When you say that the one impediment to a Japanese surrender was the Emperor's salvation, you are making a gross understatement. To begin with, the nation of Japan in 1945 was in a chaotic, unpredictable state of affairs. The nation was not speaking with one unified voice, as your assertion implies. Japan had been ruled throughout the war not by the Emperor, but by the military. The Japanese military was opposed not just to unconditional surrender, but to any surrender. Japan in its entire history had never laid down arms to an enemy. The military code under which Japan fought explicitly forbade surrender. Even after the surrender on the Missouri, huge numbers of the military, from generals to privates, ferociously resisted surrender. Far from caring about Hirohito, military factions sought to remove him through a coup as he was preparing to tell the populace that the war was lost. The communications between Togo and Sato clearly revealed disagreement among the non-military members of the government, While Sato, from afar in Moscow, pleaded for acceptance of the Potsdam agreement, Togo forcefully told him that Japan would fight to the death rather than accept unconditional surrender. After the Missouri," when MacArthur told the transitional government that he was coming to Japanese soil, the government urged him to delay his arrival, for the reason that they could not guarantee his safety, nor were they yet confident in their ability to control events (MacArthur came anyway).
Much of our understanding of these internal intrigues and conflicts came only after war's end. At the time when the A-bomb decision had to be made, the Allies could not be sure whether peace feelers from Japan had any basis of authority, nor could they be in any way sure that the Emperor, or the government had effective control over the military. Given Japan's history of treacherous negotiation (Pearl Harbor), it would be perfectly reasonable to view peace overtures as nothing more than a delaying tactic to allow more time for defense preparations.
Revisionists such as yourself are quick to point out that American leaders were divided in opinion, as perhaps with Truman and Eisenhower ... yet you speak in such terms as "Japan was willing..." Surely you see the gross inconsistency here?
After Pearl Harbor, Japan continued on the offensive against the U.S. with plans to take Midway. Only when we defeated them and sunk four of their carriers at Midway, did Japan begin the retreat to their defensive periphery. From that point on, the war was lost to Japan and we were chasing them back across the Pacific, with heavy casualties at every island we took. Every step closer to Japan meant heavier casualties for us, culminating at Okinawa. The Japanese homeland was a mystery to us, shielded behind a bamboo curtain (in an expression of the times). You seem to think that at that point the burden of responsibility for ending the war shifted to the U.S. You seem to believe that it was incumbent on the U.S. to try to understand Japan, to be sympathetic to their feelings about the Emperor, to appreciate why unconditional surrender was not acceptable to them, to have compassion for their population which had suffered and, to be flexible in proposing peace terms that might induce Japan to surrender. Well, Solon, few Americans who were alive then, and not many now, will ever agree with you on that. We all have a simpler view: that Japan started the war, lost it, caused untold misery and suffering to their own people, and that the responsibility for surrendering and ending the killing rested squarely on their shoulders, and not upon ours. Had Japan ever said to the world, "Okay, we give up" ... the war would have ended and there would have been no more bombings and no more suffering.
You say that "scholarly opinion" believes that there were better alternatives to the bombs that were not acted upon. Harry Truman was no scholar. He was a decisive actor. Our only scholarly president (at least with a Ph.D.) was Woodrow Wilson ("He Kept Us Out of War"). I am an admirer of WW, but by keeping out of the first world war until near the end of it, WW lost any leverage as to the peace terms at Versailles. Those terms were extremely harsh on Germany (to WW's lament). The result was that the seeds of an inevitable World War II were sowed. If we elected war leaders on the basis of scholarship, we would not be having this discussion, as we long would have lost our freedom. There are times for thinking and hoping ... and there are times for action.
As to the alternatives, it is not enough to say, "We could have done this...." You must also be able to say, "If we had done this, then they would have done that." Thus, the alternatives become speculation multiplied by more speculation. For example, we could have imposed a blockade. What would Japan have done then? You might answer that as they neared the specter of starvation, they would have surrendered. I might answer, they would have interpreted and characterized our blockade as signal of weakening resolve, the military would have tightened their grip on the government, and they would have used the time to intensify their defense preparations for an even bloodier battle on Japanese soil that would have forced us to make concessions. Is your speculation any better than mine?
I respect the many notables who have distanced themselves from the atomic bombings, whether then or later. Just as we can never know Truman's real motives, neither can we know the motives of those who spoke out. Politics may have played a part in it. In any case, these critics are expressing only opinions, and everyone is entitled to one. Remember that Admiral Leahy was of the opinion that the bombs would not work.
You make the assertion that They assured the Japanese that their "Jesus" would not be prosecuted, executed, or dishonoured. The surrender terms have been posted here and do not contain any such assurance. Can you give us documentation as to where and when this assurance was given to the Japanese government? |
