The "comprador" theory was in some evidence in the recent Seymour Hersh New Yorker article (http://www.newyorker.com/printable/?fact/020311fa_FACT )that was discussed here. My personal take was that the chosen stalking horse of the Perle/Wolfowitz faction, one Ahmed Chalabi, seemed singularly uninspiring.
A dispute over Chalabi's potential usefulness preoccupies the bureaucracy, as the civilian leadership in the Pentagon continues to insist that only the I.N.C. can lead the opposition. At the same time, a former Administration official told me, "Everybody but the Pentagon and the office of the Vice-President wants to ditch the I.N.C." The I.N.C.'s critics note that Chalabi, despite years of effort and millions of dollars in American aid, is intensely unpopular today among many elements in Iraq. "If Chalabi is the guy, there could be a civil war after Saddam's overthrow," one former C.I.A. operative told me. A former high-level Pentagon official added, "There are some things that a President can't order up, and an internal opposition is one. Show me a Northern Alliance"—the opposition group in Afghanistan that, with United States help, scored early victories against the Taliban—"and then we can argue about what it will cost to back it up."
One thing to keep in mind about the 250k figure: Gulf War I involved about double that number, but it took many months to set up. And that was with full Saudi cooperation. The other thing to keep in mind is that without a Northern Alliance-type opposition organization in place, occupation would be much trickier. |
