Chuck posted the SBR on his web site in order to introduce a rather feeble presentation revealing a one-sided perspective of the issue. Certainly, his commentary on the report made no pretence at disguising which "side" he was on as to the suitability of ending the war by targeting civilians. He chooses, colours, and shades words and sentences from the report, to create what he hopes will be a believable apologia for his prejudices. It turns out, however, to be clumsy and unconvincing.
Inasmuch as there are so many informed and scholarly books and papers considering the questions at issue here, it seems feckless to spend much time critiquing Chuck's minor opinions and prejudices. I scarcely gave his transparently biassed rant more than a cursory glance.
One would expect people who post military fact finding reports on their web site to have an opinion and an agenda. One would suspect they posted it for a reason, and that their aggrieved commentary reflects that reason. However, one is disappointed to have expectations so thoroughly met.
The things which Chuck says are all things which the Report (wisely) did not. In the Report, where one would expect the bias and self interest to be very overt, one is pleasantly surprised to find a rather balanced and intelligent weighing of the evidence, and a matter of fact commentary without blame.
On the other hand, I just don't consider this type of comment (typical of Chuck), to indicate someone who has any ammunition in his intellectual gun:
"The Survey acknowledged that use of the atomic bombs hastened the end of the war;"
DUHHH!!!!!
From the Report...
"The first and crucial question about the atomic bomb thus was answered practically and conclusively; atomic energy had been mastered for military purposes and the overwhelming scale of its possibilities had been demonstrated..."
The fact is, that it is widely acknowledged that the war was over and that the U.S. could have ended it by diplomatic means rather than military, simply by allowing a conditional surrender before their demonstration of atomic power rather than after. That it was a message to the Soviets is undeniable. That this was the major reason for what is otherwise rather inexplicable, seems likely.
I prefer the comments and the company of these people, over the myopic pespective of Chuck:
~~~DWIGHT EISENHOWER
"...in [July] 1945... Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. ...the Secretary, upon giving me the news of the successful bomb test in New Mexico, and of the plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent.
"During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face'. The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude..."
- Dwight Eisenhower, Mandate For Change, pg. 380
In a Newsweek interview, Eisenhower again recalled the meeting with Stimson:
"...the Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing."
- Ike on Ike, Newsweek, 11/11/63
~~~ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. LEAHY
(Chief of Staff to Presidents Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman)
"It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons.
"The lethal possibilities of atomic warfare in the future are frightening. My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children."
- William Leahy, I Was There, pg. 441.
~~~HERBERT HOOVER
On May 28, 1945, Hoover visited President Truman and suggested a way to end the Pacific war quickly: "I am convinced that if you, as President, will make a shortwave broadcast to the people of Japan - tell them they can have their Emperor if they surrender, that it will not mean unconditional surrender except for the militarists - you'll get a peace in Japan - you'll have both wars over."
Richard Norton Smith, An Uncommon Man: The Triumph of Herbert Hoover, pg. 347.
On August 8, 1945, after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Hoover wrote to Army and Navy Journal publisher Colonel John Callan O'Laughlin, "The use of the atomic bomb, with its indiscriminate killing of women and children, revolts my soul."
quoted from Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 635.
"...the Japanese were prepared to negotiate all the way from February 1945...up to and before the time the atomic bombs were dropped; ...if such leads had been followed up, there would have been no occasion to drop the [atomic] bombs."
- quoted by Barton Bernstein in Philip Nobile, ed., Judgment at the Smithsonian, pg. 142
Hoover biographer Richard Norton Smith has written: "Use of the bomb had besmirched America's reputation, he [Hoover] told friends. It ought to have been described in graphic terms before being flung out into the sky over Japan."
Richard Norton Smith, An Uncommon Man: The Triumph of Herbert Hoover, pg. 349-350.
In early May of 1946 Hoover met with General Douglas MacArthur. Hoover recorded in his diary, "I told MacArthur of my memorandum of mid-May 1945 to Truman, that peace could be had with Japan by which our major objectives would be accomplished. MacArthur said that was correct and that we would have avoided all of the losses, the Atomic bomb, and the entry of Russia into Manchuria."
Gar Alperovitz, The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb, pg. 350-351.
~~~GENERAL DOUGLAS MacARTHUR
MacArthur biographer William Manchester has described MacArthur's reaction to the issuance by the Allies of the Potsdam Proclamation to Japan: "...the Potsdam declaration in July, demand[ed] that Japan surrender unconditionally or face 'prompt and utter destruction.' MacArthur was appalled. He knew that the Japanese would never renounce their emperor, and that without him an orderly transition to peace would be impossible anyhow, because his people would never submit to Allied occupation unless he ordered it. Ironically, when the surrender did come, it was conditional, and the condition was a continuation of the imperial reign. Had the General's advice been followed, the resort to atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been unnecessary."
