Back in the Clinton years we used to say that problems in the WH were caused by a lack of "adult supervision." This was literally true in the sense that many of the staff were simply too young and inexperienced to make mature judgments. But it can apply metaphorically as well, to refer to people who while older chronologically are a bit, well, immature. There's no better way to piss off a neocon than to roll your eyes and adopt a tone of world-weary sophistication, as if to say, "please just let us professionals handle things rather than you ideologues." Here's an excellent example of that genre, in response to the Kristol et al. letter:
washingtonpost.com
Back in the Real World
By Fareed Zakaria
Washington Post
Tuesday, October 2, 2001; Page A25
If you read Washington's newspapers and magazines these days, you'd think that we have just passed the D-Day of this war. Pundits, editorialists and
television commentators are busy mapping out our strategy for the war on terrorism after we have defeated al Qaeda. With that small matter taken care of, the
armchair generals urge that we quickly move to overthrow the governments of Iraq, then Syria, then Iran and then perhaps Libya if we're still in the mood. It
would be as if, the week after Pearl Harbor, Americans sat down to plot whom to take on once America had disposed of Japan and Germany.
Meanwhile, the Bush administration is beginning the long, hard process of fighting al Qaeda, the shadowy network that has been behind almost every attack
on American citizens in the past decade. It is trying to find an effective military response to the barbarism of Sept. 11. It is constructing a coalition that will
root out and destroy al Qaeda and its many branches. And it is trying to ensure that the short-term goal of the strike does not impair the long-term war by
fracturing the alliance.
This is an immense challenge, and one the administration is handling superbly. But in doing so it is already being criticized for neglecting its cardinal duty to
destroy Saddam Hussein. Even more offensive to its critics is the fact that it's engaging in diplomacy.
The notion that the military strikes against the Taliban will be easy is absurd. We could, of course, strike at empty camps, declare victory and go home. But
this will fool no one. The kind of serious operation that has a chance of real success is likely to be risky. The record on these missions is daunting, from
Nixon's Son Tay raid to Ford's Mayaguez operation to Carter's Desert One fiasco to the Bush/Clinton misadventure in Somalia. The administration is right
to take its time, gather all the intelligence and strike hard and smart. Success, not speed, is what counts.
The biggest part of this war effort is diplomatic. As everyone from George W. Bush to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld acknowledges, the crucial
dimensions of the struggle are covert operations, intelligence gathering and police work. All of this requires the active cooperation of many other
governments. U.S. Marines cannot go into Hamburg and arrest suspects. We cannot shut down banks in the United Arab Emirates. We cannot get
intelligence from Russia except if the Russians share it with us. It's all very well to target states such as Syria that harbor terrorists, but al Qaeda has been
smart enough to set up most of its bases in states that harbor them involuntarily, such as Germany, Britain, France and even the United States. The FBI
estimates that 1,000 of these people live in America. How will bombing Baghdad close these cells?
There has been a debate within the administration about how to proceed and, thankfully, Colin Powell and some others have been able to prevail -- for now --
over the hotter heads in the Defense Department. The Powell strategy has gained the crucial support of Vice President Dick Cheney, who understands that
key allies such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt will not go along with a wider war against all terrorism instead of a campaign targeted against al Qaeda. Living
close to the enemy, the Saudis and Egyptians know just how complex the battle against al Qaeda will be.
It was inevitable that the sensible strategy would win out. When America faces a real crisis or enemy, fantasy foreign policies collapse and reality intrudes.
You see a similar pattern in our relations with China. In the absence of a crisis, Americans have a fiery hothouse debate over just how we are going to
overthrow the evil butchers of Beijing. And then something like the airplane crisis in Hainan takes place and the administration follows a sober course. In the
first six months the Bush administration fired off in several unilateral directions, annoying countries around the world. Now a crisis is upon us and this very
team is paying America's U.N. dues, taking matters to the United Nations, telling Russia that we understand its situation in Chechnya, forgiving Pakistan for
its nuclear explosions and even finding a kind word for the Iranian mullahs.
During the 1990s the United States lived in a foreign-policy funhouse. With no challengers in sight and a historic economic boom, we viewed foreign policy
as a form of volunteer work. We did it, but strictly on our terms. The only constraints we faced were internal: Was it politically sustainable domestically?
Foreign policy was a luxury, not a necessity.
Now we face a real crisis, a real threat and real external constraints. No matter how often we proclaim it, other nations know that they are not all equally at
risk. The United States is target No. 1. We need favors from them. And they will do them. But we will have to do favors in return. A foreign policy of fiats
and ultimatums will give way to one of negotiations and diplomacy. Welcome to the real new world order.
The writer is editor of Newsweek International and a columnist for Newsweek.
© 2001 The Washington Post Company |
