No, but because of this one ... :0)
stratfor.com
Seoul Fears Impending Crisis On Korean Peninsula
29 March 2002
Summary
South Korean presidential advisor Lim Dong Won, the architect of the Sunshine Policy and facilitator of the 2000 inter-Korean summit, told reporters that he was going to North Korea in early April to stave off a "rumored crisis on the Korean peninsula in 2003." The crisis in question is the collapse of the 1994 Agreed Framework, in which Pyongyang abandoned its nuclear program, and the end of North Korea's self-imposed missile test moratorium. Seoul is extremely worried about a repeat of the 1993-1994 nuclear standoff -- only this time it fears neither side can back down.
Analysis
South Korea is sending presidential national security advisor Lim Dong Won to North Korea April 3-5 in an attempt to restart dialogue between the divided nations. Lim told reporters that his primary goal is to prevent a "rumored crisis on the Korean Peninsula in 2003," according to South Korea's Yonhap news agency.
Lim's rumored crisis stems not only from U.S. President George Bush's "axis of evil" comments or the inclusion of North Korea on a leaked list of seven potential U.S. nuclear targets. 2003 also marks the end of North Korea's self-imposed missile moratorium and the likely default of the 1994 Agreed Framework, through which Pyongyang suspended its nuclear program. Seoul is clearly no longer driving international relations with Pyongyang, and leaders fear that if they don't step in to stem rising tensions now, "the peninsula could be in deep trouble," as Lim so eloquently put it.
On April 10, 2000, South and North Korea issued a joint statement announcing South Korean President Kim Dae Jung's plans to travel to Pyongyang that year, a trip that helped win Kim the Nobel Peace Prize. Now, just two years later, the hopes for inter-Korean reconciliation have faded and fears of a nuclear standoff are rising. Seoul feels it is standing in the middle of a giant game of "chicken" between Pyongyang and Washington, and it is desperately waving its arms for one of them to swerve.
From a security standpoint, 2003 could easily shape up to be another banner year for Korean-U.S. tensions. Pyongyang will end its moratorium on long-range missile tests, and another launch of a North Korean satellite appears likely. Next year is also the initial date for the Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) -- a consortium including the United States, Japan and South Korea -- to complete work on a light-water nuclear reactor in North Korea. In return for the reactor, North Korea agreed in 1994 to abandon its domestic nuclear program.
Pyongyang sees 2003, then, as the perfect opportunity to threaten the United States into submission. The KEDO project is significantly behind schedule, so, from North Korea's point of view, the United States will have defaulted on its half of the bargain and North Korea will again become a de facto nuclear state. Add to this a test of the Taepo Dong-2 long-range missile, which by some accounts is capable of striking the mainland United States, and North Korea becomes a force to be reckoned with -- at least on paper.
Thus, from Pyongyang's perspective, the very thought of North Korea becoming a nuclear power with intercontinental ballistic missiles will have U.S. leaders so shaken up that they will repent of their ire toward the North and establish normal diplomatic relations with Pyongyang, ending the economic and political isolation of the past 50 years. And, not coincidentally, 2003 happens to be the 50th anniversary of the signing of the armistice that ended the Korean War.
Such logic, even under normal circumstances, is highly dubious. In the post-Sept. 11 world, in which the United States views its top priority as preventing al Qaeda or another militant group from getting weapons of mass destruction, it becomes laughable. It was no accident that North Korea was included in the "axis of evil" or in the leaked list of potential nuclear targets. Pyongyang's own missile development is funded by sales to other countries, and its suspected stocks of chemical, biological and perhaps even nuclear weapons could serve as another revenue stream.
For Seoul, Washington's unstoppable quest is about to collide with North Korea's immoveable obstinacy, and South Korea is caught in the middle. Rising tensions on the peninsula will do little for South Korea's economic evolution and even less for Kim Dae Jung's legacy. And this issue of legacy, or -- perhaps more accurately -- time, is also driving the South Korean government to accelerate contact with its northern counterpart.
Kim's single term as president will end in early 2003, and a shift in leadership in Seoul inevitably will lead to a lull in inter-Korean contact as the new government deals with domestic issues and formulates its foreign policy. And when it comes to North Korea, the lack of a clearly defined policy is the same as a negative policy, as was evident in the first months of the Bush administration. Kim Dae Jung has less than a year to kick Korean reconciliation back into high gear or watch the gains of June 2000 fade forever into the record of failed inter-Korean accords.
For South Korea's lame-duck administration, the fear of a 2003 crisis is both very real and an opportunity for one last shot at bringing off the diplomatic coup of the century. Lim's mission will be to convince the North Koreans of the seriousness of Washington's current mindset and to show how North Korea can slip out of the noose by working more closely with Seoul. Pyongyang's dire economic situation and Japan's rising militancy may be other examples in Lim's repertoire to encourage Pyongyang to take hold of South Korea's outstretched hand.
Whether Lim's visit will be enough to encourage North Korea to step back from the brink, or convince Washington that there is still something redeemable in Pyongyang, remains to be seen. If Lim can get both sides thinking, that may be enough -- at least for a while. |