William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964, pg. 512.
Norman Cousins was a consultant to General MacArthur during the American occupation of Japan. Cousins writes of his conversations with MacArthur, "MacArthur's views about the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were starkly different from what the general public supposed." He continues, "When I asked General MacArthur about the decision to drop the bomb, I was surprised to learn he had not even been consulted. What, I asked, would his advice have been? He replied that he saw no military justification for the dropping of the bomb. The war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor."
Norman Cousins, The Pathology of Power, pg. 65, 70-71.
~~~JOSEPH GREW
(Under Sec. of State)
In a February 12, 1947 letter to Henry Stimson (Sec. of War during WWII), Grew responded to the defense of the atomic bombings Stimson had made in a February 1947 Harpers magazine article:
"...in the light of available evidence I myself and others felt that if such a categorical statement about the [retention of the] dynasty had been issued in May, 1945, the surrender-minded elements in the [Japanese] Government might well have been afforded by such a statement a valid reason and the necessary strength to come to an early clearcut decision.
"If surrender could have been brought about in May, 1945, or even in June or July, before the entrance of Soviet Russia into the [Pacific] war and the use of the atomic bomb, the world would have been the gainer."
Grew quoted in Barton Bernstein, ed.,The Atomic Bomb, pg. 29-32.
~~~JOHN McCLOY
(Assistant Sec. of War)
"I have always felt that if, in our ultimatum to the Japanese government issued from Potsdam [in July 1945], we had referred to the retention of the emperor as a constitutional monarch and had made some reference to the reasonable accessibility of raw materials to the future Japanese government, it would have been accepted. Indeed, I believe that even in the form it was delivered, there was some disposition on the part of the Japanese to give it favorable consideration. When the war was over I arrived at this conclusion after talking with a number of Japanese officials who had been closely associated with the decision of the then Japanese government, to reject the ultimatum, as it was presented. I believe we missed the opportunity of effecting a Japanese surrender, completely satisfactory to us, without the necessity of dropping the bombs."
McCloy quoted in James Reston, Deadline, pg. 500.
(see comlete article for full quotations and other links, etc.)
doug-long.com
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May I suggest that you may find this commentary (in two parts) to be somewhat more informed and balanced than the floundering of Chuck? But then again...you may not.
doug-long.com
This is a quick summary of the above article:
doug-long.com
"With the end of the European war, the Allies focused their efforts on Japan. Japan still fought fanatically, despite being badly hurt by bombing and blockade.
The Potsdam Proclamation, which demanded the unconditional surrender of Japan, was issued. It made no mention of Japan's central surrender condition: the status of the Emperor. Japan rejected the Proclamation.
The Japanese believed the Emperor to be a god (this is a key point).
The U.S. dropped atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Russia declared war against Japan.
Japan, because of its military, still refused to surrender.
Japanese peace advocates, fearing the imminent destruction of the Emperor, prevailed upon the Emperor to break with tradition and make government policy by calling for peace now. The Emperor did so.
As the result of the Emperor's call for surrender, the entire Japanese cabinet, including the military, agreed to surrender. The cabinet saw that this would allow the Emperor to be retained.
Even Japan's doves would have fought to the death had they not felt the Emperor would be spared. They saw "unconditional surrender" as a threat to the Emperor.
President Truman had been advised of the importance of the Emperor to the Japanese.
Japan was seeking Russia's help to end the war in July 1945. The U.S. was aware of this at the time thru intercepted Japanese cables. But the U.S. did not keep up with this change in Japan's position.
The U.S. chose military methods of ending the war rather than diplomatic methods. The desire for revenge helped make military methods more attractive.
Was it necessary to use the atomic bomb on Japan to end the war without an invasion of the Japanese mainland? Quotes from historians who felt it was not necessary can be found in: Article. Quotes from prominent Americans who felt the atomic bombings were not necessary can be found in: Quotes.
We probably could have ended the war sooner with fewer deaths on all sides by using the full carrot and stick: 1) offer retention of the Emperor for a quick surrender; and 2) threaten Russian invasion and 3) atomic destruction as the alternative. None of these key incentives to surrender were used prior to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima.
Had the above method failed, and had the Russian invasion failed to bring surrender soon, the atomic bombs were still available - but as a last resort.
After the atomic bombings, Japan was allowed to retain their Emperor, anyway."
Here is another excellent article:
csf.colorado.edu |
