The Wrong Time to Fight Iraq
Editorial
The New York Times
November 26, 2001
The surprisingly swift successes of the
American military campaign in
Afghanistan have spurred talk about military
action to oust Saddam Hussein from power in
Iraq. The world would be a safer place with
Mr. Hussein's cruel dictatorship removed. At this point, however, there are no
good short-term options for getting rid of him. The Bush administration would
make a serious mistake by moving to wage war in Iraq.
One reason is that America's mission in Afghanistan is far from accomplished.
Osama bin Laden and many top aides remain at large, Taliban fighters still hold
out in the countryside and a few urban redoubts, and the creation of a stable
post- Taliban government has barely begun. Until these basic objectives are
achieved, Afghanistan will remain a potential base for international terrorism.
Finishing the job in Afghanistan requires holding together the international
coalition Washington has skillfully assembled. War in Iraq at this juncture
would almost certainly shatter that coalition. While some Arab leaders have no
love for Mr. Hussein, public opinion in the Arab world would not allow them to
support American military action against him, at least in the absence of clear
evidence linking Baghdad to the events of Sept. 11 or subsequent bioterrorism.
The American and British governments could quickly find themselves alone in
any military campaign against Iraq.
War in Iraq would also undermine whatever possibility now exists for damping
violence between Israelis and Palestinians and restarting efforts toward a
lasting peace. Progress in the new peace initiative announced by Secretary of
State Colin Powell last week might make it easier to ratchet up the pressure on
Baghdad at a later date. Moving militarily against Iraq now would hobble
America's power as a Mideast peacemaker.
Diplomacy aside, the military challenges of war in Iraq are far more
formidable than anything yet seen in Afghanistan. Mr. Hussein can count on
the loyalty of a large army, equipped with more modern and lethal weapons
than the Taliban ever had. The center of his power, Baghdad, is a sprawling
metropolitan area unsuitable to the kind of special operations American troops
have conducted in Afghanistan. In another crucial difference, the United
States would be operating without any effective local allies like the Northern
Alliance in Afghanistan. The Iraqi National Congress, the umbrella opposition
group supported by Washington, is a feud-ridden collection of exiled politicians
who command no combat forces.
Without ground fighters, American air power cannot prevail. The only military
option with any realistic promise of success would be sending in an
overwhelmingly large American ground force. It takes months to transport and
build up such forces, and, unlike the situation prior to the Persian Gulf war,
Washington could not count on the use of staging bases in Saudi Arabia.
Even if these military obstacles could somehow be overcome, Washington
would still be faced with the problem of putting together a new Iraqi
government. The country is sharply divided between Sunni and Shiite Muslims
and between Arabs and Kurds, and there is a real risk of its disintegrating into
weakened fragments, easily manipulated by more powerful neighbors like Iran.
What Washington should do now is intensify its efforts to build up a more
serious internal Iraqi opposition. While Mr. Hussein's security forces are
fearsomely effective, there are hundreds of thousands of discontented Iraqis.
Many can be found among the southern Shiite and northern Kurdish minorities
that took up arms against Baghdad in 1991, only to be abandoned by
Washington, and probably also among the ruling Sunni Arab group of central
Iraq. An effective internal opposition could develop into a potential fighting
force and perhaps the nucleus of a future government.
Meanwhile, Washington should put maximum diplomatic and military pressure
on Baghdad. It can use its improved ties with Russia to enact more sustainable
United Nations economic sanctions and to press for an early resumption of
international weapons inspections. More than two decades of experience
suggests that Saddam Hussein is unlikely ever to become a respectable
international citizen. The challenge of removing him is best left for a day when
the United States can count on the strong and effective support of opposition
forces in Iraq.
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