israelinsider.com
What was behind Sharon's warning to the West
By Reuven Koret October 7, 2001
Publicly the furor has subsided over Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's warning to the Western democracies, and the United States in particular, not to repeat the lessons of 1938 and appease the Arabs at Israel's expense. It was dismissed by the U.S. Secretary of State as a brief "cloudburst." America and its allies understandably want to focus their attention on the expected Afghan campaign. The Israel-American media war of words is over, for now.
But behind the scenes, the anger and suspicions on both sides have not subsided. The Israeli press Sunday morning was filled with stories and speculation about why Sharon decided to go public with his unprecedented caution to the Western coalition and his comparison of the situation of Israel with that of Czechoslovakia before the Second World War.
What brought Sharon is launch such an outburst at such a sensitive moment? An "inside" report by senior correspondents Shimon Shiffer and Nahum Barnea in Israel's leading daily, Yediot Ahronot sheds considerable light on the circumstances that led to the speech.
They report that on Thursday, Sharon received an excited phone call from German Foreign Minister Yoshka Fischer, considered one of Israel's diplomatic allies in Europe. "I spoke with Bashar Assad," Fischer said. "He told me that Syria was always against terrorism. You have now idea how moved I was. To hear such things from the Syrian President." Sharon, the report went on, exploded with anger, to hear that not only was Syria believed to have been "always" against terror, but that the senior German diplomat was so moved to hear Assad claim as much.
Not only that. Fischer went on to make demands of Israel. "You must go toward the Palestinians," he said. "It is possible that these concessions will be painful for the current generation, but they will promise a better future for coming generations."
It is possible that the conversation with the German about "generations to come" reminded Sharon about generations that came before. And with the prospect of a major war breaking out, the Israeli Prime Minister evidently felt it was necessary to go on record with his strongly felt perspective on what he clearly felt to be a concerted effort to force Israel into concessions for the sake of appeasing the Arab states that the Americans want to support its war coalition.
"There is a certain moment," Yediot quotes Sharon as saying, "that you discover that they working behind your back." It was at that moment, he said, "I decided, that's it. In a little while the war will begin. Israel will be forced to make far-reaching concessions to the Palestinians. If it will refuse, it will be blamed for undermining the war effort. This was the last moment."
Sharon had observed the developments following the events of September 11 with growing trepidation. The United States had formulated a new Middle East initiative without consulting Israel, and press reports indicated that the U.S. had further modified that initiative in favor of Arab positions. This would not be the first time, and the Yediot reports makes the colorful observation that in times of crisis, Israel always goes from being the presentable wife to being shunned as the "other woman" who must be concealed from polite company. This time the "freeze-out" of Israel from U.S. consideration appeared almost total, as if Israel no longer existed in the eyes of the Americans.
Nevertheless, Sharon said that he ordered Israel's secret services to give "everything" to assist the American war preparations, passing on intelligence "worth more than gold" with regard to bin Laden and sharing operational secrets of Israel's special anti-terrorist units.
But like the loyal wife that had been supplanted, Sharon felt that not only were the efforts unappreciated but that the Americans seemed to be going out of their way to scorn and snub Israel. The decision of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to leave Israel off his itinerary on his weekend trip to the region was particularly galling.
Then there was the apparent distinction that the Americans and the Europeans were trying to make between global terrorism (against them) and local terrorism (against Israel). There was the effort to make a reconciliation with Iran, with dangerous strategic implications for the ability of the Iranians to develop their nuclear capability, and the wooing of Syria, despite the Syrian support for Hizbullah in Lebanon, which only last week launched an unprovoked cross-border missile attack on Israeli bases.
And there was the most immediate bone of contention: the pressure to cover for Arafat and the Palestinians. American pressure forced Sharon to agree to let Foreign Minister Shimon Peres meet Arafat "under fire." After the ceasefire agreement, as a senior Sharon adviser put it, Israel "ceased" and the Palestinians "fired." The result were a first-of-its-kind terrorist incursion into an Israeli settlement in Gaza, a car bomb attack in Jerusalem, a shooting attack at the Afula bus station, and dozens of other attacks.
Arafat, from Sharon's perspective, did not do even the minimum, not making even a single arrest. For simply making a condemnation of violence, Sharon noted, Arafat won worldwide praise. Not only that, he was rewarded with a removal of American pressure but also with President Bush's expression of support for a Palestinian state as part of the traditional American "vision" for a peaceful Middle East."
"There's a limit," Sharon told Yediot, and he feared the worst was yet to come. "The minute the war breaks out, an American envoy will come around with a plan, and Israel will be represented as undermining the war effort." Sharon felt it was the last moment to make a statement, and that this was not the time for quiet diplomacy. Besides, there was an issue of self-respect, the right of an independent to state its case and stand on its rights. "Since when do we pass speeches to the Americans in advance?" the Prime Minister asked, rhetorically. |
