OMAID WEEKLY
29 October 2001
Democracy is the only solution for Afghanistan
One of the last interviews of Ahmad Shah Masood (ra)
Omaid Weekly exclusive: Continued from our previous issue, the following is an interview with Ahmad Shah Masood (rahmatullah alaih - God's blessings upon him), conducted in early August 2001 by Dr. Piotr Balcerowicz, a lecturer at the Institute of Oriental Studies at Warsaw University. Dr. Balcerowicz, who had consultated with Omaid Weekly before his trip to northern Afghanistan this summer, has travelled the world widely and has numerous writings on Afghanistan.
Piotr Balcerowicz: It is sometimes said that ethnic factors underlie the conflict between you and the Taliban. The Taliban are generally supported by the Pashtoon population, whereas the United Front [eds: Afghanistan's national resistance force] are supported by Tajiks.
Ahmad Shah Masood: Despite the years-long fighting in Afghanistan, ethnic differences, and all the difficulties that plague Afghanistan, I do not think that there is even a single Afghan who would favour the disintegration or fragmentation of the country along ethnic lines. We are all unanimous that there should be one, unified Afghanistan.
PB: What are the prospects for any peace agreement with the Taliban...when all such [previous] attempts have been consistently rejected by the Taliban.
Ahmad Shah Masood: Yes, that is still feasible, provided Pakistan stops supporting the Taliban so that the Taliban will have no other choice but to negotiate with us.
In the past, the Taliban had only one demand from everybody: "capitulate and surrender your weapons." This was their only demand. In the course of time, their demands have changed. Now they tell us: "Keep your weapons, and we will keep ours; you can retain your territory, and you can even have the second most important post in the government, the prime ministry; but there is one condition: accept the Emirate of Afghanistan [eds: Taliban administration] and its principles." We have rejected this offer.
I see it extremely difficult, and to some extent impossible, to co-exist with the Taliban in the long run, or to share a long-term coalition with them.
We do, however, only see the possibility of sharing a coalition government with the Taliban for a transitional period, at the end of which we should go toward democratic elections. In our opinion, that is the only acceptable solution. Otherwise to come up with a permanent solution in which the Taliban are involved seems extremely difficult, if at all possible.
PB: Suppose you succeed in resolving the conflict either by forming a coalition government or by winning the war against the Taliban. What would be the main principles governing the future Afghan state? In other words, what are the social and legislative fundamentals of your ideal Afghan state?
Ahmad Shah Masood: I would like to emphasise that, by no means, do we strive to seize full power. Our aim is not to have the upper hand in Afghanistan. No at all!
What we struggle for is something else: an Afghanistan where every Afghan -- irrespective of sex -- finds happiness for himself or herself. I am deeply convinced that this can only be ensured through democracy and a democratically elected government, based on consensus. It is only then that we can indeed solve a number of problems that have beset the Afghan people. The true solution lies only in such a political and social situation and only with such a type of government in which all tribes, all ethnic groups, and all the people see themselves fairly represented.
PB: As we all know, the Taliban are largely Pashtoon, whereas the United Front is largely Tajik, but also includes significant numbers of Pashtoons and Uzbeks [eds: and Hazaras]. What role does the difference in ethnic composition play in the conflict between the [United Front] and the Taliban?
Ahmad Shah Masood: Firstly, that is not the only factor in the conflict, but it is certainly one of the causes. [However,] Haji Abdul Kadir, a member of the anti-Taliban democratic opposition [eds: the United Front], is a Pashtoon. At the same time, there are Tajiks who are fighting alongside the Taliban in Badakhshan [in the northeast] and Qandahar [in the south] provinces.
There is also no doubt that injustices of the past have been a reason for today's fighting. But, again, that is not the only motive or reason for today’s war. There are many other factors.
One such factor is the [discrepancy in the] view of Afghanistan's present and the vision of Afghanistan's future. The Taliban say: "Join us and accept the post of prime minister," while they keep the highest office in the country, the presidency. But, for what price?!
The difference between [the United Front and the Taliban] concerns mainly our way of thinking about the very principles of [Afghan] society and the State. We cannot accept their conditions, or else we would have to compromise our principle of wanting to create a modern democracy. We are fundamentally against the system called "the Emirate of Afghanistan." I would like to return to the issue of the "Emirate" in a moment.
In fact, it is Pakistan that is responsible for deepening the crack between the ethnic groups in Afghanistan. It is a contemporary usage of the old method of "divide and conquer." Pakistan simply wants to ensure that Afghanistan will not be a sovereign power for a very long time.
