I read the articles urging us to invade Iraq and the one providing insight into the emerging Russian oil market relative to world supply (I skimmed the third as it's an area that's not on my list of immediate concerns, which are driven by the immediacy of plans afoot that will be complete long before any university is likely to even make a multi-committee decision on where to do lunch).
I have enormous concerns with the plausibility of the ambitious goals laid out in the Iraq ITR plan (invade, topple & rebuild) and I am suspect of the analysis put forth in the evolving oil dynamic article. Yet I consider a complete understanding of both topics to be instrumental in formulating a successful foreign policy for the Middle East in the next quarter century.
Starting with the oil article, Edward L. Morse appears to be an established expert on oil matters and an accomplished analyst/author ( cfr.org!214 ) , who writes often for Foreign Affairs but does not appear to be a staff member ( cfr.org )
Since I have read none of his other works, I can't offer a reasoned judgment on his expertise (though it seems to be considerable enough to meet most standards) or his objectivity in analysis. It is the latter regard that concerns me most, as he serves as Executive Adviser at Hess Energy Trading Co., LLC.
His co-author, James Richard, is listed as "a portfolio manager at Firebird Management, an investment fund active in eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia."
These professional positions lend credence to the idea that the two know the oil business intimately. Production & refining capabilities, demand, development of future oil infrastructures, OPEC history, investment possibilities and even the international global politics of oil are all within the probable bailiwick of one or both of these authors.
But two areas of analysis remain suspect. First, there is the possibility that they'll advance positions likely to be advantageous to their companies. Even if we choose to grant that they are magnanimous enough not to push ideas that might directly line their company coffers, it is reasonable to conclude that they are both in favor of the oil business and its profitability. Which can, at least, slightly skew their objectivity.
Second, in being pro-oil business, it raises the biggest question about their perspectives on alternate energy possibilities. Indeed, the analysis presents a dismissive approach to that topic. It's almost entirely contained in one concluding paragraph:
"The critical element that Washington can add is a policy mix that would arrest the growth of U.S. oil demand by adopting a transportation policy that forces greater efficiency. This effort would take the post-September 11 world seriously. If both Washington and Moscow encouraged what their companies and publics already do -- increasing production in both countries while restraining demand in the United States -- the stage could be set for a very new petroleum world."
"Restraining demand" via "adopting a transportation policy that forces greater efficiency" is a pretty limited description of one choice out of many that could be applied to the demand end of the equation. It brings to mind 'greater fuel efficiency standards' and 'smaller vehicles' which are roads we've already travelled with little success.
Given that several large and medium size auto companies are jointly working in concert with hydrogen fuel cell companies, while other companies are developing similar cells to provide self-contained onsite power generation to homes and businesses, I think they gave short shrift to the discussion of reducing demand. As other innovative technologies are spawned and fleshed out (bullet trains, Ginger the human mobility device, net conferencing to reduce jet travel demands, etc), there are a myriad of choices to be made in demand reduction.
Adding another paragraph or two for balance would not have detracted from the scope of the article. In fact, it would have bolstered it since they wrote (with my bolding):
"The U.S. increase in imports accounts for more than a third of the total increase in oil trade and more than half of the total increase in OPEC's production during the 1990s. This fact, together with the fall in U.S. oil production, means that the United States will remain the single most important force in the oil market."
But perhaps that was viewed as extraneous to their conclusions, which largely focus on issues of supply: Russia/Central Asia's competition with Saudi Arabia/OPEC, pipeline and transport options for the former, greater economic stability and efficiency for the former, and the post 9-11 reassessment of the odd couple partnership existing between the US and Saudi Arabia.
Consider the phrasing about the US options with Russia:
"significant room remains for U.S. influence, whether good or bad. " >SNIP<
"Unilateral economic favors dispensed by Washington, for example, could bankroll Russia's " >SNIP<
"If the U.S. government desires to get more involved in supporting Russian " >SNIP<
"The United States can also support legislation that further promotes " >SNIP<
"In addition, Washington can aid the effort to stop such practices by improving the educational and training programs " >SNIP<
And note the added tone of the word I bolded here:
"In the oil and gas sector, Americans must help the Russians and the Kazakhs determine the most efficient export routes " >SNIP<
And the direction leaned to towards the end:
"In the long term, Moscow may have far more going for it than Riyadh. " >SNIP<
"Riyadh, on the other hand, might have vast known reserves, but it also has a closed state monopoly. Most alarming, Saudi Arabia has been unable for 20 years to increase its production capacity" >SNIP<
"If both Washington and Moscow encouraged what their companies and publics already do -- increasing production in both countries while restraining demand in the United States -- the stage could be set for a very new petroleum world. " >SNIP<
Morse, as an adviser to an energy trading firm, is probably open to going wherever increased profitability lies. But Field's company is "an investment fund active in eastern Europe, Russia, and Central Asia", so there's no doubt which solutions directly impact his bottom line; it's the ones the article leans to.
I don't mean to suggest that there aren't other good reasons to give considerable weight to non-Saudi options after all that's come to increasing public light post-9-11. Human, political and economic costs of altering current arrangements must be carefully weighed in determining our course, but these gentleman rarely move beyond business feasibilities and how the US can aid them.
Had the article been a roundtable discussion with these two, a financial analyst with a macro view of the economic impact on world markets of decisions made favoring Russia or Saudi Arabia, a political analyst to discuss the sociopolitical aspects of same, and an alternate energy expert of the stature of, say, Amory Lovins, I think the full scope and ramifications of the coming decisions could be explored far more thoroughly.
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Kev@everybuddy'sacri.tic
Note: I also intended to address the article advocating the ITR of Iraq but it's late and I've written enough for one post. I will write the second this weekend, and intend to revisit Mr. Morse's words a bit more, as well.
If you must know, I think the invasion idea is wrong, but not for the reasons you might suspect. Indeed, one of the options deserving of consideration that the author failed to mention is a nuclear strike to the tip of Hussein's pointy little head.
Stay tuned. |
