IRAQ: The WMD Threat in 2001
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Iraq continues to give non-proliferation groups ulcers. Simply put, no one has any illusion that Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq has put any limits on their development and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction. Given production rates of a decade ago, and the fact that there have not been on the ground inspectors since December of 1998, it is pretty well assured Iraq is only a few years from completing the development and fueling of a nuclear weapon.
Moreover the Iraqi biological and chemical weapons programs are most likely in full production today, producing toxins and agents for sale to anyone with the right targets in mind -- in essence, anyone who would like to deploy these weapons against what Iraq's Suddam Hussein feels are the evils of the world -- U.S. and U.K. come to mind, but also any other non Islamic state that Iraq feels it has a grudge with.
This report provides details on the Nuclear, Biological and Chemical capabilities of Iraq, extrapolated from December 1998, using tidbits of information declassified and found in open source locations worldwide.
The Logic
Former CIA Chief, James Woolsey, on December 13, 2001, in a speech at a conference on Iraq and Terrorism, put forth the supposition that World leaders have no choice but to go after Iraq and to do it very soon. His rationale was based upon at least seven factors point to the necessity of not only taking on Iraq to prevent the spread of WMD but applying a number of reasons that the need is one of great urgency.
Woolsey's position supports MILNET's proposition even before 9/11, that Iraq is a festering danger to world peace and must be removed as quickly as the civilized world can muster the energy and courage to do so.
Below we cite the specific threats in the WMD arena, based on verified data prior to December 1998 as well as subsequent overt and covert methods employed by the U.N.'s UNSCOM replacement UNMOVIC.
Nuclear
"...as noted by the Security Council in resolution 1284 (1999), there remain unresolved disarmament issues, including issues of key importance. Moreover, the absence of inspectors, and the lack of continuity of knowledge since 1998, raises the question whether additional issues have arisen that must also be resolved."
-- United Nations Security Council Report, S2001/833, "Sixth quarterly report of the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission under paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999). [UNMOVIC-S-2001-833.pdf] milnet.com
In non-proliferation speak, this simply means - No inspectors, no confidence. Or even more simple -- "We have no idea what Iraq is up to".
UNMOVIC is the agency within the U.N. infrastructure now responsible for verification of treaty conditions. The sixth report from the organization makes it quite clear that the U.N. doesn't have a clue as to Iraq's compliance with the treaty obligations agreed to by Iraq in 1992. UNMOVIC reports that they are now relying on commercial overhead imagery (satellite photos for the un-initiated) to try to scope out activity around suspected manufacturing sites.
More interesting however is that UNMOVIC believes Iran capable of constructing a nuclear weapon in weeks if fissile material were available.
Iraq Watch, a non governmental watchdog group says Iraq was on the verge of building a weapon nearly a decade ago, and that the Clinton administration not only knew of this readiness to construct, but took no action to intercept components in route.
Biological
Iraq Watch also lists the documents from UNMOVIC that detail the dual use items imported into Iraq that are critical in the development of biological weapons. MILNET also features a complete collection of U.S. Nonproliferation reports that also clearly cite Iraq's continued WMD programs and unused dual use equipment purchase. The lists contains such items as glove boxes, centrifuges, HEPA containment systems, anaerobic, dry boxes and growth systems such as fermenters, bioreactors, chemostats, continuous flow fermatation systems and others.
When checking for dual use systems usage, non-proliferation experts look to see if purchases are accompanied by activities that demonstrate a remarked increase in non-weapons production. In the case of Iraq, purchases of the equipment has had little or zero effect on the production of medicines or medical agents stockpiled or made available in commercial quantities. In other words, the equipment, while clearly in use due to maintenance parts being requested and accompanied by "core" replacement material that indicates heavy use, has not been used to produce medicines or other dual use, non-weapons related products. Simply put, the only use identifiable would be for weapons research or production.
Given the three years since 1998's cessation of inspections, UNMOVIC has determined that in all likelihood, Iraq has a major biological program underway and has had sufficient time to stockpile battlefield quality and battlefield quantities.
Chemical
Similar in nature to the investigations (non inspection regime) being conducted in the area of biological weapons research and production, Iraq's chemical weapons program appears to also be blooming. In nearly identical fashion to the logical approach taken to unmask Iraq's bio program, UNMOVIC now believes Iraq's chemical program is in full production of several agents that are battlefield ready and deliverable.
Dual use equipment purchases and installations, like that in the bio-weapons field, have not been followed by a marked increase in available non-weapons products. In fact, recent requests for agricultural agents such as fertilizers and insecticides have continued to be denied by the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture, leading investigators to believe that component agents are being exhausted by weapons manufacturing. And like the biological investigation, overhead imagery indicates heavy staffing and traffic at suspected facilities.
All these indicators point to not only a well developed weapons program, but a highly active production program as well.
One investigator, wishing to remain anonymous, has said, "...well if I needed to find a site to produce chemical or biological weapons in a pinch, I'd go to Iraq -- I could start manufacturing in hours."
Conclusions
The MILNET report, compiling various open source intelligence, interviews with leading non-proliferation experts, as well as sources within the U.N. UNMOVIC organization, paints a distressing picture of the current capabilities of the Iraqi NBC weapons programs, and then goes on to speculate on the obvious threat of proliferation from Iraq to nations and terrorist groups with agendas that align with those of Iraq's Suddam Hussein.
Military action to eliminate production facilities and destroy stockpiles seems imminent given the current state of affairs.
© Copyright 2001, Michael Crawford - MILNET
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The complete report, IRAQ: The WMD Threat in 2001, is available now on MILNET.
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