"... there seems little prospect that the Alliance could think of taking the most committed of Taleban strongholds, such as Kandahar, where popular religious, family and Pashtun community commitment to the Taleban authorities merge into a continuum. "
MONDAY NOVEMBER 12 2001
After Mazar
thetimes.co.uk
America must soon clarify what it wants from its Afghan allies
After the stalemate, the action was swift. The capture of Mazar-i Sharif was, for the US and for Britain as well as their uncertain allies the Northern Alliance, a quick victory which seemed overdue. Opponents of the campaign in Afghanistan, as well as some of its more restless supporters, had been bemoaning the lack of tangible results from five weeks of airstrikes. The seizure of Mazar-i Sharif on Friday represented the first substantial victory of the campaign. It made it possible, at last, to draw a cross on a map to show where the Taleban had been pushed back. It has been swiftly followed by victories in other towns in the area, and a push by the Northern Alliance towards Kabul. Perhaps buoyed by this success, Geoff Hoon, the Defence Secretary, yesterday gave the first confirmation that British troops are on the ground in Afghanistan.
Yet it would be unwise to exaggerate the breakthrough. Victory in Mazar brings new challenges as well as new opportunities for the Alliance and the international military coalition operating through it. The Alliance’s task on the ground will only get harder, in military terms, from now on. The areas in the north of Afghanistan that it holds today are those most hostile to the Taleban for historical and ethnic reasons — and therefore easiest for enemies of the Taleban to sway.
Mazar-i Sharif was never a natural Taleban stronghold. In 1997 Mazar townsfolk drove Taleban fighters out within days of their first invasion; they paid a bloody price for their rebellion when Taleban forces marched back in 15 months later, slaughtering hundreds of people, forcing women out of school and imposing Sharia. Resentment has festered. Reports of mass beard-shaving and dancing in the street this weekend suggest that its recapture has proved a relief to locals.
The Northern Alliance’s next moves, which must logically take it south into the traditional homelands of the majority Pashtun ethnic group and of the Taleban, will inevitably be harder for this unruly alliance of ethnic minorities. Even if the Alliance were to move on to Kabul, capturing the capital from its Taleban rulers, there would be nothing to stop guerrillas pursuing a partisan war against it from the rugged lands all around. This strategy was enough to baffle Soviet troops while they held Afghanistan’s cities in the 1980s.
At present, there seems little prospect that the Alliance could think of taking the most committed of Taleban strongholds, such as Kandahar, where popular religious, family and Pashtun community commitment to the Taleban authorities merge into a continuum. Alliance generals, who are today fighting together for convenience’s sake but may fall out at any time, have methods of celebrating success so bloody that the Western partners sponsoring them risk being embarrassed. Yet, as the military challenges facing them grow harder, Alliance leaders will need ever more back-up from the West, through both air support and ground troops.
A diplomatic conundrum — the need to balance Pakistan’s wish for strong Pashtun involvement in a future Afghan government with Russia’s wish for it to be built around the non-Pashtun Alliance — has made Western leaders dither over how far to let the Alliance seize the military initiative. This has resulted in Western messages so mixed — among them President Bush’s exhortation to “head south . . . but not into the city of Kabul itself”, and Mr Hoon’s floppy formulation, “we want them to march towards Kabul . . . to deny the Taleban regime and Osama bin Laden space” — that the Alliance is unsure how to proceed. Nevertheless, by last night Alliance commanders believed they had secured Western backing for an attack on Kabul that they hoped would be under way before dawn. It is unrealistic to expect the Alliance to wait, poised on the brink of each victory, while Western allies weigh the next moves. Leaders in Washington and London will have to make much clearer what they want of their Afghan allies. |
