Pt3
"III. The Bible and Rape
We come to the section, in which it becomes quite evident that Martin is not interested in doing serious study of the biblical text and its context. Although I could say much more, I’ll let the arguments below speak for themselves.
Martin claims that in the Bible, "God seems to be tacitly approving of rape" in some places while in others "rape is condemned but without regard for the victim’s welfare." The main example Martin gives is Deuteronomy 22:23-29. The text reads:
23If there is a girl who is a virgin engaged to a man, and another man finds her in the city and lies with her, 24then you shall bring them both out to the gate, and you shall stone them to death; the girl, because she did not cry out in the city, and the man, because he has violated his neighbor’s wife. Thus you shall purge the evil from among you. 25But if in the field the man finds the girl who is engaged, and the man forces her and lies with her, then only the man who lies with her shall die. 26But you shall do nothing to the girl; there is no sin in the girl worthy of death, for just as a man rises against his neighbor and murders him, so is this case. 27When he found her in the field, the engaged girl cried out, but there was no one to save her.
28If a man finds a girl who is a virgin, who is not engaged, and seizes her and lies with her and they are discovered, 29then the man who lay with her shall give to the girl’s father fifty shekels of silver, and she shall become his wife because he has violated her; he cannot divorce her all his days (NASB).
Martin makes the following criticism concerning this passage:
Here [in vv. 28-29] the victim of rape is the property of the father. Since the rapist has despoiled the father’s property he must pay a bridal fee. The [girl] apparently has no say in the matter and is forced to marry the person who raped her. Notice also if they are not discovered, no negative judgment is forthcoming. The implicit message seems to be that if you rape an unbetrothed virgin, be sure not to get caught.
Before getting further into the discussion, we note that Martin displays a lack of exposure to the historical and social context in which the Bible was written. With regard to the Deuteronomy 22 passage, we should note three distinct scenarios:
#1: Consensual sex/adultery between a man and a betrothed girl: v. 23: "He lies with her"; this need not imply force or violence. This act is tantamount to adultery as engagement is tantamount to marriage (‘he has violated his neighbor’s wife’).
#2: Rape of an engaged girl: v. 25: "[he] forces her [an engaged girl] and lies with her, then only the man who lies with her shall die."
#3: Rape of an unengaged/single girl: v. 28: "[he] seizes her [a girl who is single and not engaged] and lies with her and they are discovered": the word seize literally means "handle/take hold of." Although rape (as in the NIV) may be too strong a translation, according to Christopher Wright, this act does appears to be that of rape.
In response, then, to Martin’s criticism, one must point out that only in a legal sense were children considered "property" of the father in Old Testament Israel. So, to violate a girl—even with her consent—would be an offense against her father/parents as well. This is not so foreign as Martin would make it appear. In the United States, it is not uncommon to hear of attempts at legislation which a parent should be notified before a young teenage girl can have an abortion. This is a reasonable demand—even though this teenager is not the property of her parents.
With regard to the claim that the girl has no say in the matter and must marry the man, Martin overlooks the cultural background to such a command. In the latter case (v. 28), the sexual encounter appears to be that of a man taking advantage of a "minor." Christopher Wright argues:
the girl would no longer attract a potential bridegroom and the exchange of gifts and dowry that went along with the marriage. It is for this loss that the man must compensate the father (29a). . . . [This law] gives the offender no option but to marry the girl (and the father no right to refuse), with no easy way out through a quick subsequent divorce. The girl is thus assured of security and provision, in place of virtual widowhood if she had been abandoned after the loss of her virginity.
In addition, the law offers a further protection to both the girl and the (possible) child born from this union.
Martin misses the point and engages in an argument from silence when he says, "Notice also if they are not discovered, no negative judgment is forthcoming. The implicit message seems to be that if you rape an unbetrothed virgin, be sure not to get caught." First of all, in the case of casuistic law in the Pentateuch, not all contingencies are accounted for. Thus it is commonly understood among Old Testament scholars that the Israelite laws are exemplary rather than exhaustive. So there is no reason to think that all conditions should be spelled out. Furthermore, common sense tells us that not much can be done if there is no evidence to act on! We could rephrase what Martin says and apply it to the crime of a well-planned murder: "Notice also if a murder is not discovered, no negative judgment is forthcoming. The implicit message seems to be that if you murder someone, be sure not to get caught." But this is so obvious that Martin’s point seems silly. Thirdly, the mention of the word discovered in the biblical text (v. 28) is significant. It implies that if a man’s taking sexual advantage of an unengaged single girl becomes public knowledge, then the girl would certainly not be viewed as a prospective candidate for marriage within her society.
Let us continue with Martin’s argument:
In the case of the rape of a betrothed virgin in a city, the Bible says that both the rapist and the victim should be stoned to death: the rapist because he violated his neighbor’s wife and the victim because she did not cry for help [vv. 25-27]. Again, the assumption is that the rapist despoiled the property of another man and so must pay with his life. Concern for the welfare of the victim does not seem to matter. Moreover, it is assumed that in all cases that a rape victim could cry for help and if she did, she would be heard and rescued. Both of these assumptions are very dubious. . . .
