Omaid Weekly
22 October 2001
Next Afghan government to be composed of Afghans, not Pakistani mercenaries and agents
Editorial
After the September 11 devastation, it became more evident to the world -- at least to some of those who were still ignorant of this blatant fact -- that, for many years now, Pakistan's military establishment directly and indirectly supported terrorists based in Afghanistan.
Veritably, it has been many years that Osama bin Laden and thousands of his followers have fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan, and outside of that country, have organized and committed numerous terrorist and murderous acts.
Throughout these years, Pakistan's intelligence agency, the InterServices Intelligence (ISI) directorate, has given them all sorts of aid and assistance. Only after September 11 were Pakistani generals forced to nix their support to the Taliban, and instead join the United States-led international war against terrorism. However, Pakistan's cooperation with the international anti-terror alliance is the façade Islamabad would like us to see.
In reality, Pakistan hasn't truly brought any genuine or fundamental change to the ISI, which continues to be a staunch and dedicated ally of the Taliban and other terrorist groups. The removal of a given general or agency head does not bring any substantial or concrete change to the policies of that given agency or organization.
Through various means, the ISI is still trying to keep a foothold in Afghanistan. Currently, ISI generals and some of their Afghan agents have sought to popularize, and eventually legitimize, the oxymoronic term "moderate Taliban." In doing so, the ISI hopes to prolong the rule of the barbaric, murderous, and disgraced Taliban militia.
According to ISI generals, the best example of a "moderate Taliban" is the militia's so-called "foreign minister," Mulla Wakil Ahmad Motawakel. Among the good deeds of Mulla Motawakel, whose ISI-manufactured defection is still being played out, are his call, broadcast in a widely seen television program, for international assistance to help the Taliban build execution galleys in Kabul.
The inclusion of the Taliban in a future government is a flagrant affront against the bloodstained nation of Afghanistan. And any support given to this idea -- from opinion or editorial pieces to diplomatic dealings -- is a bona fide act of cruelty and oppression against the nation and people of Afghanistan.
As Haroun Amin, a Washington representative of Afghanistan's United Front national resistance force, recently stated on a CNBC program, imposing elements of the Taliban on the people of Afghanistan is the same as if the World War II allies had imposed elements of the Nazis (which they may have termed "moderate Nazis") on the German people.
To exploit any opportunities made possible by the current crisis, and in addition to jockeying for support for their "moderate Taliban" scheme, Pakistani generals have called to task some of their most contemptible and disdained Afghan spies and agents. The ISI plans to send these Afghan agents and spies into Afghanistan, use them as a rallying point, provide them with assistance, and build around them any future Afghan government. In many cases, these Afghan agents and spies will simply repeat the roles they played in the 1980s and early 1990s. A prime example is Jalaluddin Haqqani, who is reportedly responsible for many of the atrocities committed by the Taliban in their attacks in the Shamali -- such as the poisoning of reservoirs.
It is shameful for anyone involved in the Afghan crisis and its outcome to ignore genuine and honorable Afghans, and instead, under the influence of Pakistani generals, choose to impose -- or re-impose -- the dishonorable and infamous on Afghanistan and its people.
All of Afghanistan's ethnic groups, in all its regions, include among them hundreds of patriotic and virtuous individuals. And these are the individuals who must compose the next Afghan government, not Pakistani mercenaries and agents. ><
Taliban lack support from the Afghan people One of the last interviews of Ahmad Shah Masood (ra)
Omaid Weekly exclusive: The following is an interview with Ahmad Shah Masood (rahmatullah alaih - God's blessings upon him), conducted in early August 2001 by Dr. Piotr Balcerowicz, a lecturer at the Institute of Oriental Studies at Warsaw University. Dr. Balcerowicz, who had consulted with Omaid Weekly before his trip to northern Afghanistan this summer, has traveled the world widely and has numerous writings on Afghanistan.
Piotr Balcerowicz: How was it possible that in the early- and mid-90s the Taliban movement proved so successful? Which factors were responsible?
Ahmad Shah Masood: Three main factors contributed to their success at that time. First, it was the unstable situation inside Afghanistan when the Soviets withdrew their troops in 1989. The mujahideen were not in good terms with each other, especially in Qandahar in the south and in the areas controlled by Abdur Rashid Dostum. On the top of that, the misdeeds of compatriots such as Gulbudin Hekmatyar and some others played a major role.
The second factor was the assistance the Taliban were receiving mainly and directly from Pakistan, and indirectly from the United States. Pakistan intervened from the very outset and was engaged in founding the Taliban movement. Saudi Arabia also helped.
Third, the Taliban themselves adapted good military tactics and had good and well-calculated politics. They chose good slogans for the people: they came to bring peace. With good military tactics, they started their offensive from Qandahar. And the very fact that they came under the name of the Taliban, that is “religious students” or “seekers of true knowledge”, gave them legitimacy.
These factors were responsible for pushing back the mujahideen.
But, in fact, as you well know yourself, all these factors I have mentioned are large chapters by themselves and should dealt with separately in great detail.
PB: If you knew then what you know now, and if you could go back in time, to the early 1990s, how would you have done things differently? What would you have changed your policy and strategy?
Ahmad Shah Masood: The factors I have mentioned were not completely within our control. They were of a more generic nature, relating to the overall character of the country and its territory. We had control only over some of them, and then only to a very limited degree.
