Mike—
You’ve issued a challenge. I’m not going to pick up the gantlet, but I would like to share some observations on the Hunt process.
The BEA Hunt report was my first. I was lucky to have a thoughtful and indefatigable co-author. Even more important, however, was the thread itself. Given the thread’s rigor, I was understandably anxious. But the absolute confidence that conclusions would be weighed carefully allowed us to make them. And, for a technologically challenged writer, I could rest somewhat easier knowing that missing links or misinterpretations would be picked up.
Hunt reports, almost by definition, deal with emergent technologies. And these have implications that go beyond the technology itself. Although Thomas gave us insights into app server technology that we could never get on our own—no matter how many white papers we read—his comments go further and it is this extension, I think, that you pick up in your challenge.
So my observations are mostly on what emergent technologies mean for a Hunt or any assessment of a potential gorilla and its claims to gorilladom:
1. competitive landscape
Despite Coleman & Co.’s roots at SUNW and in the Forte technology, I didn’t pay much attention to SUNW. iPlanet’s share in the app server market just didn’t seem ominous or to pose much threat. This is a fault I will name “blindsided by the present.”
Market shares in an emergent market are difficult to nail down in the present—you are usually dealing with apples and oranges in various revenue statements. They become treacherous when present trends are projected forward and research boutiques that routinely reinforce these projections sometimes compound the problem. Not only can an upstart emerge, an established company like SUNW can suddenly take a turn and focus its considerable clout on the emergent market. There may, in fact, be some scale [perhaps early tornado] that draws in the big guns. We extrapolate from current first-mover advantage in an emergent market at our peril.
2. macro environment
Gorillas emerge from tornadoes, and current market conditions—levels of IT spending—may not allow a tornado to get up a head of steam. Ignoring this relationship I call being “blindsided by optimism.” The adrenaline goes up when clues of an impending tornado are glimpsed. The sighting itself then becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. With those clues we must be in for a full-blown tornado. Maybe, but maybe not. While we look for proof of gorilladom and a tornado, we have to be just as scrupulous about looking for clues that go the other way.
3. value chain
Numbers are important, but they can also mislead. This peril I call “the lock-in trap.” All thirteen-point hands are equal in bridge, but some are more equal than others. Beyond sheer numbers we have to look at the strength of the relationships in the value chain. What does it say for BEA’s value chain that a customer can run both WebLogic and iPlanet? How do we evaluate that relationship?
4. personal myopia
We all bring personal biases to our analysis. Mine happens to be an innate conservatism. A tornado would probably have to be clocking 300 mph before I’d be convinced. And here I continue to believe that gorillas are a rare breed. They not only have to control a market worth controlling, but also enjoy a competitive advantage that looks as if it will serve them well for a sustained period.
Here is where the thread is so valuable. The level of discussion constantly challenges assumptions and helps make up for personal limitations. When I first approached Chaz about doing a BEA Hunt, he gave us the go-ahead and hoped it might spark some discussion. The thread certainly met his test.
So my hat is off to you all. Many thanks.
--Judith |
