Why America isn't listening
The first in a new series of monthly columns on global
issues from one of Britain's leading foreign policy
thinkers: Tony Blair is attempting to win international
support for an American strategy which he can't
control. Its a dangerous strategy, but Europe needs
him to succeed.
Mark Leonard
The Guardian
Sunday March 10, 2002
At the end of Philadelphia Avenue in Washington a middle-aged
woman with a weather-beaten face and a brown wig sits on a
milk crate. Surrounded by placards calling for nuclear
disarmament, she hands out cheaply produced leaflets to
passers-by. This remarkable woman has been holding a vigil
outside the White House day and night for 21 years - sleeping,
in a sitting position, for just 3 hours a night, so as to avoid
breaking the stringent DC vagrancy laws. It is impossible not to
be moved by her conviction and moral rectitude; it is equally
impossible not to be depressed by the futility of a cause which
has robbed her of the best years of her life.
It does not take long for Americans to figure out that Concepcion
Picciotto is European. Like Concepcion's faith in world peace,
the European belief in multilateralism and the human rights of
prisoners seems weak and unworldly - a luxurious delusion
which post-9/11 America can no longer afford.
I went to Washington and New York last week to take the
temperature of American foreign policy. It there was one theme
that united policy-makers in the White House and State
Department with academics and analysts from a range of
think-tank and media perspectives, it was that America will only
listen to Europe if we can come up with new arguments or
strategies that will surprise and interest them.
The post-9/11 belief that Americans had learnt the necessity of
multilateralism has been reversed; Americans seem to have
learnt only the impatience and frustrations of a multilateral
approach. Even NATO - practically the leanest and most
targeted institution around - is seen as terminally bureaucratic.
A grizzled old hand like Marvin Kalb, a news anchor at NBC for
two decades, described the new impatient mood: "Up until 9/11
we were willing to stay up all night and talk through the issues.
Now people are not interested in your pious, well-intentioned
advice. 9/11 was an intellectual slap across the head".
So Americans seems as little inclined to listen to lectures from
European governments as from Concepcion's pavement
protestors. So what should Europe do?
Tony Blair's answer has been to be unflinching in his public
support for the United States. The left dismiss this as weak or
opportunistic, and believe Blair is deluded in believing that such
solid support will enable him to influence, or extract
concessions, later. Does he really think Bush, Cheney and
Rumsfeld will listen to him?
The latest dispute over steel shows that, though Condi Rice may
have been reduced to tears by the playing of the star-spangled
banner at Buckingham Palace, the Republicans' gooey
sentimentality does not infuse their political strategy or weigh
heavily when it comes to paying back domestic political
constituencies.
Many Americans compared Blair's plight to that of the
long-suffering Colin Powell - arguing about the detail and
reluctantly making concessions in the hope that more influence
can be exerted from the inside than by sniping from the
sidelines. By its nature, this form of influence cannot win
spectacular public victories. It seeks to work at the margins, in
the tactics and implementation of policy rather than at a
strategic level. But the complexity of US foreign policy-making,
and the continued importance of the State Department in
making and implementing this, has been understated in much
recent media commentary.
Francis Fukuyama became famous for his confident belief in the
global triumph of liberal democracy. He does not believe that the
events of 9/11 change this fundamental analysis. But he tells
me that the differences between us are about much more than
policy or interests, they are existential: "The US and Europe
come at international law from such different angles. Every
country in Europe has been busy divesting itself of sovereignty
with the Euro and Maastricht. Americans still have an abiding
belief in American exceptionalism and sovereignty. The
American government still thinks that sources of legitimacy are
national and that there are no higher sources of legitimacy. The
traditional concern is that a lot of international law has been
made by governments which are less democratic than the US".
In fact, Fukuyama claims that Americans are so suspicious of
international law that they don't even think that Europeans
themselves believe in it, "A lot of my friends think that
Europeans do not really take GMOs or global warming seriously
- they think these are just deliberate ploys to hobble America".
But other Americans cite examples of European influence.
Joseph Nye - who was in the Pentagon during the Clinton era
and now runs the Kennedy School at Harvard - thinks we need
to pick battles in areas where we have some influence: "There is
a tendency for Americans to think that Europeans don't matter.
But - on the extradition of suspects, bargaining on the trade
round, the fact that GE couldn't merge with Honeywell - they do.
Europeans should remind Americans every now and again that if
they want co-operation it is a two way street. There is a
tendency to think that Europe is controlled by a bunch of
whining lefties. So when criticism comes from unexpected
directions - such as Chris Patten's recent outburst - it is more
difficult to dismiss."
But Blair's apologia is not just aimed at the residents of the
White House. The primary audicence is the rest of the world. It
would be straightforward to stand aside with our principles intact
while the US acts in a unilateral way. But that could have an
even more corrosive effect on liberal internationalism than
explaining and supporting their actions (even if you have to
occasionally swallow hard). The idea of an international
community based on rights and responsibilities is a public good
- and one that Europe has more to gain from than anyone else.
The hard truth is that this international order, simply to exist, will
continue to depend heavily on American power. So the
legitimacy of this "European project" of creating a rule-based
world order will remain umbillically linked to America's standing
in the world. Blair is accused of simply supplying a multilateral
fig-leaf for US actions, but the alternative may be no international
legitimacy at all. This may be strategic tight-rope walking and
nobody can be confident that it will succeed. Many American
actions risk unpicking all the painfully extracted advances of the
late 20th century - from the International Criminal Court and
Kyoto to the WTO and Kosovo. But if the American
administration remains unintertested in framing its actions in
ways that appeal to wider audiences, it is safer for Blair to take
on this role than let no one do it at all.
The European perception that this makes him simply
cheerleader-in-chief is simplistic. This must be a three-pronged
strategy; not simply an ambassadorial role. And at least as
important as consultations on how to implement strategy is the
humanitarian aftercare role that Europe can supply for military
interventions. Some British diplomats and soldiers may bridle at
a role that could be caricatured as international social work. But
prevention and reconstruction is the vital part of the jigsaw which
bores the Americans. This is where Europe has the capacity to
make a meaningful contribution.
In many ways Europe's role in global society mirrors Germany's
role in the development of the European Union. While France
and Britain have asserted the national interest and bristled at the
idea of becoming net contributors to the EU, Germany has
made a long-term investment in the structures and quietly paid
for the EU's development and smoothed the disagreements
between its more nationalistic fellow member states.
Blair is riding sky-high in American opinion despite having
slipped a principled universalism into the coalition's rhetoric. The
necessary contradiction of his position - that he is supplying
legitimacy for actions and events over which he lacks ultimate
control - puts him in permanent danger of losing credibility. But
his energetic attempt to square this circle has to be a better bet
than principled irrelevance.
Mark Leonard is Director of The Foreign Policy Centre
(www.fpc.org.uk) and editor of the forthcoming collection
"Reordering the World: the long-term implications of September
11th". This is the first in a series of monthly online columns for
Observer Worldview. You can email the author at
mark@fpc.org.uk.
To send your views on the piece or make suggestions about
Observer Worldview, email
observer.editor@guardianunlimited.co.uk
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