We can't take Arafat out of the solution, galling though it may be. He's got the support of the Palestinian people now more than ever before.
Did you ever read the Mitchell Report? I am going to post it here just so you can do so.
>>SHARM EL-SHEIKH FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE FINAL REPORT
April 30, 2001
The Honorable George W. Bush
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, DC 20500
Dear Mr. President,
We enclose herewith the report of the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee.
We sought and received information and advice from a wide range of individuals, organizations,
and governments. However, the conclusions and recommendations are ours alone.
We are grateful for the support that you and your administration have provided to the Committee.
Respectfully,
Suleyman Demirel
Thorbjoern Jagland
Warren B. Rudman
Javier Solana
George J Mitchell, Chairman
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
The Government of Israel (GOI) and the Palestinian Authority (PA) must act swiftly and decisively
to halt the violence. Their immediate objectives then should be to rebuild confidence and resume
negotiations.
During this mission our aim has been to fulfill the mandate agreed at Sharm el-Sheikh. We value
the support given our work by the participants at the summit, and we commend the parties for
their cooperation. Our principal recommendation is that they recommit themselves to the Sharm
el-Sheikh spirit and that they implement the decisions made there in 1999 and 2000. We believe
that the summit participants will support bold action by the parties to achieve these objectives.
The restoration of trust is essential, and the parties should take affirmative steps to this end. Given
the high level of hostility and mistrust, the timing and sequence of these steps are obviously crucial.
This can be decided only by the parties. We urge them to begin the process of decision
immediately.
Accordingly, we recommend that steps be taken to:
END THE VIOLENCE
The GOI and the PA should reaffirm their commitment to existing agreements
and undertakings and should immediately implement an unconditional
cessation of violence.
The GOI and PA should immediately resume security cooperation.
REBUILD CONFIDENCE
The PA and GOI should work together to establish a meaningful "cooling off
period" and implement additional confidence building measures, some of
which were detailed in the October 2000 Sharm el-Sheikh Statement and
some of which were offered by the U.S. on January 7, 2001 in Cairo (see
Recommendations section for further description).
The PA and GOI should resume their efforts to identify, condemn and
discourage incitement in all its forms.
The PA should make clear through concrete action to Palestinians and Israelis
alike that terrorism is reprehensible and unacceptable, and that the PA will
make a 100 percent effort to prevent terrorist operations and to punish
perpetrators. This effort should include immediate steps to apprehend and
incarcerate terrorists operating within the PA's jurisdiction.
The GOI should freeze all settlement activity, including the "natural growth" of
existing settlements.
The GOI should ensure that the IDF adopt and enforce policies and
procedures encouraging non-lethal responses to unarmed demonstrators, with
a view to minimizing casualties and friction between the two communities.
The PA should prevent gunmen from using Palestinian populated areas to fire
upon Israeli populated areas and IDF positions. This tactic places civilians on
both sides at unnecessary risk.
The GOI should lift closures, transfer to the PA all tax revenues owed, and
permit Palestinians who had been employed in Israel to return to their jobs;
and should ensure that security forces and settlers refrain from the destruction
of homes and roads, as well as trees and other agricultural property in
Palestinian areas. We acknowledge the GOI's position that actions of this
nature have been taken for security reasons. Nevertheless, the economic
effects will persist for years.
The PA should renew cooperation with Israeli security agencies to ensure, to
the maximum extent possible, that Palestinian workers employed within Israel
are fully vetted and free of connections to organizations and individuals
engaged in terrorism.
The PA and GOI should consider a joint undertaking to preserve and protect
holy places sacred to the traditions of Jews, Muslims, and Christians.
The GOI and PA should jointly endorse and support the work of Palestinian
and Israeli non- governmental organizations involved in cross-community
initiatives linking the two peoples
RESUME NEGOTIATIONS
In the spirit of the Sharm el-Sheikh agreements and understandings of 1999 and 2000, we
recommend that the parties meet to reaffirm their commitment to signed agreements and mutual
understandings, and take corresponding action. This should be the basis for resuming full and
meaningful negotiations.
