Debunking the "Oil Rush" slant on the Afghan crisis:
Unlocking the Assets: Energy and the Future of Central Asia and the Caucasus - Main Study
James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy
Rice University, April 1998 [in tempore non suspecto]
rice.edu
Excerpt:
Oil production in Central Asia and the Caucasus will never match the Persian Gulf where there are five major oil powers and several smaller producers. Many of the countries of the Caspian Basin have limited, if any oil potential. More than half of the Caspian region's proven oil reserves and 80% of its estimated possible oil reserves lie in one country - Kazakhstan. Turkmenistan holds large reserves of natural gas but its distance from key consumer markets may mean those reserves will be commercially difficult to develop. (See Table 3)
The huge distance of Central Asian and Caucasus reserves from the world's key energy consuming regions implies a considerable financial burden to bring these resources to market. In particular, the countries of the region with the largest export potential, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, are landlocked. Unlike competitors in other large oil-rich regions such as the Middle East, South America and even Russia, they cannot simply ship oil by tanker from domestic ports. Instead, they must rely on expensive pipelines constructed through foreign territories as the chief means for transport.
If the barriers to bringing Central Asian and Caucasus oil and gas were purely economic, then it could be assumed that market forces would eventually bring the region's resources to commercial exploitation to meet the world's growing energy requirements. But a host of complex technical, logistical, geopolitical, social, religious and cultural factors also weigh into the equation.
These obstacles to the Caspian Basin's development mean that, although its energy resources might be geologically equivalent in scale to the North Sea, the region's output is unlikely to reach that potential. Once technological hurdles were tackled, the North Sea represented a huge oil province where a stable investment climate allowed maximum exploration and development of dozens of fields simultaneously over a relatively short period of time. Central Asia and the Caucasus have far more numerous and burdensome barriers to exploration and development than those found in other areas such as the North Sea. These barriers will impede the region's ability to move rapidly to peak output levels implied by reserve figures. (See Tables 4 & 5)
North Sea oil production ended 1997 at 6.1 million barrels a day (b/d) but is expected to peak in the coming years. Venezuelan oil production stood at 3.5 million b/d in early 1998 but is expected to rise to over 6 million b/d by the middle of the next decade. Even under the most optimistic assessments, by the year 2010, Caspian oil production will likely reach little more than 3.5 million b/d and cover only 3-4% of anticipated global oil use. By contrast, Venezuelan oil is expected to account for as much as 7-8% while Middle East oil will still dominate with a 25 to 35% share, depending on market conditions.
In short, the Caspian Basin is not going to be the "ace in the hole" for international energy security. The region is by no means the only major oil and gas province in play that can help diversify world oil supplies and reduce reliance on the volatile Persian Gulf. Substantial reserves remain to be exploited in Africa, South America and offshore Asia. In particular, the payoff in terms of magnitude of incremental supply to global markets would be much higher if greater efforts were applied to unblock the significant resources lying in Mexico and Russian Siberia rather than similar efforts in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Increased attention to liberalization, or other means, to finance expanded resource development in Mexico and Russia also meets other important U.S. foreign policy goals.
History has proven that control of energy supplies is the type of matter that major powers go to war over. As Desert Storm demonstrated, few would question whether access to the vast resources of the Middle East is worth a significant commitment of time and resources. The stability of the world economy continues to rely on the steady flow of moderately priced oil from the Persian Gulf. The diversification of oil supply through development of regions like Central Asia may lessen the importance of the Persian Gulf over time. But the Gulf will require a major U.S. security commitment for many years to come. Involvement in Central Asia and the Caucasus alone cannot significantly reduce the need for U.S. to police the Persian Gulf but could prove costly in political, military and economic terms.
Beyond energy, Central Asia and the Caucasus' location between Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey makes it a magnet for foreign powers and a flash point for potential conflict between them. In addition to neighboring countries, the U.S., Europe and Japan have all exhibited interest in the region's economic potential. These factors raise the risk of a geopolitical competition in a region that already suffers from localized conflicts, economic distress and environmental disasters. Such competition, if unchecked, could cause instability both there and in neighboring countries, notably Russia, and also complicate Washington's relations with Moscow.
[snip]
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