On the other hand, according to the Bible, the situation is completely different if the rape occurs in "open country." Here the rapist should be killed, not the victim. The reason given is that if a woman cried for help in open country, she would not be heard. Consequently, she could not be blamed for allowing the rape to occur. No mention is made about the psychological harm to [the victim]. No condemnation is made of a rapist in open country, let alone in a city, who does not get caught.
We must clarify this notion of property in the first of the two paragraphs just cited. In verse 22, the penalty for adultery (to which a betrothed could be subject) is death (Dt. 22:22; Lev. 20:10). This fact argues against the assumption that women were nothing more than the property of their husbands in Old Testament Israel. After all, why destroy the "property" as well as punish the guilty man? Moreover, there is no other property offense in Old Testament law that is punishable by death. Thus Martin is simply wrong when he says "the [dubious] assumption is that the rapist despoiled the property of another man." Again, contrary to Martin’s claim that concern "for the welfare of the victim does not seem to matter," we have seen how the law provided security and material provision for young women who were sexually violated.
The other "dubious" assumption Martin mentions is similarly flawed: "it is assumed that in all cases that a rape victim could cry for help and if she did, she would be heard and rescued." Again, Wright addresses this issue, urging us to consider both intention, circumstances and action:
. . . the circumstances in which [sexual intercourse] occurs affect the assumptions the court might make regarding intention and thus also affect its allocation of guilt and punishment. The contrast between a busy town and a deserted countryside makes an obvious difference to what could be assumed regarding the woman’s consent. The difference is also expressed in the vocabulary [i.e., consent in v. 23 vs. rape in v. 25] . . . . In the latter case, the court should accept what could only be the woman’s own testimony in the matter and assume her innocence.
Regarding the first instance mentioned in our Deuteronomy 22 passage (i.e., adultery between an engaged girl and another man), there is a certain legitimate assumption: Although rape could take place in the city, this particular case is not one of rape because if the woman had cried for help, then help most certainly would have come. But because she did not call for help, it can be assumed that she consented to the man’s advances. But pace Martin, this Deuteronomy 22 passage is not assuming that in all cases the rape victim would be heard if she cried out, as Wright states. Thus given a few important facts about the biblical text and the cultural context, Martin’s arguments lose their force.
There is another passage Martin mentions, to which we now turn—Numbers 31:18, where, Martin alleges, "Moses encourages his men to use captured virgins for their own sexual pleasure, i.e., to rape them" (5). At first sight, the passage does seem quite harsh: "Now kill all the boys. And kill every woman who has slept with a man, but save for yourselves every girl who has never slept with a man" (NIV). However, the context for this command—as in various other OT commands of this nature—should not be overlooked. In light of the rampant adultery at Baal Peor and its potentially corrupting influence, this command is put in perspective. It is these young girls who have not debased themselves in the orgiastic worship of Baal (Num. 25).
Furthermore, Martin’s assumption that rape is presupposed here is mistaken. A similar passage in Deuteronomy 20:13-14 is worth noting:
When the Lord your God gives it [i.e., the city which has rejected Israel’s terms of peace] into your hand, you shall strike all the men in it with the edge of the sword. Only the women and the children and the animals and all that is in the city all its spoil, you shall take as booty for yourself.
John Sailhamer comments: "The present law ensures the well-being of those captured women [and children] by giving them protection against being sold into slavery. It also provides for the assimilation of the captive women into Israelite society by allowing marriage to them." Thus it was permissible in such instances to, not rape, but take a wife, who would be incorporated into the people of Israel through marriage. It seems far less likely that men could be as readily integrated into early Israel.
Martin again fails to make his case regarding the biblical perspective on rape. In a number of ways, then, the psychological well-being of the raped girl is taken into account: (a) she is provided for rather than abandoned to virtual widowhood because she has been sexually violated; (b) easy divorce by the man is not possible; (c) a potential child from this union has the security of a two-parent family. Also, by failing to account for many of the cultural dimensions of Old Testament Israelite culture, the force of Martin’s point is vitiated.
Conclusion
Michael Martin’s use of philosophical argument and the biblical text is insufficient to make his case. First, he has not established—from an ontological point of view—the objectivity of naturalistic morality; he has only dealt with the epistemological dimension. We also saw that theism rather than atheism furnishes a more fitting context for moral values, which themselves presuppose human dignity, purpose, rights, and the like. Second, Martin’s raising the Euthyphro dilemma seems purposeless since his atheistic position is vulnerable to just such a dilemma. Furthermore, Anselm’s perfect-being theology offers a sufficient way out of the Euthyphro dilemma. In this scenario, we see a God who acts morally naturally and without consulting any exterior moral standards (i.e., without obligation). Finally, Martin’s argument against the Bible’s view on rape fails to make any case for the atheistic position.
So can Martin be a moral realist? Yes, with regard to the order of knowing; no, with regard to the order of being.
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