One of the things that people overlook about NATO strategic doctrine is that it depended on the existential threat of nuclear use in the event that the Warsaw Pact overran NATO forces. That is why no president would make a declaration that we would not use nukes first. Flexible response was a means of enhancing the credibility of the implied threat. The idea was that with a wide array of options before a massive strike, there was less inhibition for first use than would be the case if escalation to the worst case were automatic. The whole idea of the Soviets placing intermediate range missiles in Eastern Europe, for example, was to tip the balance in their favor, because we would not likely escalate markedly in retaliation. When we put in the counter- missiles, that advantage was negated, because we returned to a credible tit- for- tat situation, and therefore did not have to accelerate escalation. SDI, by making almost any scenario of exchange short of a massive strike obsolete, finally makes nukes useless among states.
Furthermore, it is not far- fetched, with todays network of terrorists with various patron states, for an intermediate range launch to occur from neutral or friendly territory, thus reducing the chances of ordinary punitive retaliation. We cannot say with enough certainty that they would not do it, merely based upon prior actions. Closing that gap would allow us to concentrate on low tech means of delivery.
I do not know for certain if we are still purchasing weapons grade material, but I would imagine so. I do not recall any announcement rescinding the commitment. |