INTRODUCTION
On October 17, 2000, at the conclusion of the Middle East Peace Summit at Sharm el-Sheikh,
Egypt, the President of the United States spoke on behalf of the participants (the Government of
Israel, the Palestinian Authority, the Governments of Egypt, Jordan, and the United States, the
United Nations, and the European Union). Among other things, the President stated that:
The United States will develop with the Israelis and Palestinians, as well as in
consultation with the United Nations Secretary General, a committee of fact-finding
on the events of the past several weeks and how to prevent their recurrence. The
committee's report will be shared by the U.S. President with the U.N. Secretary
General and the parties prior to publication. A final report shall be submitted under
the auspices of the U.S. President for publication.1
On November 7, 2000, following consultations with the other participants, the President asked us
to serve on what has come to be known as the Sharm el-Sheikh Fact-Finding Committee. In a
letter to us on December 6, 2000, the President stated that:
The purpose of the Summit, and of the agreement that ensued, was to end the
violence, to prevent its recurrence, and to find a path back to the peace process. In
its actions and mode of operation, therefore, the Committee should be guided by
these overriding goals ... The Committee should strive to steer clear of any step that
will intensify mutual blame and finger-pointing between the parties. As I noted in my
previous letter, "the Committee should not become a divisive force or a focal point
for blame and recrimination but rather should serve to forestall violence and
confrontation and provide lessons for the future." This should not be a tribunal whose
purpose is to determine the guilt or innocence of individuals or of the parties; rather,
it should be a fact-finding committee whose purpose is to determine what happened
and how to avoid it recurring in the future.2
After our first meeting, held before we visited the region, we urged an end to all violence. Our
meetings and our observations during our subsequent visits to the region have intensified our
convictions in this regard. Whatever the source, violence will not solve the problems of the region.
It will only make them worse. Death and destruction will not bring peace, but will deepen the
hatred and harden the resolve on both sides. There is only one way to peace, justice, and security
in the Middle East, and that is through negotiation.
Despite their long history and close proximity, some Israelis and Palestinians seem not to fully
appreciate each other's problems and concerns. Some Israelis appear not to comprehend the
humiliation and frustration that Palestinians must endure every day as a result of living with the
continuing effects of occupation, sustained by the presence of Israeli military forces and
settlements in their midst, or the determination of the Palestinians to achieve independence and
genuine self-determination. Some Palestinians appear not to comprehend the extent to which
terrorism creates fear among the Israeli people and undermines their belief in the possibility of
co-existence, or the determination of the GOI to do whatever is necessary to protect its people.
Fear, hate, anger, and frustration have risen on both sides. The greatest danger of all is that the
culture of peace, nurtured over the previous decade, is being shattered. In its place there is a
growing sense of futility and despair, and a growing resort to violence.
Political leaders on both sides must act and speak decisively to reverse these dangerous trends;
they must rekindle the desire and the drive for peace. That will be difficult. But it can be done and
it must be done, for the alternative is unacceptable and should be unthinkable.
Two proud peoples share a land and a destiny. Their competing claims and religious differences
have led to a grinding, demoralizing, dehumanizing conflict. They can continue in conflict or they
can negotiate to find a way to live side-by-side in peace.
There is a record of achievement. In 1991 the first peace conference with Israelis and Palestinians
took place in Madrid to achieve peace based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
In 1993, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel met in Oslo for the first
face-to-face negotiations; they led to mutual recognition and the Declaration of Principles (signed
by the parties in Washington, D.C. on September 13, 1993), which provided a road map to reach
the destination agreed in Madrid. Since then, important steps have been taken in Cairo, in
Washington, and elsewhere. Last year the parties came very close to a permanent settlement.
So much has been achieved. So much is at risk. If the parties are to succeed in completing their
journey to their common destination, agreed commitments must be implemented, international law
respected, and human rights protected. We encourage them to return to negotiations, however
difficult. It is the only path to peace, justice and security.
