If U.S. Wants to Engage, Analysts See Many Options
By Peter Slevin and Glenn Frankel
Washington Post Staff Writers
Sunday, March 31, 2002; Page A17
As Israeli tanks rumble and Palestinian suicide bombs explode in a struggle that
looks more like war each day, more voices are asking what
President Bush could do if he left the sidelines. After all, Vice President
Cheney returned from the Middle East to say last week that "there
isn't anybody but us" to help resolve the conflict.
The administration says there is very little room for diplomatic maneuver,
despite the worsening bloodshed and concern that the conflict
could jeopardize the White House's evolving campaign against Iraq.
As one official said yesterday: "The administration would be prepared to
do a substantial amount, if it thought it would be accepted."
Many analysts contend there is a broad spectrum of policy options and
strategies for the United States, short- and long-term, should the
president choose to engage. These range from full support for Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon's military campaign and a full-scale
diplomatic initiative to putting U.S. troops in the region as peacekeepers.
A former British foreign secretary, Lord Hurd, has even called for Bush
to summon Sharon and Arafat to a remote location where they
would not be allowed to leave until they made peace.
Robert Malley, a Middle East adviser to President Bill Clinton,
reflected the views of many in that more activist administration when he said
that Washington must press the two sides toward a comprehensive
final agreement. In a piece he cowrote for the next issue of Foreign
Affairs, he insists that the Bush administration cannot
wait for the violence to subside.
"In the short run, perhaps, overwhelming Israeli force might quiet
the situation," Malley said. "But then there'll be more terrorist attacks,
and attacks on the occupying troops, and once those attacks hurt Israel
enough and threatened stability in the region, the United States
would feel compelled to come back in -- as has happened time
and time again."
In contrast, Richard Perle, chairman of the Pentagon's advisory Defense Policy Board,
believes the administration should give Sharon full
support, including pressing the European allies to lean on Arafat to fulfill his
promises to suppress terrorism. "We need to bring the
maximum pressure to bear on Arafat, not Israel," Perle said.
U.S. participation at critical junctures has often made a difference
in Israeli-Arab conflicts. U.S. presidents intervened forcefully with Israeli
prime ministers during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, to persuade Israel
not to destroy the surrounded Egyptian army, and in 1982, to halt the
destruction of West Beirut during the invasion of Lebanon.
The 1991 Middle East peace conference in Madrid required months of
intensive shuttle diplomacy by then-Secretary of State James A.
Baker III. Even the 1993 Oslo Accords, which resulted from talks
launched secretly between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators without U.S.
knowledge, required a U.S. endorsement and earned a White House signing ceremony.
But neither Sharon nor Arafat has shown himself amenable to diplomatic persuasion.
The administration is unwilling to get involved
beyond the mission of envoy Anthony C. Zinni, a senior official said
yesterday, because of the belief that "the effort put in will not equal a
successful or a useful outcome." The official said that policy could change depending
on events.
In the short term, to win a cease-fire the administration needs a strong,
visible Middle East envoy with extensive reach and authority, said
Israeli security analyst Yosef Alpher, a former member of Mossad, the
Israeli intelligence service. He added that such political issues as the
fate of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip should be
part of the discussion.
In the long term, Alpher said, Washington needs to lead an international effort
to produce a new diplomatic framework for peace. "All of the
international mechanisms set up for Israelis and Palestinians to make
peace have failed us -- [U.N. Security Council Resolution] 242, the
Madrid and Oslo frameworks. We need the U.S. to sit down with the
Europeans, the Russians, Israelis and Arabs, and work out a new
formula."
"Most of us in Israel realize this administration isn't terribly interested in
this conflict and doesn't want to get its hands dirty," Alpher said.
But if unresolved, he warned, the fighting will not only do great damage
to Israel, a treasured ally, but also spill into Lebanon and Jordan.
The cycle can be broken only with "some kind of formula that will allow
each one to save some face," said former national security adviser
Brent Scowcroft. "We are hesitant to do anything now for fear that it looks
like we're condoning terrorism if we put pressure on Sharon."
Edward S. Walker Jr., until last year the assistant secretary of state for
Near Eastern affairs, believes a formidable injection of presidential
influence is required. "The president has to come out on the
podium itself," Walker said, "and he's got to make it credible that he is
concerned, that it is affecting our interests. How can you be standing
there and saying you care when you're not prepared to do anything?"
Walker said Bush, at a minimum, should recall Zinni to the White House
to demonstrate his personal commitment. Even better, he said,
would be the appointment of a higher-profile envoy. Walker's own choice?
George H.W. Bush, the president's father.
A well-supported U.S. envoy should lead both sides through confidence-building
steps while telling Sharon to "offer a proposal that takes us
from Point A to Point B -- and Point B is engagement and genuine negotiations,"
Walker said.
"You step on the Israelis," he continued. "You make it clear that they
are now beginning to impinge on serious American interests
throughout the region. You don't confront, you don't demand, you don't impose,
but you certainly make it clear that this is not a one-sided
problem."
On the contrary, Bush has been right to support Sharon and demand that
Arafat do more to arrest and disarm militant extremists, said
Jason Isaacson, international affairs director of the American
Jewish Committee. He believes an aggressive approach is needed because
Arafat's "not answering that call."
"What concretely has to happen is there are thousands of Palestinian terrorists
who will not tolerate the state of Israel, cannot coexist with
the state of Israel, have made it abundantly plain that their mission is the
destruction of Israel -- and who must be disarmed, and if not
disarmed, then removed from the scene," Isaacson said.
Isaacson said the administration should urge Arab states to squeeze the
fundraising operations of the Islamic militant group Hamas. He also
said the White House should press the European allies to compel Iran to cut ties
to the militant Hezbollah in return for trade.
An administration official said he expects European governments in the
coming days to revive the idea of sending international monitors to
the region. Proposed last year and brought up again recently by Zinni,
the monitors could build confidence by verifying promises made by
both sides. Palestinian leaders have long sought a large international presence,
but some Israelis fear the monitors would have an
anti-Israeli bias.
Sam Lewis, a former U.S. ambassador to Israel, said the White House
does not have many good choices.
"It's only after a lot more killing goes on," Lewis said, "that you're going to have
either side ready to take advice from outside."
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