Actually, Mr. Friedman does not understand some of the problems of nuclear deterrence. There is a great deal of uncertainty about whether we would launch a nuclear offensive in response to a rogue missile, for a couple of reasons: one, we have an aversion to killing civilians; and two, there is a fear of destabilization once the first volley is fired. That is one of the things that occupied us with the Soviets: how to enhance the credibility of a retaliatory strike? Thus, we made sure that our soldiers in Germany were in forward deployment, so that no one could worry we would "opt out" of our defense commitment to NATO; we developed "flexible response", so that the Soviets would not imagine they could nuke Western Europe, leave us alone, and get away with it; and we built in massive redundancies to make sure of enough survivability to deny victory.
Well, rogue states are not insane, but they are reckless, and they are contemptuous of the soft West. Saddam Hussein demonstrated the tendency: he didn't think Bush pere had it in him. Thus, there is another side of deterrence to consider, and that is the side that makes one take a risk to no purpose. If I am sure I can hurt someone I hate, it might be worth running a risk. But if I will not likely cause the damage I had hoped, why bother? Thus, their calculations are further complicated: is it worth finding out if we have it in us to retaliate, if a missile defense is likely to limit the damage? |
