My knowledge of bio war is limited to really bad farts.
Here's a start:
CHEMICAL, BIOLOGICAL, RADIOLOGICAL AND NUCLEAR (CBRN) TERRORISM
December 18, 1999
This paper uses open sources to examine any topic with the potential to cause threats to public or national security
INTRODUCTION
1. In the wake of the March 1995 sarin attack on the Tokyo subway, as well as other recent high-casualty terrorist incidents, governments and publics alike
are viewing with growing concern the potential threat posed by chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons in the hands of terrorists.
How easy would it really be for an individual terrorist or terrorist group to manufacture or otherwise obtain such weapons? Perhaps even more important:
How easy would it be for them to deliver such weapons, or disperse such agents, and to what effect? The answers obviously depend on the type of
weapon or agent that one is talking about. The experience of the Aum Shinri Kyo suggests that the manufacture of an effective nerve agent—even one for
which the “recipe” has been widely known for some time—is not quite as easy as commonly believed. The sect also clearly ran into technical difficulties in
its various attempts to manufacture and effectively disperse biological agents, such as botulinum toxin and anthrax—which at least partly explains its later
focus on chemical weapons.
DISCUSSION
Acquisition of CB Materials
2. A wide range of potentially deadly chemical and biological (CB) agents including various insecticides, industrial chemicals and potent toxins such as ricin
may be relatively easy to produce or otherwise acquire. Some deadly pathogens can be obtained through the mail from scientific supply houses; in other
cases it is possible to harvest them from nature or to “grow your own” with relatively unsophisticated equipment and limited expertise. It may also be
possible to steal deadly agents from civilian research facilities or military stockpiles, as reportedly has occurred—in the case of chemical weapons, at
least—in the former Soviet Union. Nor is it inconceivable that a state sponsor of terrorism—most if not all of whom have active weapons of mass
destruction programs of their own—would be willing deliberately to provide terrorists with CB weapons or materials, if it could convince itself of “plausible
deniability” while using a surrogate group to inflict a devastating blow on an enemy.
Problems of Dissemination
3. The effective dissemination of CB agents may be more difficult than their manufacture. For example, the popular scenario involving poisoning the water
supply of a major metropolitan area does not appear very feasible, given the large quantities of agent that would be required and the various filtering or
purification measures usually in place. It is also true that the lethality of some types of highly toxic agents depends crucially on the type of exposure; and
that some of the deadliest agents, while perhaps suitable for individual assassinations, may not easily be adapted for use in a mass-casualty attack. The
open-air release of an agent may be crucially affected by unpredictable or difficult-to-predict meteorological conditions, while even the release of an agent
in a confined space may be subject to the vagaries of individual doses and air circulation patterns. Nevertheless, credible scenarios can be devised that,
assuming optimal meteorological conditions and the most effective means of dispersal possible, could result in staggering numbers of fatalities, ranging well
into the thousands for chemical agents and into the hundreds of thousands—or possibly even millions—for biologicals.
Nuclear Materials
4. In general, CB agents are considered to be cheaper and easier to produce or otherwise acquire than would be nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the
seizure in recent years of special nuclear materials on the black market in Europe, albeit in quantities insufficient to construct a nuclear explosive device,
has lent new credibility to the threat of nuclear terrorism as well. The “experts” appear to disagree on whether a small group of technicians such as might
be brought together by one of today’s terrorist groups would be able to overcome the engineering difficulties of constructing a nuclear explosive device.
