From: Paul W. Ewald
Date: 10.2.01
What are they up to?
The puppet masters who orchestrated the September 11th attack might
be as strategically suicidal as many people make them out to be. That
assumption leads to an oft-mentioned scenario for this episode of our
history. They destroy a symbol of free enterprise and thousands of
civilians. We get mad and blow them away. End of story.
The future might unfolds in this way. But underestimation of the
enemy has been a common cause of disaster throughout history, from
the underestimation of Romans by the Teutones and the underestimation
of the Parthians by Romans a half century later to underestimation of
the Soviets by the Nazi's and the underestimation of the Afghans by
the Soviets a half century later. Imperial Japan paid dearly for its
underestimation of the destructive power of the United States a half
century ago. We would be wise consider carefully the possibility that
the attack at the World Trade Center is part of a clever strategy
rather than simply an act of terrorism.
The horizons of analysts have generally been focused on relatively
gradual escalations of destruction that can be grasped in the context
of previous experiences with terrorism. We need to consider the
entire spectrum of possible scenarios, particularly those on the most
damaging end of the spectrum, all in the context of the possible
goals of the perpetrators and the tradeoffs they would be willing to
experience in order to achieve those goals. Many analysts have
mentioned, for example, the danger of repeating the recent Soviet
fiasco in Afghanistan, but that possibility is a relatively minor
threat. The U.S. has demonstrated competence at learning from
mistakes of previous engagements. The greater dangers lie in new
opportunities for disaster that arise from the minds and actions of
clever adversaries who do not share our values - in this case the
values of technological advancement and freedoms of speech and
expression.
Perhaps the most important starting point in assessing the spectrum
of dangers is to recognize that our terminology may restrict our
outlook. The term terrorist may not be appropriate in the current
situation, because, by definition, terrorists are committing violent
acts to instill terror in the target population. This term causes us
to focus on our response rather than the goals of our adversaries.
The perpetrators may be global nihilists and may thus be more
dangerous than mere terrorists.
The first step in this line of thinking arises frequently in the
discussions of the motivation of the perpetrators. It is suggests
that the September 11th attack was carried out to provoke the United
States and its allies to lash out against Islamic countries, thereby
increasing support for the militant fringes of Islam. But the
important questions is, "For what purpose?" If the finger pointing at
Osama bin Laden is pointing in the right direction, we can look to
his rhetoric for clues to the strategic motivations behind the
attack. His rhetoric suggests that he is motivated by the American
presence in Saudi Arabia because it is holy soil for Islam. He calls
for American withdrawal from Saudi Arabia. But is that really his
goal?
The actions of bin Laden and his associates use of economic resources
to destroy the people and structures of modern society. More economic
resources would allow him to create more destruction for whatever
long-term goals he may have. The Saudi economic wealth seems the most
attractive source of such resources. His fractious history with the
Saudi government, his connections there, and his recent criticism of
the Saudi government for allowing American presence in Saudi Arabia
are all consistent with control of Saudi wealth as the intermediate
goal of the current round of destruction. If so the emphasis on the
US presence is a clever chess move. By casting the American military
presence as an affront to the holiest sites of Islam, he generates
animosity against the Saudi government and the US. If the US were to
withdraw (for example, to reduce the animosity against the Saudi
government) then bin Laden becomes more powerful because he is
considered a hero and leader for many in the Islamic world; moreover,
an important military barrier to the takeover of the Saudi resources
is removed. If the US maintains its military presence in Saudi Arabia
and especially if it uses these bases to harm civilians, then the
animosity against the US and the Saudi government is heightened,
again increasing support for bin Laden and his program for militant
Islam.
One way to get control of Saudi wealth would be to push the situation
in Saudi Arabia toward a revolution like the one that toppled the
Shah of Iran. One way to so push this situation would be to make the
United States so angry that it would lash out against predominantly
Islamic countries, causing the death of innocent muslims. Or, if such
violence could not be instigated, perhaps the rhetoric of the United
States could be ratcheted up, creating the sense of a Crusade against
Islam.
