Reommendations on the Immediate Use of Nuclear Weapons, by the Scientific Panel of the
Interim Committee on Nuclear Power, June 16, 1945.
Source: U. S. National Archives, Record Group 77, Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers,
Manhattan Engineer District, Harrison-Bundy File, Folder #76.
TOP SECRET
THIS PAGE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
Order Sec Army By TAG per
720564
RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE IMMEDIATE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
A. H. Compton
E. O. Lawrence
J. R. Oppenheimer
E. Fermi
[signature]
J. R. Oppenheimer
For the Panel
June 16, 1945
You have asked us to comment on the initial use of the new weapon. This use, in our opinion, should be such as to promote a satisfactory adjustment of our international relations. At the same time, we recognize our obligation to our nation to use the weapons to help save American lives in the Japanese war.
(1) To accomplish these ends we recommend that before the weapons are used not only Britain, but also Russia, France, and China be advised that we have made considerable progress in our work on atomic weapons, that these may be ready to use during the present war, and that we would welcome suggestions as to how we can cooperate in making this development contribute to improved international relations.
(2) The opinions of our scientific colleagues on the initial use of these weapons are not unanimous: they range from the proposal of a purely technical demonstration to that of the military application best designed to induce surrender. Those who advocate a purely technical demonstration would wish to outlaw the use of atomic weapons, and have feared that if we use the weapons now our position in future negotiations will be prejudiced. Others emphasize the opportunity of saving American lives by immediate military use, and believe that such use will improve the international prospects, in that they are more concerned with the prevention of war than with the elimination of this specific weapon. We find ourselves closer to these latter views; we can propose no technical demonstration likely to bring an end to the war; we see no acceptable alternative to direct military use.
(3) With regard to these general aspects of the use of atomic energy, it is clear that we, as scientific men, have no proprietary rights. It is true that we are among the few citizens who have had occasion to give thoughtful consideration to these problems during the past few years. We have, however, no claim to special competence in solving the political, social, and military problems which are presented by the advent of atomic power.
This is the kind of contemporaneous document you may have in in mind, CH. Truman received this top-secret recommendation two months prior to the bombing. He received the Strategic Bombing Report one year after the bombing. |