Theft of an intact nuclear weapon is not considered very likely, given the stringent security measures in place in most of the nuclear-weapon states,
although political instability and socio-economic decay in some of them—including the former Soviet Union—must remain of some concern. Tactical
nuclear weapons, whose security features may be more vulnerable to tampering, are of greater concern than strategic nuclear weapons in this regard.1
5. Of greatest concern from the viewpoint of a potential nuclear explosive capability may be the security of weapons-usable fissile material held in
research institutes, naval fuel depots, and other similar nuclear facilities, especially in the former Soviet Union (FSU). Despite considerable expenditures
through the US Nunn-Lugar “Cooperative Threat Reduction” programme and aid by other Western states, the security of some of these installations in the
FSU remains inadequate. However, a more likely threat of nuclear terrorism would be the radiological one, that is, the dispersal of radioactive substances
to contaminate air or water, or to render unusable a particular area or facility. Radioactive materials that could be used for such contamination are available
from a wide range of relatively non-secure facilities, including hospitals, medical and research laboratories, universities, waste dumps, and so forth.
Although some types of contamination may be more difficult to achieve than commonly believed, given the widespread public anxiety about nuclear
material in any form, the mere threat of such use of radioactive materials could be a potent terrorist tool. The same considerations would apply to attacks
on nuclear power facilities or on shipments of nuclear materials that could threaten radioactive release.
Past Use of CBRN Materials by Terrorists
6. There has been some limited use of CB agents by terrorists in the past. Left-wing extremists in Europe have threatened their use against civilian
populations or military targets; right-wing extremists in North America have conspired to poison city water supplies and have succeeded in acquiring
quantities of deadly agents; state sponsors of terrorism reportedly have developed CB weapons suitable for terrorist use; food products have been
deliberately contaminated, in some cases causing human casualties and/or considerable economic losses; insurgent groups in various parts of the world
have sometimes used CB agents against government forces; and individual assassinations have been carried out by such means.
There have also been some limited attacks on nuclear power facilities worldwide; numerous unsubstantiated threats to trigger a nuclear explosive device;
and at least one reported case of the use of radiological materials—albeit in a very limited manner (the placing of a cesium capsule by Chechen rebels in a
Moscow park)—by terrorists.
7. Nevertheless, despite widespread publicity about the threat, there have been few actual attempts by terrorists to cause mass civilian casualties using
CBRN agents. Exceptions have been the typhoid poisoning of 750 people (none fatally) by the Rajneesh sect in Oregon in 1984; and the various attempts
by the Aum Shinri Kyo using both chemical and biological agents, the most “successful” of which resulted in 7 dead and 270 injured in Matsumoto, and 12
dead and 5,500 injured in Tokyo. Far more common have been unsubstantiated threats, hoaxes or relatively low-level incidents causing few if any
casualties. However, as information and capabilities spread widely through such means as the Internet, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the
authorities to distinguish between a mere hoax and the real thing. This raises all kinds of tough questions about the appropriate responses to such threats,
which may be extremely disruptive for normal, day-to-day activities, and may afford terrorist individuals and groups a potent instrument against society,
even in the absence of a real capability or willingness to carry out an actual attack.
Current Trends
8. While some traditional terrorist groups are likely to continue to be constrained by such factors as the unfamiliarity of the weapon and its questionable
political utility, the likelihood of CBRN weapons use by other terrorists is both considerable and growing, given trends such as the following:
the recent increase in high-casualty, indiscriminate attacks in general (as exemplified by the World Trade Center, Oklahoma City, and East Africa embassy
bombings);
the proliferation of NBC weaponry, materials, expertise, and technology worldwide, including the availability of materials and weapons expertise from
existing or former state programmes; and
the increase in inter-ethnic and religiously-inspired violence, with fewer humanitarian inhibitions.
Of particular concern is the emergence of groups—such as apocalyptic religious cults, right-wing extremists, and ad-hoc extremist Islamic groups—whose
aim is not to bargain with governments nor to win over public opinion to their point of view, but rather to cause the maximum possible amount of damage
and disruption to a people or a system that they consider especially abhorrent. Many of these groups are by nature difficult targets for intelligence agencies,
reducing the chances of advance warning of, or the opportunity to prevent, such an attack.