If Osama bin Laden understands the American mindset even moderately
well, he would not expect the United States to pack up and withdraw
from Saudi Arabia in response to the attack on the World Trade
Center. If that were his preferred outcome the attack would have
occurred against Americans or the American base in Saudi Arabia
rather than on US soil, as in the Beirut model. Attacks on American
soil will strengthen rather than weaken American resolve to maintain
our presence in Saudi Arabia. Thus his rhetoric about the American
bases in Saudi Arabia was probably crafted to get muslims inflamed
against the Saudi government. His following in Saudi Arabia, his
familiarity with Saudi society, and his contacts within that society
may put him in a relatively good position to generate this response
and to use it to topple the Saudi government.
But why control of the Saudi government? It could be just revenge,
but his past actions indicate that his mode of operation involves
control of the wealth and the things that wealth could by, things
such as nuclear weapons. Attempts to gain large numbers of nuclear
weapons by countries who would like to have them has not been
particularly successful. But two points should be kept in mind. These
countries did not have the economic assets of Saudi Arabia to
allocate to this purpose, and the net value of nuclear weapons for
most countries may be much less than for someone who wants to control
a medieval world. Osama bin Laden has reportedly been attempting to
acquire nuclear weapons, apparently without success. But his nest egg
of a quarter billion dollars is pocket change in comparison with the
wealth of Saudi Arabia. We should consider carefully, and
imaginatively, what he might have planned for such weapons should he
acquire them.
On the basis of statements and actions by bin Laden and his
associates, the prospect of destroying modern civilization is not as
unappealing for them as it would be for people who value modern
civilization. It has become a cliche to talk about bombing an
opponent back to the Stone Age. As Walter M. Miller has portrayed in
his novel CANTICLE FOR LIEBOWITZ, however, this cliche is probably
incorrect. There would be enough steel tools, implements, and
information to support a lifestyle no more primitive than that
enjoyed in the Middle Ages. The life style advocated by the most
severe of the militants bears a much greater similarity to medieval
lifestyles than does the lifestyles of technologically advanced
society. Which of the two sides would be more deterred by the
prospect of being bombed back to the Middle Ages, and which side
would be more likely to make such threats and carry them out if they
had the weapons in hand? The jockeying between the US and USSR over
nuclear weapons appears tame - even collegial - compared with the
actions that could be envisioned when one side has little interest in
the products of post medieval technology, except as tools to destroy
post-medieval technology.
If their intermediate goal is to replace the Saudi government through
a revolution analogous to the Iranian revolution that toppled the
Shah, will the US and other governments of the modern world be
willing to do what is necessary to prevent it? If the Saudi
government is toppled, what would these governments of the modern
world be willing to do to avoid having the wealth of this region
being transformed into weapons of mass destruction?
Could such mass destruction actually be accomplished by people who
seem to interested in using modern technology primarily to destroy
modern technology? The destructive power of modern technology is
great - only a tiny fraction of it has ever been used. One wouldn't
need thousands of nuclear bombs to bomb civilization back to the
Middle Ages, perhaps only a few hundred, well placed in the centers
of modern civilization, and enough planning to detonate them
simultaneously.
It is not just enough for the modern governments to think like the
enemy. For democratic societies the general public must also do so,
because government action is dependent on public support. The
emotional responses of the public and the action that they take and
advocate can either ameliorate or exacerbate the threat. Usurpation
of mid-east wealth by global nihilists could have catastrophic
consequences that dwarf the effects of the World Trace Center attack.
Recognizing this difference can be important in generating public
support for activities the reduce the chances of revolutions in
countries such as Saudi Arabia.
Lesser threats may also be altered by public awareness and action.
One of the best example concerns biological weapons. As I argued in a
recent book (Plague Time, Free Press:NY), biological weapons are not
particularly effective weapons for terrorists. For the same reasons
they would not be particularly good weapons for global nihilists.
Rather than weakening resolve their use would tend to galvanize. The
threat of biological weapons, however, generates concern because the
damage they could cause is repulsive and potentially pervasive. If
the public realizes this difference between their use as a threat and
as a weapon, and are prepared to withstand the impact of their use,
their effectiveness as a threat diminishes.
