The problem is not just mastering the technical ability to shoot down a warhead...it's how to do so reliably, the first time out, without warning, amid lots of decoys. I'd say the odds of that are pretty low. But still, if we throw enough money, time, and energy at the problem, we're likely to get at least something that might be useful in some circumstances. So the question is really an insurance one: how much is it worth to us to take out a policy that would provide some protection from one relatively unlikely class of threat?
If it was cheap and unproblematic, the answer would probably be, "sure, why not?" But if (as is actually the case) the financial cost will be somewhere in the 12 figure range, if success is not guaranteed, and if it carries political and diplomatic costs as well, then the calculus looks different. The way to look at this is as a pragmatic question of defense policy, not through ideology, or arms control theology, or politics, or what have you. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry gave what I thought was a sensible treatment of the issue in the November/December issue of Foreign Affairs; it's also a chapter in the How Did This Happen? book.
tb@pragmatist.com
PS please, no more bubble charts. It reminds me of the Little Prince; I don't see a hat, but rather my portfolio swallowed by a python.... |