9. Terrorist interest in the use of CB weapons has grown substantially since the Tokyo subway attack. In testimony before a US Senate committee in
September 1998, FBI Director Louis Freeh stated that the FBI had investigated over 100 CBRN cases during 1997, a tripling of the 1996 figure. The
following month, another senior FBI official noted that whereas 68 new investigations into the use or threatened use of CBRN materials had been initiated
in 1997, the number had already exceeded 86 in 1998. Director Freeh commented in February 1999 that the FBI dealt with an “anthrax warning letter”
somewhere in the US almost every day.
10. There have also been reports of new or renewed interest by a number of traditional international terrorist groups, including the Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
Hizballah, the Algerian Armed Islamic Group (GIA), Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Sikh and Chechen terrorists, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),
the Khmer Rouge, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). These reports are usually quite vague, and not all of them have been particularly
credible, but the trend is worrisome. Senior US government officials have publicly asserted that the terrorist financier Osama bin Laden has been actively
seeking chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons for use against Western targets. The recent apparent resurgence of the Aum Shinri Kyo in Japan is also
troubling, given the technical knowledge possessed by some of its remaining followers and the possibility of yet-undiscovered stocks of CB agents or
precursors.
CONCLUSIONS
although it is impossible to estimate the precise likelihood of a mass-casualty terrorist attack using CBRN materials, the technical obstacles to such an
attack are by no means insuperable. It appears to be a case not of “if,” but rather of “when,” the next such event will occur;
based on a combination of trends in both capabilities (or the availability of means) and motivations, as well as empirical evidence of actual interest, the
threat appears to be growing;
as in the past, such an attack is perhaps most likely to come without warning from an individual or group of which we have been previously unaware;
despite increased attention to the threat since the Tokyo subway attack, society remains highly vulnerable to such attacks, the potential consequences of
which are horrendous in the extreme; and
even hoaxes—which are increasing in number and becoming progressively more credible—can cause enormous disruption to society, in some cases
perhaps achieving the ends of the terrorist even without an actual attack.
CANADIAN INTERESTS
11. While Canada has not experienced any major, mass-casualty incidents of CB terrorism, there have been threats to contaminate the water supplies of
various localities, as well as fairly frequent claims of product contamination by animal-rights or environmental extremists. Such contamination has usually
only been threatened rather than actually carried out, although the threats have sometimes resulted in substantial economic losses as products were
withdrawn from the market. In April 1993, Canada Customs at the Alaska-Yukon border seized 130 grams of the deadly poison ricin from an American
possessing neo-Nazi literature and later linked to “survivalist” groups. More recently, various news media outlets and guide outfitters received envelopes
containing razor blades purportedly coated with rat poison from an extremist animal- rights group. Gas masks and chemical protection suits were among
the items seized from the cache in B.C. of a US right-wing militia group in October 1996. And unsubstantiated threats to use “chemical or bacteriological
products” against Montreal in the name of the “World Islamic Front” caused brief disruptions in that city in March 1998.
12. To date, there have been no significant incidents linked with the threat or use of nuclear terrorism in Canada. There have been suggestions in the past
that terrorists might attack Canadian nuclear facilities according to the theory of the “path of least resistance,” since they are less well-guarded than their
American counterparts. However, as with most types of terrorism, a sophisticated and well-organized group is believed more likely to target the US
directly (although the possible use of Canadian territory or resources in such an attack remains a concern, of course).
13. In general, Canada cannot be immune from the broad international trends in this area. We do have our share of individuals or groups, such as the Order
of the Solar Temple, that can be described as espousing “doctrines of irrational escapism.” While we do not have a home-grown militia movement as
virulent as that of our southern neighbour, we do have our share of neo-Nazis, and have unwittingly provided in at least one case a place of refuge and
stockpiling for one of the American militia groups. Finally, while Canada may not constitute as lucrative a target for foreign terrorist groups as the USA,
many such terrorist groups do have some kind of presence, if only playing a supporting role, in our country. And Canada’s continued international activism
in peacekeeping efforts around the globe, as well as the possible spillover from ethnic conflicts elsewhere in the world, could conceivably make us the
target of an externally-inspired, mass-casualty terrorist attack.
