The Middle East Missions
The Washington Post
Sunday, March 10, 2002; Page B08
THE BUSH administration has rightly decided to resume its efforts to broker
an end to the mounting warfare between Israelis and Palestinians.
Now it faces a tricky task of diplomatic choreography: simultaneously
managing the mission of special envoy Anthony C. Zinni, who returns
to a conflict the administration has been reluctant to tackle, and
that of Vice President Cheney, who leaves today to advance the
Bush administration's own agenda in the Middle East -- starting with
its effort to bring change to Iraq. As a practical matter, it is
impossible to separate the two initiatives. But the administration
must try to avoid two traps that have crippled U.S. diplomacy in the past.
One would be to allow Arab states to use the Israeli-Arab dispute to avoid
matters of vital interest to the United States, such as the necessity to
confront Saddam Hussein.
The other would be to reenter the Arab-Israeli maelstrom
merely as a gesture of appeasement to Arab allies, without summoning
the creativity and willingness to persevere that will now be necessary
to restart a peace process.
The moderate Arab leaders Mr. Cheney will visit clearly are appalled
and frightened by the nearly unprecedented Israeli-Palestinian bloodshed,
graphic scenes of which are broadcast nightly across the region.
But the crisis has also come at a convenient moment for the Arabs,
who are most reluctant to talk with the Bush administration about
a new campaign against Iraq -- much less the political, social and
economic reforms that must be carried out in their countries
if Islamic extremism and terrorism are to be extinguished.
If they could, they would speak with Mr. Cheney exclusively about the
still-sketchy peace proposal of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, and whether
or not it will be endorsed by an Arab summit at the
end of the month. The Bush administration is right to
encourage that initiative, even if it has little chance of becoming the vehicle
of a peace settlement. But it must also press on with the initiatives that are
now central to U.S. interests after Sept. 11 -- beginning with Iraq -- and make
clear to Arab allies that those initiatives must go forward, whether or not there
is progress on the Israeli-Palestinian front.
At the same time, the seriousness of the Arab-Israeli crisis means the
administration cannot afford to dispatch Gen. Zinni once again without
giving him a chance to succeed. In the past, the Bush administration's
efforts to broker a cease-fire have failed at least in part because of a lack of
energy and staying power; its envoys have been reluctant to pressure
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, or hold Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat
fully accountable for his actions. The impulse has been to retreat to the
sidelines whenever one side or the other breaks a promise or behaves
badly. Meanwhile, the Bush team has refrained from creating the
outlines of a process leading to a permanent settlement that could be
offered as an alternative to the current bloodshed. Without that prospect,
moderates on both sides have been neutralized.
If it is to succeed in this intervention, the administration must be ready
to use U.S. influence to demand that both Mr. Sharon and Mr. Arafat cease
their attacks -- and that Mr. Arafat then take decisive action against Palestinian
terrorists. Israel must be made to ease its pressure on average
Palestinians and stop the provocative acts that have contributed
to the breakdown of previous cease-fires. Mr. Arafat must understand that a failure
to perform will lead to concrete consequences, including a rupture of relations
with the United States. If a cease-fire can be obtained, the
administration needs to be ready to facilitate the quick beginning
of a serious political process, one that will draw in Arab states as well as Israel
and the Palestinians. And it must be ready to accept the fact that even
if Mr. Arafat cooperates -- and perhaps especially if he does -- extremists
will still occasionally manage to carry out acts of terrorism. These must
be energetically fought; but they cannot be allowed to serve as a pretext for
renewed warfare.
© 2002 The Washington Post Company |