DISCUSSION
It is clear from their statements that the participants in the summit of last October hoped and
intended that the outbreak of violence, then less than a month old, would soon end. The U.S.
President's letters to us, asking that we make recommendations on how to prevent a recurrence of
violence, reflect that intention.
Yet the violence has not ended. It has worsened. Thus the overriding concern of those in the
region with whom we spoke is to end the violence and to return to the process of shaping a
sustainable peace. That is what we were told, and were asked to address, by Israelis and
Palestinians alike. It was the message conveyed to us as well by President Mubarak of Egypt,
King Abdullah of Jordan, and UN Secretary General Annan.
Their concern must be ours. If our report is to have effect, it must deal with the situation that
exists, which is different from that envisaged by the summit participants. In this report, we will try
to answer the questions assigned to us by the Sharm el-Sheikh summit: What happened? Why did
it happen?
In light of the current situation, however, we must elaborate on the third part of our mandate: How
can the recurrence of violence be prevented? The relevance and impact of our work, in the end,
will be measured by the recommendations we make concerning the following:
Ending the Violence.
Rebuilding Confidence.
Resuming Negotiations.
WHAT HAPPENED?
We are not a tribunal. We complied with the request that we not determine the guilt or innocence
of individuals or of the parties. We did not have the power to compel the testimony of witnesses
or the production of documents. Most of the information we received came from the parties and,
understandably, it largely tended to support their arguments.
In this part of our report, we do not attempt to chronicle all of the events from late September
2000 onward. Rather, we discuss only those that shed light on the underlying causes of violence.
In late September 2000, Israeli, Palestinian, and other officials received reports that Member of
the Knesset (now Prime Minister) Ariel Sharon was planning a visit to the Haram al-Sharif/Temple
Mount in Jerusalem. Palestinian and U.S. officials urged then Prime Minister Ehud Barak to
prohibit the visit.3 Mr. Barak told us that he believed the visit was intended to be an internal
political act directed against him by a political opponent, and he declined to prohibit it.
Mr. Sharon made the visit on September 28 accompanied by over 1,000 Israeli police officers.
Although Israelis viewed the visit in an internal political context, Palestinians saw it as highly
provocative to them. On the following day, in the same place, a large number of unarmed
Palestinian demonstrators and a large Israeli police contingent confronted each other. According
to the U.S. Department of State, "Palestinians held large demonstrations and threw stones at
police in the vicinity of the Western Wall. Police used rubber-coated metal bullets and live
ammunition to disperse the demonstrators, killing 4 persons and injuring about 200."4 According
to the GOI, 14 Israeli policemen were injured.5
Similar demonstrations took place over the following several days.6 Thus began what has become
known as the "Al-Aqsa Intifada" (Al-Aqsa being a mosque at the Haram al-Sharif/Temple
Mount).
The GOI asserts that the immediate catalyst for the violence was the breakdown of the Camp
David negotiations on July 25, 2000 and the "widespread appreciation in the international
community of Palestinian responsibility for the impasse."7 In this view, Palestinian violence was
planned by the PA leadership, and was aimed at "provoking and incurring Palestinian casualties as
a means of regaining the diplomatic initiative."8
The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) denies the allegation that the intifada was planned. It
claims, however, that "Camp David represented nothing less than an attempt by Israel to extend
the force it exercises on the ground to negotiations,"9 and that "the failure of the summit, and the
attempts to allocate blame on the Palestinian side only added to the tension on the ground..."10
From the perspective of the PLO, Israel responded to the disturbances with excessive and illegal
use of deadly force against demonstrators; behavior which, in the PLO's view, reflected Israel's
contempt for the lives and safety of Palestinians. For Palestinians, the widely seen images of the
killing of 12-year-old Muhammad al Durra in Gaza on September 30, shot as he huddled behind
his father, reinforced that perception.