14. Based on past examples, the type of CBRN terrorist incident most likely to be experienced by Canada in future is a hoax or threat rather than an actual
attack, or a relatively low-level instance of product contamination rather than a mass-casualty outrage. As capabilities and information spread, however, it
is becoming increasingly difficult for the authorities to distinguish between a mere hoax and the real thing. And, in the end, Canada remains as vulnerable
as any of the other Western industrialized states to the kind of nightmarish, mass- casualty CBRN terrorist attack that until recently was confined to fiction.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SELECTED SOURCES
Graham T. Allison et al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1996.
Richard A. Falkenrath et al., America’s Achilles’ Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Terrorism and Covert Attack. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1998.
Journal of the American Medical Association 278:5 (6 August 1997) (Special Issue on Biological Warfare and Terrorism).
David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World. New York: Crown Publishers, 1996.
Paul Leventhal and Yonah Alexander (eds.), Preventing Nuclear Terrorism. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987.
The Monitor: Nonproliferation, Demilitarization and Arms Control 3:2 (Spring 1997) (Special Issue on “Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction”).
Ron Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: The Threat According to the Open Literature. Ottawa: Canadian Security Intelligence Service, June 1995.
Ron Purver, Chemical and Biological Terrorism: New Threat to Public Safety?. London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism,
Conflict Studies 295, December 1996/January 1997.
Brad Roberts (ed.), Terrorism With Chemical and Biological Weapons: Calibrating Risks and Responses. Alexandria, VA: Chemical and Biological Arms
Control Institute, 1997.
Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999.
Jonathan B. Tucker et al., “Chemical/Biological Terrorism: Coping with a New Threat.” Politics and the Life Sciences 15:2 (September 1996), pp.
167-247.
Jose Vegar, “Terrorism’s New Breed.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 54:2 (March-April 1998), pp. 50-55.
csis-scrs.gc.ca
And from today's Washington Post:
Crop-Dusters Thought to Interest Suspects
By Justin Blum and Dan Eggen
Washington Post Staff Writers
Monday, September 24, 2001; Page A01
BELLE GLADE, Fla., Sept. 23 -- The first visit came in February, when three Middle Eastern men drove through the sugar cane fields to the
single-runway Belle Glade State Municipal Airport to ask about crop-dusters.
How many gallons of fuel can the planes hold, the group's leader asked. How many gallons of chemicals? How fast are they? Are they difficult to fly?
During the next seven months, the casually dressed man returned to Belle Glade at least once, workers said, and other groups of Middle Eastern men
visited many more times to quiz them about the intricacies of crop-dusters -- with emphasis on how far they can fly and how much poison they can carry.
The men often had video or still cameras, taking pictures of the crop-dusters and attempting to photograph the interiors.
An airport employee has since identified the first group's leader as Egyptian Mohamed Atta, 33, who the FBI believes was at the controls when an
American Airlines flight from Boston slammed into the World Trade Center on Sept. 11.
His visits to an obscure airport in rural Florida, combined with other evidence unearthed since the terrorist attacks, have prompted the FBI and other
federal agencies to issue warnings about potential chemical or biological weapons attacks from crop-dusters, which are a common sight over farmland
throughout rural America.
Today, as a result of what sources called a "serious, credible threat," the Federal Aviation Administration grounded crop-dusters for the second time since
the Sept. 11 attacks on New York and Washington that left more than 6,000 people missing and presumed dead.
"The theory is that they were looking into this as a backup to their main objective, or else as a whole other type of operation that could still be a concern,"
one U.S. government official said today. "There are certainly enough questions to elevate our concerns."
In addition to the visits by Atta and others to the Belle Glade airport, investigators discovered a manual on crop-dusters in the possession of Zacarias
Moussouai, a man with alleged links to Osama bin Laden. Moussouai was detained in August in Minnesota after he sought training at a flight school.
