November 13, 2001
Commentary
As Taliban Falter, We
Must Show No Restraint
By Ralph Peters. Mr. Peters is a retired Army officer and the author of "Fighting For The Future: Will America Triumph?" (Stackpole Books, 1999).
Far more armies have been destroyed during a retreat than during a battle. An army may be defeated without losing its cohesion or will to fight, and the average clash of arms is more likely to give it a black eye than to break its back. But when an army feels hopelessly beaten and the soldier's fear breaks the bonds of discipline to become panic, forces that appeared formidable days or only hours beforehand can dissolve into little more than desperate running targets for the victor's pursuit. The exploitation of an enemy's collapse pays the greatest dividends of any form of military operation. And that opportunity lies before us.
As I write, those Taliban forces deployed to northern Afghanistan appear to be broken and in disarray. U.S. forces are aiding the Northern Alliance's pursuit of our enemies. We have the precious chance to maintain the momentum, to increase the pressure, to spread panic among the Taliban forces, and, perhaps, to begin the process of annihilating the field forces protecting Osama bin Laden, Mullah Omar, and their lieutenants. This could be the beginning of the end -- although the last phases of this campaign, the brutal mopping up, could still take months or more. We must not throw away the opportunity to strip terrorism of its military cover.
War is no time to listen to the voices of moderation, as exemplified by the worried tones of diplomats. If we give in to the nonsensical caution that the Northern Alliance should not be allowed to take Kabul, we may squander the best opportunity to bring about the Taliban's broad collapse before the winter. Far from complicating a peace by alienating the Pashtun majority in Afghanistan's south, the Northern Alliance's control of Kabul would be a bargaining chip and an incentive to the Taliban's erstwhile supporters to enter a coalition government. Control of Kabul means psychological dominance of the country. We must not leave the city in enemy hands.
If we are fortunate, the Northern Alliance will break their tentative promise not to enter Kabul and seize the city at the first opportunity. Their instincts are better than ours, and they know that when your enemy is down it is time to hit him harder than ever.
In Desert Storm, we had the power and momentum to go all the way to Baghdad, but we listened to the diplomats, whose bureaucratic hegemony is threatened by military victory. As a result, Iraq remains a cancerous problem for us and the world. Precisely the same self-hobbling thinking has persuaded our government that the Northern Alliance must be restrained in its progress. This is utter folly, but it guarantees continued work for fools with diplomatic passports.
Wars are to be won. They are not playing fields for theorists. Enemies are to be destroyed, not merely admonished. And the best chance to destroy a military enemy is to pursue him relentlessly and ferociously when his organization begins to come apart. From Varus's Roman legions in the marshes of Germany, through Napoleon's retreat from Moscow, to the destruction of, first, entire Soviet armies, then entire German ones on World War II's Eastern Front, down to the Highway of Death leading north from Kuwait City, mighty armies -- or those perceived as such -- have been destroyed utterly when their fronts collapsed and they struggled to save themselves by fleeing. This is a killing hour, and we must rise to it.
There are many variables in war, and we cannot predict the outcome of the current round of sieges, battles and retreats in Afghanistan with certainty. The Northern Alliance's pursuit may falter short of Kabul -- out of supplies, energy, adequate numbers of troops or operational unity. But as long as they can continue to destroy Taliban units and recapture cities and towns, we should encourage and support them.
And they may have a better chance than pundits have credited them with possessing, since, especially in Afghanistan, the undecided tribals and even former enemies flock to the victors. Instead of losing its drive as it moves south, the Northern Alliance may gain in numbers and in that most important military advantage, the adrenalin rush of victory.
Or the Taliban may be able to consolidate along the Kabul line, gathering in far-flung forces and survivors to put up a renewed, dogged resistance. Much depends on the success of our allies' pursuit, on our own willingness to keep pounding the Taliban from the air as they flee, on our willingness to deploy specialized ground forces (should the right opportunity present itself), and on the unknowable importance the Taliban leadership may or may not attach to Kabul. We may see Taliban counterattacks that, briefly, turn back the Northern Alliance, or even disastrous overconfidence on the part of exposed Northern Alliance units. The gods of war love unpleasant surprises.
Yet, our military campaign has facilitated a worthy, early success against our enemies. This is a crucial time when, in our president's own words, we must "not waver." When a victory offers itself to us, we should seize it without hesitation or absurd remorse.
In the long-term war against terrorism, the Afghan campaign may last a few more months, or a few more years. In the meantime, we should focus singlemindedly on the destruction of our enemies. If we should have learned any military wisdom over the past dozen years, it is that a partial victory is no more than a defeat with candy-coating. At present, we are fortunate in that Afghans are killing Afghans and foreign religious mercenaries for us. Instead of urging restraint upon them, we should be cheering them on at the top of our lungs. |