From the perspective of the GOI, the demonstrations were organized and directed by the
Palestinian leadership to create sympathy for their cause around the world by provoking Israeli
security forces to fire upon demonstrators, especially young people. For Israelis, the lynching of
two military reservists, First Sgt. Vadim Novesche and First Cpl. Yosef Avrahami, in Ramallah on
October 12, reflected a deep-seated Palestinian hatred of Israel and Jews.
What began as a series of confrontations between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli security
forces, which resulted in the GOI's initial restrictions on the movement of people and goods in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip (closures), has since evolved into a wider array of violent actions and
responses. There have been exchanges of fire between built-up areas, sniping incidents and
clashes between Israeli settlers and Palestinians. There have also been terrorist acts and Israeli
reactions thereto (characterized by the GOI as counter-terrorism), including killings, further
destruction of property and economic measures. Most recently, there have been mortar attacks on
Israeli locations and IDF ground incursions into Palestinian areas.
From the Palestinian perspective, the decision of Israel to characterize the current crisis as "an
armed conflict short of war"11 is simply a means "to justify its assassination policy, its collective
punishment policy, and its use of lethal force."12 From the Israeli perspective, "The Palestinian
leadership have instigated, orchestrated and directed the violence. It has used, and continues to
use, terror and attrition as strategic tools."13
In their submissions, the parties traded allegations about the motivation and degree of control
exercised by the other. However, we were provided with no persuasive evidence that the Sharon
visit was anything other than an internal political act; neither were we provided with persuasive
evidence that the PA planned the uprising.
Accordingly, we have no basis on which to conclude that there was a deliberate plan by the PA to
initiate a campaign of violence at the first opportunity; or to conclude that there was a deliberate
plan by the GOI to respond with lethal force.
However, there is also no evidence on which to conclude that the PA made a consistent effort to
contain the demonstrations and control the violence once it began; or that the GOI made a
consistent effort to use non-lethal means to control demonstrations of unarmed Palestinians. Amid
rising anger, fear, and mistrust, each side assumed the worst about the other and acted
accordingly.
The Sharon visit did not cause the "Al-Aqsa Intifada." But it was poorly timed and the provocative
effect should have been foreseen; indeed it was foreseen by those who urged that the visit be
prohibited. More significant were the events that followed: the decision of the Israeli police on
September 29 to use lethal means against the Palestinian demonstrators; and the subsequent
failure, as noted above, of either party to exercise restraint.
WHY DID IT HAPPEN?
The roots of the current violence extend much deeper than an inconclusive summit conference.
Both sides have made clear a profound disillusionment with the behavior of the other in failing to
meet the expectations arising from the peace process launched in Madrid in 1991 and then in Oslo
in 1993. Each side has accused the other of violating specific undertakings and undermining the
spirit of their commitment to resolving their political differences peacefully.
Divergent Expectations: We are struck by the divergent expectations expressed by the parties
relating to the implementation of the Oslo process. Results achieved from this process were
unthinkable less than 10 years ago. During the latest round of negotiations, the parties were closer
to a permanent settlement than ever before.
Nonetheless, Palestinians and Israelis alike told us that the premise on which the Oslo process is
based — that tackling the hard "permanent status" issues be deferred to the end of the process —
has gradually come under serious pressure. The step-by-step process agreed to by the parties
was based on the assumption that each step in the negotiating process would lead to enhanced
trust and confidence. To achieve this, each party would have to implement agreed upon
commitments and abstain from actions that would be seen by the other as attempts to abuse the
process in order to predetermine the shape of the final outcome. If this requirement is not met, the
Oslo road map cannot successfully lead to its agreed destination. Today, each side blames the
other for having ignored this fundamental aspect, resulting in a crisis in confidence. This problem
became even more pressing with the opening of permanent status talks.
The GOI has placed primacy on moving toward a Permanent Status Agreement in a nonviolent
atmosphere, consistent with commitments contained in the agreements between the parties. "Even
if slower than was initially envisaged, there has, since the start of the peace process in Madrid in
1991, been steady progress towards the goal of a Permanent Status Agreement without the resort
to violence on a scale that has characterized recent weeks."14 The "goal" is the Permanent Status
Agreement, the terms of which must be negotiated by the parties.