"The intelligence community came to us and encouraged us to shut down the crop-dusters," FAA spokesman Scott Brenner said.
Investigators have also issued warnings to the trucking industry to watch for suspicious activity involving the hauling of chemicals, radioactive waste,
biological agents and other hazardous materials.
The FBI "has received information on numerous terrorist threats regarding potential use of chemical, biological and/or radiological/nuclear WMD," or
weapons of mass destruction, according to an alert issued last Thursday by American Trucking Associations.
The FBI last week arrested a former Boston cabdriver, Nabil Almarabh, who had financial ties to some hijackers and had recently secured a Michigan
license to haul hazardous materials such as dynamite, gases and toxic and radioactive waste. Two other men arrested in Almarabh's former Detroit home
had licenses to drive commercial trucks, officials said.
"We're trying to exercise an abundance of caution," one FBI official said. "We're not downplaying anything. Any time we get a suspicious report or
circumstances, we are trying to ask people to be on the lookout."
James Callen, executive director of the National Agricultural Aviation Association, said the nation's 4,000 crop-dusting planes, which are also used to
combat fires and mosquitoes, commonly hold 300 to 800 gallons of chemicals. Crop-duster pilots must obtain small-plane commercial licenses and training
for agricultural aviation, Callen said.
Callen said the FBI and FAA have not informed the group of any specific reason for the grounding orders. He said there have been no confirmed reports
of stolen planes or chemicals in recent weeks.
The Belle Glade airport, in a part of the Everglades that was drained to accommodate agriculture, is home to several crop-dusting businesses. The airport is
about an hour's drive from Delray Beach, the coastal community where some of the alleged hijackers are believed to have lived.
James Lester, who loads chemicals on to the planes for a crop-dusting company, told FBI agents last week that he had seen Atta and two other Middle
Eastern men come by twice since February, asking questions about crop-dusters.
Lester said that in addition to questions about fuel and chemical capacities, Atta repeatedly asked to look at the interior of the cockpit and inquired about
how to start the planes. The men said they were flight students and wanted to get in the cockpit, but Lester would not let them.
"I just told the guys, 'You can't get in the airplane,' " Lester said. "They just kept standing around."
Willie Lee, general manager of South Florida Crop Care, a single-plane crop-dusting business at the airport, said groups of two or three Middle Eastern
men came by nearly every weekend for six or eight weeks prior to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks -- including the weekend just prior to the assaults. He said
he did not pay much attention to them and could not identify any of the men from photos of the hijackers shown to him by the FBI.
He said they described themselves as flight students, with several mentioning a South Florida flight school where investigators initially believed some of the
hijackers might have trained.
"They pull in the gate there and get out and ask you all about the airplane," Lee said. "How much does it haul? How hard is it to fly? . . . They would want
to get up on the wing and look at it."
Lee said a small population of people from the Middle East lives in Belle Glade, and the men's presence did not arouse his suspicion. He also said he thinks
the visits involved as many as 12 to 15 people, who came in groups of two or three at a time. He said they stayed for 45 minutes to an hour per visit.
After the attacks, FBI agents visited the airport and followed up with a number of phone calls to ask if any of the Middle Eastern men had returned or if
anyone had seen anything suspicious, Lee said. Beginning last Friday evening, the airport was placed under 24-hour police watch, he said.
Lee's plane -- an Air Tractor 502 -- holds 500 gallons of chemicals and 200 gallons of fuel. "That's a bomb itself right there," Lester said, pointing to the
plane. "A bomb itself right there ready to explode."
Lester now questions whether he should have been more suspicious of the men.
"Maybe if we'd have thought about it," Lester said, "and put two and two together, maybe we could have stopped something from happening."
Blum reported from Belle Glade and Eggen reported from Washington. Staff writer Don Phillips contributed to this report.
washingtonpost.com |
