Anyway, the main thing that happened was that the Politburo supported reform for two reasons:1) because they needed to make a "peace offensive" to counter Reagan's hawkishness; and 2) because they were afraid the base economy could not support further military development. I think Gorbachev was a sincere reformer, although he evolved in office, but Khruschev only went so far before the Politburo put him out to pasture and Breshnev initiated neo- Stalinism.
In the end, the fact that Reagan liked Gorby, but would not drop his strategic guard, kept Gorby in office long enough to make the situation difficult to reverse. When the Politburo finally moved on him, the Moscow populace, under the leadership of Yeltsin, was bold enough to mount a significant protest. Even before that, conscripts were fleeing the army, and satellites were challenging the empire. Everything was getting out of hand.
Probably the most significant strategic move, on Reagan's part, was the promotion of SDI, which scared the Soviet's badly. When Reagan refused a comprehensive settlement on strategic force reduction because Gorbachev insisted upon trying to kill SDI, in Reykjavik, domestic support for the program went sky high, and the Soviets became really agitated about it. |
