I'll respond to the latter part of your post now and then the part about Java tomorrow after I've have a chance to look at some things.
>>Why does Microsoft not turn Windows over to a standards body?
I would say that since we have poured 10+ years of work and capital into it, you'd have to give me some pretty good reasons as to why we should consider doing such a thing. Normally for-profit companies do not give away their intellectual property, unless greater benefit for the company can be gained from doing so or the monetary value of the propery is negligible (not the case with Windows, since it still generates substantial revenue).
Your stated reasons for not doing it are the ones I (and everyone else) suspected, and it's not surprising that Microsoft does not want to give away what it considers to be its crown jewels. It's always easiest in dealing with an uncertain future to look to the past and to project into the future the favorable trends of the past.
Are you so sure the benefits of giving away Windows don't exceed the costs?
I'm not an expert, but I am also not convinced that they don't.
Of course, before getting into our discussion, it is necessary to define exactly what "Windows" is. In saying Microsoft should turn Windows over to a standards body, I'm not suggesting that Microsoft should give up intellectual property rights to the graphical user interface, the thing that greets users when they boot up and interact with their computers. That's Microsoft's trade dress, and they have every right to defend it, just as, for example, Coca Cola has every right to defend its trademark and trade dress, the unique shape of its bottle, its distinctive red and white logo.
What I do think Microsoft should give up is the secret part: the inner workings, the stuff beneath the APIs, the things that make it work the way it does.
First, I think that, at some point, trying to keep control of Windows will become more of a liability than an asset for Microsoft. Why? Because if you are focused on trying to do what is best for the company in terms of trying to hold onto control of Windows, you become less able to meet the challenges of other, new technological developments, such as the internet, with a completely open mind. A classic example, I think, is a speech Ballmer recently gave about Microsoft's answer to extranets: it was, in essence, to have Windows running everywhere. The problem is, Windows isn't going to run everywhere. Check out this article on the dedication of Mac users, and you will see what I mean. (http://www8.zdnet.com/pcweek/opinion/0630/30corner.html ) Even if it runs on, say, 95 percent of all platforms, no business in its right mind will develop business-critical applications, for example, in windows native code in Microsoft's Java environment because chances are, five percent of its customers are not going to have Windows and are going to be unable to use those applications. Therefore, if a particular application is what gives your business a competitive advantagge with the customer, you certainly want to be able to allow all of your customers to use it, and not just the 95 percent (in our hypothetical world) who run Windows.
So, Microsoft needs to develop true cross-platform capabilities for its software. The current strategy centered on controlling Windows is an impediment to that. It also impedes the adoption of the vision of Windows running everywhere that Ballmer claims to want to promote, since the only way people are going to make Windows universal is if people overcome their fear that, by doing so, they give Microsoft too much power.
Second, there are a fair number of analysts in the investment community who say that projecting current revenue trends for large applications like Office is very risky. Why? Because peole want to orgainze their networks in the way that is most economical and efficient for the enterprise (as opposed to the individual user). Now, in the past, when people were moving from Mainframes to PCs, the lower cost of PCs and inproved productivity that resulted from giving everyone in a particular department access to the same set of applications more than compensated for the increased costs due to the redundancy of giving everyone a local hard drive with its own set of applications. However, Java and faster network speeds change that calculus. With Java working in a fast network, it is possible to centralize everything on a server and to let individual users utilize only those parts of, say, Office, that they actually need only when they need them. Not only that, but many organizations simply do not need all the features of full-blown Office and will look for thinner, cheaper software to run on their networks.
This won't work in the SO/HO market for some time, but as public networks become more reliable, the new paradigm will spread out from large businesses to the home market.
What does that mean? It means less revenue in the Operating System and business productivity applications space. Building a fortress around Windows and Office, and saying, "that's our Maginot Line; we're going to defend it at all costs," is not going to change this reality. Trying to convert the internet into an extension of the desktop is not going to prevent it (even assuming the internet can be so converted, something I do not believe).
So Microsoft loses a lot of time and energy defending Windows, time and energy that needs to be spent elsewhere.
What about the fact that other people will want to copy Windows and steal your intellectual property? My response is: prove to me that that would happen. My impression is that, even after standards are made open, the company that first created the standard gives up very little real control or market share. In exchange for giving up relatively little real control, you'd get to dump a lot of antitrust and marketing baggage about how "proprietary" Windows is and how everyone is afraid of and/or hates Microsoft. That's just my impression, but what's your impression?
Have you studied, using, for example, econometric modeling, what the real impact would be on Microsoft if Windows were turned over to a standards body? Would Microsoft's revenues drop under such a scenario faster than they are already fated to drop if Microsoft continues on its present course? Would they drop at all? What, and how valid, are the assumptions underlying the model that generated this conclusion? |