Continued in our next issue…
Powell's comments show low regard for Afghans
By Farhad Ahad
As an Afghan-American and a participant in the international Afghan community, I am puzzled and disappointed over Secretary of State Colin Powell's latest stance on the Taliban. In a State Department briefing, Powell said that if the Taliban comply with US requests to turn over Osama bin Laden, then Afghanistan would go back to where it was before the attacks, with the Taliban running the country "whether for good or for bad." In an interview with The Associated Press, he went further and said, "If they did that, we wouldn't be worrying about whether they are the regime in power or not," and "it's a tough place to fight conventional battles." Why would Powell make such remarks?
Back in May, in a news conference announcing $43 million of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, Powell stated that the aid "will bypass the Taliban," who, in fact, were not helpful "but worsen the relief situation."
First, how the aid reached the people of Afghanistan and where it went remains unclear to Afghan-Americans. Second, Powell is aware that the Taliban: 1) harbor and defend the indicted terrorists including members of al-Qaida, 2) have committed unspeakable crimes against humanity in Afghanistan, 3) do not have any meaningful support among the vast majority of the people of Afghanistan, 4) lack international credibility, 5) are to women in Afghanistan what the fascist Nazis were to Jews, and 6) in addition to committing genocide against all Afghans, they are guilty of carrying out razing, murdering, raping and looting throughout parts of Afghanistan under their occupation.
Exactly how narrow are Powell's targets? Does he believe that "smoking Osama out of his hole," "dead or alive," will stop the Taliban from continuing their campaign of crimes against humanity?
After the Persian Gulf War, I read Bob Woodward's book The Commanders, which included profiles of the military figures behind the US and the commanders' stances on the war. Then, as now, Powell voiced steadfast objections to freeing Kuwait using military force and promoted ousting Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein through economic sanctions. Powell thus effectively disobeyed the commander in chief, who had decided the only option to force Saddam out of Kuwait was through the use of force.
Today, the statistics are against Powell: It is estimated that some 20,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed in the war. However, the casualty toll of the economic blockade against Iraq stands at approximately 50 times that number -- 1 million children victims. So why is it that Powell shies away from military action -- followed by humanitarian and economic aid -- instead of ongoing sanctions and isolation?
Woodward claims that as a commander in Vietnam, Powell was committed to protecting his men in uniform. The "Zero Casualty" doctrine is the work of Powell, and he has promoted it time and again in public interviews. In fact, and understandably, the American public has rewarded him with great trust and the highest prestige for his remarkable record of sustaining minimal American casualties. Yet today, the war against terrorism is different. The philosophy of "Zero Casualty" might be acceptable in wars of limited scope, such as bombing raids in Kosova; however, will it succeed as a tactic in America's "new war"?
As a student of political science and history, I strongly believe that had the US special operation forces carried out the mission to snatch bin Laden from Afghanistan as far back as two years ago, the world would be a much safer place now. The operation risked the loss of a small number of lives in the special operation forces; the outcome would have prevented the attacks on civilian targets, perhaps saving more than 6,500 innocent lives. The mission was canceled, perhaps, because of the risk involved in this type of operation.
Afghan-Americans, who lost at least one of their own heroes in the World Trade Center tragedy, one of the first emergency medical technicians to arrive at the scene, are left to assume that for Powell, the lives of men in uniform might be of greater value than those of civilians.
Unsuspecting attacks on civilians can be forgiven through diplomacy, but soldiers' lives will not be placed at risk. It is disconcerting to think that despite the fact that history is against Powell's doctrine, he continues to dismiss the significant threat to American and universal humanitarian principles posed by the isolated and oppressive Taliban militia.
For this Afghan-American, Powell's remarks resemble nothing short of a lack of regard for innocent civilians, whether they are the people of Afghanistan or Americans in the United States or around the world, as long as the military incurs no casualties. Is this how Powell plans to fight the new war? By turning a blind eye to collaborators of the terrorists, in an attempt to subdue a hypothetical "cycle of violence," or rewarding them with monetary and political means? It is difficult to think the terrorists will not be encouraged to behave more audaciously the next time they are ready to carry out an attack.
The acts from Kobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, to the embassies in Africa, to the USS Cole, all the way to the US soil, should be lessons that rewarding terrorism with inaction is a recipe for further, and more tragic, acts. ><
Also contributed to the Houston Chronicle. |