The PLO view is that delays in the process have been the result of an Israeli attempt to prolong
and solidify the occupation. Palestinians "believed that the Oslo process would yield an end to
Israeli occupation in five years,"15 the timeframe for the transitional period specified in the
Declaration of Principles. Instead there have been, in the PLO's view, repeated Israeli delays
culminating in the Camp David summit, where, "Israel proposed to annex about 11.2% of the
West Bank (excluding Jerusalem)..." and offered unacceptable proposals concerning Jerusalem,
security and refugees. "In sum, Israel's proposals at Camp David provided for Israel's annexation
of the best Palestinian lands, the perpetuation of Israeli control over East Jerusalem, a continued
Israeli military presence on Palestinian territory, Israeli control over Palestinian natural resources,
airspace and borders, and the return of fewer than 1% of refugees to their homes."16
Both sides see the lack of full compliance with agreements reached since the opening of the peace
process as evidence of a lack of good faith. This conclusion led to an erosion of trust even before
the permanent status negotiations began.
Divergent Perspectives: During the last seven months, these views have hardened into divergent
realities. Each side views the other as having acted in bad faith; as having turned the optimism of
Oslo into the suffering and grief of victims and their loved ones. In their statements and actions,
each side demonstrates a perspective that fails to recognize any truth in the perspective of the
other.
The Palestinian Perspective: For the Palestinian side, "Madrid" and "Oslo" heralded the
prospect of a State, and guaranteed an end to the occupation and a resolution of outstanding
matters within an agreed time frame. Palestinians are genuinely angry at the continued growth of
settlements and at their daily experiences of humiliation and disruption as a result of Israel's
presence in the Palestinian territories. Palestinians see settlers and settlements in their midst not
only as violating the spirit of the Oslo process, but also as an application of force in the form of
Israel's overwhelming military superiority, which sustains and protects the settlements.
The Interim Agreement provides that "the two parties view the West Bank and Gaza as a single
territorial unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim period."
Coupled with this, the Interim Agreement's prohibition on taking steps which may prejudice
permanent status negotiations denies Israel the right to continue its illegal expansionist settlement
policy. In addition to the Interim Agreement, customary international law, including the Fourth
Geneva Convention, prohibits Israel (as an occupying power) from establishing settlements in
occupied territory pending an end to the conflict.17
The PLO alleges that Israeli political leaders "have made no secret of the fact that the Israeli
interpretation of Oslo was designed to segregate the Palestinians in non-contiguous enclaves,
surrounded by Israeli military-controlled borders, with settlements and settlement roads violating
the territories' integrity."18 According to the PLO, "In the seven years since the [Declaration of
Principles], the settler population in the West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip,
has doubled to 200,000, and the settler population in East Jerusalem has risen to 170,000. Israel
has constructed approximately 30 new settlements, and expanded a number of existing ones to
house these new settlers."19
The PLO also claims that the GOI has failed to comply with other commitments such as the further
withdrawal from the West Bank and the release of Palestinian prisoners. In addition, Palestinians
expressed frustration with the impasse over refugees and the deteriorating economic circumstances
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.
The Israeli Perspective: From the GOI perspective, the expansion of settlement activity and the
taking of measures to facilitate the convenience and safety of settlers do not prejudice the outcome
of permanent status negotiations.
Israel understands that the Palestinian side objects to the settlements in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip. Without prejudice to the formal status of the settlements,
Israel accepts that the settlements are an outstanding issue on which there will have
to be agreement as part of any permanent status resolution between the sides. This
point was acknowledged and agreed upon in the Declaration of Principles of 13
September 1993 as well as in other agreements between the two sides. There has in
fact been a good deal of discussion on the question of settlements between the two
sides in the various negotiations toward a permanent status agreement.20
Indeed, Israelis point out that at the Camp David summit and during subsequent talks the GOI
offered to make significant concessions with respect to settlements in the context of an overall
agreement.<<
Continued in next post. |
