"Japan had been trying DESPERATELY to surrender."
Read these top secret telegrams from Foreign Minister Togo to his Ambassador to Russia, Sato, in July, 1945 (a matter of weeks before the bombing). Sato is giving instructions to his Ambassador, for his eyes only. Does he sound "desperate" to you?
The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet
Union (Sato)
[Tokyo,] July 17, 1945--p.m.
Secret
Urgent
913. Re your telegram No. 1392.
1. In the Present situation, strengthening friendly relations with the Soviet Union and, moreover, effectively utilizing the Soviets to terminate the war is difficult. This was clear from the outset but in view of the demands of the times it is essential to accomplish this boldly. Furthermore, for our side it is even difficult merely to prevent the Soviets from taking part in hostilities against Japan, and we must realize that to have them act to our advantage is a prospect hard to achieve. This is as I indicated in my telegram No. 890, and the negotiations for strengthening friendly relations between Japan and the Soviet Union constitute the basis on which to invite sincere Soviet mediation for terminating the war. Moreover, it is also considered essential in order to strengthen our stand in negotiations against the United States and Great Britain. Besides, we should not limit ourselves to sounding out the attitude of the Soviets concerning the termination of the war but should also endeavor to induce them to mediate in good faith.
2.Not only our High Command but also our Government firmly believes that even now our war potential is still sufficient to deal the enemy a severe blow, but against an enemy which can make repeated attacks we cannot always be completely free from anxiety. In such times, we continue to maintain our war strength; if only the United States and Great Britain would recognize Japan's honor and existence we would terminate the war and would like to save mankind from the ravages of war, but if the enemy insists on unconditional surrender to the very end, then our country and His Majesty would unanimously resolve to fight a war of resistance to the bitter end. Therefore, inviting the Soviet Union to mediate fairly does not include unconditional surrender; please understand this point in particular.
3. The Soviet reply concerning the dispatch of the special envoy should be obtained as soon as possible. It is extremely important to get Soviet approval quickly and I would like you to exert extreme efforts towards this end through Lozovsky.
The Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo) to the Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet
Union (Sato)
[Tokyo,] July 21, 1945--9:30 p.m.
Secret
Urgent
932. Re my telegram No. 931.
1. We cannot accept unconditional surrender (understood fully your telegram No. 1416) in any situation. Although it is apparent that there will be more casualties on both sides in case the war is prolonged, we will stand united as one nation against the enemy if the enemy forcibly demands our unconditional surrender. . It is, however, our intention to achieve, with Soviet assistance, a peace which is not of unconditional nature, in order to avoid such a situation as mentioned above in accordance with His Majesty's desire. It will be necessary for us to expert our utmost efforts to have the United States and Great Britain understand thoroughly this intention. Thus, it is impossible at this time to ask the Soviet Union unconditionally for assistance in obtaining peace; at the same time, it is also impossible and to our disadvantage to indicate the concrete conditions immediately at this time on account of internal and external relations. Under such delicate circumstances, we hope to have Prince Konoye transmit to the Soviet Union our concrete intentions based on the Emperor's wishes and following a conference to have the Soviets deal with the United States and Great Britain, while considering the Soviet demands in Asia.
2. Taking into consideration the fact that this matter is a negotiation of the utmost importance which may determine the fate of our country, I request that you take full measures to grasp the true intentions of the Soviet Union by seeking sufficient explanations, for instance, even with respect to the Soviet reply transmitted in your telegramNo. 1417.
3. It is a matter of course that the special envoy has the responsibility of advising the Government; but please explain to the Soviets, if necessary, that the envoy is to be dispatched as a special envoy in accordance with the wishes of the Emperor, whose chief aim is benevolence. Please take care to fully impress the other party with the facts regarding his Majesty's trust in Prince Konoye and the prominent position held by the
Prince in the political circles in our country.
4. If the proposal at the beginning of my telegram No. 1427 is not absolutely necessary, please avoid making a written proposal.
A full record of this lengthy top secret correspondence is available at:
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