a panel composed of Oppenheimer, Fermi, Compton, and Lawrence found "no acceptable alternative to direct military use."
dannen.com
President Truman told his diary that he had ordered the bomb dropped on a "purely military" target, so that
"military objectives and soldiers and sailors are the target and not women and children."
dannen.com
"The world will note that the first atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, a military base."
dannen.com
"It was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum."
atomicarchive.com
The work of the Interim Committee, in Stimson's words, "ranged over the whole field of atomic energy, in its political, military, and scientific aspects." [19]
During the first meeting the scientific members reviewed for their colleagues the development of the Manhattan Project and described vividly the destructive
power of the atomic bomb. They made it clear also that there was no known defense against this kind of attack. Another day was spent with the engineers
and industrialists who had designed and built the huge plants at Oak Ridge and Hanford. Of particular concern to the committee was the question of how
long it would take another country, particularly the Soviet Union, to produce an atomic bomb. "Much of the discussion," recalled Dr. Oppenheimer who
attended the meeting of 1 June as a member of a scientific panel, "revolved around the question raised by Secretary Stimson as to whether there was any
hope at all of using this development to get less barbarous relations with the Russians." [20]
The work of the Interim Committee was completed 1 June 1945, [21] when it submitted its report to the President, recommending unanimously that:
1. The bomb should be used against Japan as soon as possible.
2. It should be used against a military target surrounded by other buildings.
3. It should be used without prior warning of the nature of the weapon. (One member, Ralph A. Bard, later dissented from this portion of the committee's
recommendation.) "
army.mil
The Emporer: "Execute him 33%"
nuclearfiles.org
Memorandum for the President
[Washington,] July 2, 1945.
TOP SECRET
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I am enclosing herewith a memorandum to you on the matter of
the proposed warning to Japan, a subject which I have heretofore discussed with you. I
have tried to state as succinctly as possible how the matter lies in my mind, and in the
course of preparing the memorandum, I have consulted with the Secretary of the Navy and
the Acting Secretary of State, each of whom has approved the tenor of the memorandum
and has subscribed to the recommendations contained in it.
I have also had prepared a proposed form of proclamation which has been discussed with
representatives of the State Department and the Navy department, as well as with officers
of the General Staff but which has not been placed in final form or in any sense approved
as a final document by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Navy or the Joint Chiefs
of Staff. It has been drafted merely to put on paper something which would give us some
idea of how a warning of the character we have in mind might appear. You will note that
it is written without specific relation to the employment of any new weapon. Of course it
would have to be revamped to conform to the efficacy of such a weapon if the warning
were to be delivered, as would almost certainly b e the case, in conjunction with its use.
As these papers were primarily prepared as a possible background for some of your
discussions at the forthcoming conference, this added element was not included, but a
suitable provision could be readily added at the appropriate time.
I shall continue to discuss this matter with the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of
Navy, as well as with the representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and will of course
keep you currently informed of any further suggestions we may have.
Faithfully yours,
Henry L Stimson
[Enclosure 1]
The Secretary of War (Stimson) to the President
[Washington,] July 2, 1945.
TOP SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT
PROPOSED PROGRAM FOR JAPAN
1. The plans of operation up to and including the first landing have been authorized and
the preparations for the operation are now actually going on. This situation was accepted
by all members of your conference on Monday, June 18th.
2. There is reason to believe that the operation for the occupation of Japan following the
landing may be very long, costly an arduous struggle on our part. The terrain, much of
which I have visited several times, has left the impression on my memory of being one
which would be susceptible to a last ditch defense such as has been made on Iwo Jima an
Okinawa and which of course is very much larger than either of those two areas. According
to my recollection it will be much more unfavorable with regard to tank maneuvering than
either the Philippines or Germany.
nuclearfiles.org
AND THE US DEMANDS A SURRENDER! - -PRIOR TO USING THE BOMB!
5) Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.
nuclearfiles.org
AFTER DESTROYING HIROSHIMA, THE US WARNS JAPAN MORE IS TO FOLLOW IF THEY DO NOT SURRENDER!
nuclearfiles.org
Go to your local bar and cry in your beer for the Taliban. Maybe they'll appreciate your stupidity. |
