It seems to me that as usual the talking heads have it wrong. We hear all over television that the attack on us was sophisticated, showed high levels of coordinating skills, was complex, required lots of resources, etc etc.
Surely this is incorrect.
The beauty of the attack (from the point of view of those who made it) was its simplicity.
First and foremost, by commandeering airliners, those who made the attack got their weapon and guidance systems practically for free. When I say this, I’m not trying to be clever. Our attackers did not have to build a bomb, or figure out a way to deliver a bomb on target; all they did was capture a number of airplanes -- which they did at the cost of 15 airline tickets. Pretty cheap I would say.
What made it possible for them to get their weapons “practically for free.”
Just this: our pilots are instructed to submit to hijackers, to go along, to not resist, to not challenge. This is what allowed the hijackers to commandeer the planes simply by announcing their desire to do so.
In other words, to go to the heart of the matter, the vulnerability exploited by our enemies is our feminized culture, which has INSTITUTIONALIZED courage. Yes, policeman, firemen, soldiers, are expected to be courageous, but not the average man; rather, he is expected to dial 911.
Why is the crew of an airplane not supplied with a pistol? This would give them an advantage over hijackers, since the screening process back on the ground is pretty good at keeping out firearms. A pistol in the cockpit would certainly raise the cost of commandeering an airplane. If the measure had already been put in place, it might have saved thousands of lives yesterday.
But alas, it would also do something our feminized elites don’t want to contemplate -- lead to the expectation that somewhere along the line a man, an ordinary man, a civilian, might have to be a man.
Also -- sorry to inject a note of politics into this -- but the more I think about the response of media and government, the more I smell the stench of self-interest.
To build up our attackers is to build a case for increased appropriations for certain agencies. As a political tactic, this will probably be successful. But there is a cost. To make our attackers seem bigger than they are BUILDS IN a misunderstanding of the problem. The genius of the plan executed yesterday, as I say, lay precisely in its simplicity, its low cost nature, its sure-handed exploitation of our weaknesses.
The complexity of the situation we face vis-à-vis those who attacked us is human. We have to understand why 15 or 20 men were willing to undertake a suicide mission, which means: we have to understand a people, their religion, their politics, the pressures they feel and so on. To deal with this human complexity does not require more intelligence agents, but more agents who are intelligent. As it now stands, all we have at the top in our agencies ---in my not humble enough opinion -- are people with one superior talent: slithering up through the ranks. |
