States must now reject once and for all the notion that, however styled, European separateness in security and defense matters is consistent with a strong and effective NATO. If the EU were really capable of a united security policy, which is doubtful both politically and militarily, it would undermine the most salient remaining argument for an American military presence in Europe, which is that the Europeans cannot handle these critical questions themselves. If so, public opinion in America, from the right and the left, will rapidly conclude that America does not need the cost or the aggravation of supporting the EU’s increasingly divergent political goals. Only by straightforwardly confronting both the Europeans and ourselves with this analysis is there any realistic chance of sustaining the Alliance in anything like its present
configuration.
Kosovo made these conclusions painfully evident in several respects. First, there is the immensely troubling fact of the lengthy internal debate over whether NATO could begin its military campaign without a resolution from the United Nations Security Council authorizing such action. Although many senior officials in the Clinton Administration would have preferred this alternative -- and will undoubtedly do so in future contingencies -- the obvious threat of Russian and Chinese vetoes persuaded even the Administration of "assertive multilateralism" that this course was a non-starter. If only persuading the rest of NATO had been so easy. Now, overall political responsibility for Kosovo has been given to the Council, with ramifications we can only await with foreboding. It should be a first priority for a new President to make it clear -- to NATO and to the rest of the world -- that we reject UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s view that the UN is the world’s "sole source of legitimacy on the use of force."
Second, internal NATO political divisions during the air war routinely affected tactical military decisions, as recent
congressional testimony has demonstrated, and French President Jacques Chirac boasted publicly about his impact on target decisions. While Chirac perhaps overstated his personal role, the media were replete with finger-pointing accusations by NATO military commanders laying blame for the slowness and seeming ineffectiveness of the operation during its first two months. Undoubtedly, the passage of time will reveal more instances of EU members pursuing agendas unrelated to the issue directly at hand, as the Kosovo currency issue, mentioned above, demonstrates.
Third, and even worse, NATO political leaders engaged in an unseemly and corrosive public debate on whether or not to
commit ground troops to combat if Slobodan Milosevic did not accept NATO’s conditions. Principal blame here must go to
President Clinton for publicly debating with himself, first ruling out ground combat troops, and then reversing field. Nonetheless, the Europeans participated actively in this foolish display of the primacy of domestic politics over Alliance unity. British Prime Minister Tony Blair, implicitly in his own statements and in the unrelenting spin of his subordinates, was NATO’s "hawk," repeatedly advocating a ground war. By contrast, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder took exactly the opposite public position, to the evident delight of Belgrade. Ironically, all three came out ahead in the political short term: President Clinton escaped a decision on ground combat forces, Blair is said in London to have had a "good war," and Schroeder is now called "kriegskanzler" in Germany. NATO is the real loser.
Fourth, especially for the Europeans, it is painfully clear the United States carried the overwhelming military burden of the Kosovo campaign. Still more important is the clear explanation: our military capabilities already far exceed those of Europe, and the gap is growing. For all of their posturing about the independent security and defense identity, E.U. members have been wildly unenthusiastic about matching their rhetoric with their money. Indeed, Blair’s "hawkishness" was itself a classic "free ride," both politically and militarily. He knew that President Clinton would accept a ground war only with the greatest reluctance, and he also knew that American troops, technology and support would be central to any NATO ground effort had
one ever eventuated.
CONCLUSIONS
The evidence from Kosovo, and well before, is that everything wrong with the EU’s internal decision-making process has now infected NATO. The result is the unambiguous deterioration of NATO’s decisiveness and flexibility, two characteristics the EU has never possessed. Perhaps the Europeans can accept such confusion, both strategic and tactical, but we should not. NATO’s decline and demise would be most unwelcome for the United States, but equally unwelcome is the hobbling of our will and our capability to act unilaterally where necessary. Moreover, we still have enormously important unanswered questions globally, not the least of which are the West’s handling of Russia and China, as well as a nuclear India and Pakistan. We should all feel more comfortable with NATO intact and active.
It is far better to debate and resolve this question during the upcoming election campaign than to let NATO simply slide into senescence. We should follow two central policy lines. First, NATO should be strengthened as the West’s principle
politico-military vehicle worldwide. Second, the increased economic integration of North America, Western Europe and
Central/Eastern Europe should be then highest international economic priority for the nations of all three regions. There would be solid political support for these policies in the United States, and could be as well on the Continent if we break through the political elite’s insularity.
For example, we should continue to hope that NATO can reach consensus on acting "out of area," and in that sense one can
find one of the few positive outcomes of the Kosovo campaign. Other than the United Kingdom, most European NATO
members still believe that the correct approach is solely "in area" operations. They see NATO’s chief function (and the chief function of the U.S.) as supplying the muscle for "Combined Joint Task Forces" that allow the Europeans to take advantage of NATO for operations that do not themselves involve core NATO interests. While these structures may prove militarily feasible, and even politically constructive in the short run, over time they will result in the fragmenting of NATO’s central unifying elements, resulting in the loss of American interest in the Alliance. By going "out of area," as NATO did implicitly in the Persian Gulf War, NATO truly can avoid going "out of business."
Moreover, pursuing common defense objectives, such as national and theater missile defenses, might well be another joint enterprise that can keep NATO healthy and vibrant. Thus, recent reports that European leaders are concerned about the development of missile defenses, and its implications for the ABM treaty are especially troubling. We should miss no opportunity to explain to the Europeans that an effective missile defense, even a limited one, could provide just as much protection from rogue states for them as well as for the United States. I know of no serious advocate of missile defense who does not fully expect that its benefits would be made available to our allies in ways that should strengthen our alliances, not weaken them. Properly explained, missile defense can be a unifying rather than a divisive force in NATO’s future.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to appear before the Committee, and I would be very happy to answer any questions you and Members of the Committee might have.
Notes:
1 I have written a more extensive discussion of the breakup of Yugoslavia in "The European Union, the United States and
Former Yugoslavia," The European Journal (September-October, 1995), at p.8.
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