The relative ineffectiveness of pathogens as weapons does not mean
that they will never be used, but it does mean that we might be able
to reduce the possibility of their use by making their net
effectiveness even less than it already is. One of the best ways to
lower their effectiveness is vaccination. Those who are making
decisions about public health have been slow to move in this
direction, apparently because they are applying guidelines that are
appropriate in the absence of terrorist threats to situations in
which such threats are manifest. The tradeoffs in these two
circumstances are different.
It would be ethically questionable to require that everyone use a
vaccine such as the vaccine against smallpox, which, like most
vaccines, imposes a small probably of serious adverse effects (one in
ten-thousand to one in a million vaccines depending on the adverse
effect and the care in assessing associated risks). However, choosing
not to produce and make available a vaccine such as the smallpox
vaccine is also ethically questionable for several reasons, the most
obvious being that unvaccinated people may die or becomes seriously
ill during an attack. In addition, the ability to administer vaccines
safely may be diminished during a crisis situation and people who
might have been at a low risk for severe side effects prior to the
attack might have developed conditions that place them at high risk
by the time of the attack (conditions such as immunosuppression or
eczema, for example). Perhaps most importantly, the greater the
proportion of the population that is vaccinated, the greater the
probability of deterring such an attack. If a population is mostly
immune through vaccination, terrorists would have little impetus to
initiate an attack, which would tend to make them look impotent and
incompetent. In a situation such as the current one, getting
vaccinated against smallpox could therefore be considered an activity
that contributes to the defense not just of the vaccinated individual
but to the country as a whole. Making the relevant vaccines available
along with the relevant information about benefits and risks is the
ethically sound alternative.
Unfortunately, because those making the key decisions has been so
slow to recognize these tradeoffs, there are now woefully
insufficient numbers of the relevant vaccines. According to the
current schedule, vaccines against smallpox, for example, will not be
generally available in until 2004. It is incredible to hear experts
argue, as they have for several years, that a suitable vaccine
against smallpox cannot be made widely available, even though one had
been generally available for most of the past two centuries.
When evaluating and preparing for possible scenarios we need to shift
mentally from considering the problem from the perspective of the
targets to the perspective of the perpetrators. When we do so the
threat of biological weapons shifts from being a primary concern to a
secondary concern. This threat could be shifted further to a tertiary
concern for particular pathogens if an educated public takes action
by encouraging development of and access to vaccines, and by becoming
vaccinated.
If the instigators World Trade Center attack really are terrorists
rather than global nihilists, then some of the preparations may be
overreaction. But most of these preparations should still be useful
for terrorists. Access to vaccination is useful in either category of
attacker, as is the avoidance of harm to innocent civilians. Taking
actions that precisely target those who have carried out and who are
planning to carry out attacks should be beneficial in either case,
but especially for global nihilists because it removes the immediate
threat and the long-term threat associated with recruitment.
Some actions (such as support of Saudi government and provision of
vaccines against the most dangerous pathogens) can reduce the
attackers' estimates of success. If these estimates are reduced
sufficiently, attempts may be postponed. Postponement buys time for
countermeasures, and perpetual postponement is equivalent to a
permanent protection.
With regard to military options, before we race in to attack we
should assess whether the attack is part of the enemy's next move.
Overenthusiasm for an attack together with underestimation of the
enemy's strategy led the Romans to be slaughtered by the Parthians,
and the Soviets to be slaughtered by the Afghans. The current
situation offers few military targets and a great potential for
collateral damage to civilians, while modern technology offers new
and powerful strategies for attacks against us. As we plan our
actions to neutralize the enemy in response to the World Trace Center
attack, we need to assess and prepare for new ways in which
overenthusiasm for a counter-attack could be part of the enemy's plan
for a much greater slaughter. Because our long-term strategy depends
on their long-term strategy, gaining intelligence information about
their long-term goals may be as important as gaining information
about their locations and plans for attacks.
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