A good example of a neglected factor that we could have but did not influence was some kind of reconciliation. We should have been more willing to compromise. In other words, the forces of the United Front [eds: Afghanistan's national resistance force], as a democratic entity, which is now fighting the Taliban, should have been unified before [the Taliban's success]. It is only now that people like Ismail Khan, Abdur Rashid Dostum, Haji Abdul Qadir fight side by side. But they were not at that time.
But, in fact, this is not something we were able to do at that time, because Pakistan was dealing with each of them separately, making it extremely difficult -- practically beyond our control -- to compromise. We were not in a position, even in the 1990s, to bring an effective change even in the areas controlled by Dostum in the north or in Qandahar in the south.
PB: In 1996, you were in Kabul when the Taliban came, offering peace and cessation of internal fights. Why was their proposal, their scenario to put an end to the civil war, more attractive for people at that time than the solutions suggested by you?
Ahmad Shah Masood: Once the Taliban reached Kabul, their slogans were no longer effective. As you know, the Taliban had to fight at the gates of Kabul for two years. We were defeated mainly because Gulbuddin Hekmatyar evacuated his positions in Char Asyab on the outskirts of the city in 1995. Consequently, the Taliban came through the east, that is through the lines that had been previously under the control of Hekmatyar and Haji Qadir.
Even as early as 1995 and 1996, during the fighting in and around Kabul, and despite the difficult situation, we did not see any, even slightest, indication of hostility against our government or resentment among the population of Kabul districts under our control, such as open protests, revolts or rioting against us or the taking of weapons from government soldiers. But, this is precisely what could be observed in the Taliban-controlled part.
For a time, Kabul was partitioned into two zones, after we had had to withdraw our forces because of Hekmatyar’s act of disloyalty. We had already evacuated half of Kabul, and Taliban were in control of the other half. Still the population of Kabul did not fight against us, even though they could have.
As you can now see, it is the Taliban who have been, in the end, morally defeated. They have been gradually ruined because the have always perceived Kabul as a hostile place and they are still afraid of the repetition of the 1997 rioting and unrest. In general, they are very much mistrustful when it comes to the people in the territories they have captured.
Not far from Khoja Bahauddin in Takhar Province, there is an area called La Haban where the Taliban attacked our positions three days ago. As a consequence, they lost as many as 14 commanders in that area. It was partly due to their mistrust and fear of the people of Taloqan: They were so suspicious of the people of Taloqan that they had to withdraw most of their heavy weapons from the city. Such incidents are not rare. We have never had such worries and concerns while we were in Taloqan, or in any other province.
Continued in our next issue... ><
"United Front," not "Northern Alliance"
A 17 October 2001 press advisory from the United Front
An erroneous application by the news media of the name "The Northern Alliance" as opposed to "The United Front," the Official Title of the political and military coalition fighting the Pakistan-Taliban-Osama bin-Laden Axis in Afghanistan over the last several years, appears to be leading to an inadvertent public misconception, given currency to by the Pakistani government driven by ulterior motives.
The origins of the United Front dates back to 1997, when it was set up for the first time as an umbrella organization comprising a number of leading Afghani political parties and yet remaining open to all patriotic Afghan groups, irrespective of their ethnic, tribal, sectarian and linguistic orientation, fighting the Taliban and their foreign supporters.
Although the non-Pashtoon peoples of Afghanistan, who make up well over 60% of the country's population, came to have majority representation in the Front, the Pashtoons, a certain number of whom have formed the predominantly Pakistani Pashtoon and non-Pashtoon Taliban, were also welcomed to the Front. Indeed, several prominent Pashtoon leaders and commanders joined the Front, and are now active members of the Front at both leadership and field levels.
The so-called "Northern Alliance" on the other hand is a term that the Taliban and their Pakistani masters have sought to disseminate, with the sole objective of impressing upon the international community that the anti-Taliban forces represent only the peoples of northern Afghanistan and, by implication, are against the Pashtoons; and, therefore, not worthy of being treated by the international community as sufficiently representative to play a central role in a political settlement of the Afghan conflict.
Shored up by the joining of a wide cross-section of the people of Afghanistan, including the Pashtoons, today, the Front is an inclusive entity, which encompasses all ethnic groups of Afghanistan. Today, there are Pashtoon commanders present in the United Front, who are active, among other areas, in the southern Qandahar and Helmand provinces of Afghanistan. The title "United Front" portrays the underlying policy of the Islamic State of Afghanistan aimed at uniting all ethnic groups of Afghanistan in recognition of the ethnically diverse society of the country. Thus stated, it is important to remember that there were a couple of prominent Pashtoon leaders as part of the United Front ranking delegation, who signed the October 1, 2001 agreement with the representatives of the Rome Process headed by the former King of Afghanistan, Mohammad Zahir Shah, in Rome, Italy.
The United Front is the only inclusive and credible representative political military institution present in today's actual political-military scene in Afghanistan.
It is, therefore, highly important for the international news media and the world community at large to understand the fallacy and connotations associated with the use of the term "The Northern Alliance", and to that end apply the correct title "The United Islamic and National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan" (UNIFSA) summarily known as "The United Front", while addressing the forces fighting the Pakistan-Taliban-bin-Ladin Axis. >< |
