stratfor.com
Second Quarter Forecast: Living in an Asymmetric World
9 April 2002
The asymmetry that has defined the international system since the collapse of the Soviet Union remains an underlying historical trend that will help to shape events in the second quarter of 2002. On one side, there is the United States: the only nation in the world that is politically integrated and possesses the ability to project power globally -- not only in military terms but also politically and economically. On the other side, there is the rest of the world -- consisting of great powers with regional influence, tertiary powers and non-state powers. All of these are engaged simultaneously in trying to build coalitions to resist U.S. power while seeking to extract maximum advantage from relations with the United States.
The events of Sept. 11 deeply intensified this dynamic. The United States is now not only the pivot of the international system, but is also obsessed with preventing further attacks by destroying the al Qaeda network and by destroying regimes or facilities that might provide al Qaeda with weapons of mass destruction. From the U.S. point of view, protecting the United States from further attack supercedes all other considerations.
The normal process of international political transactions is infinitely more complex and nuanced than current U.S. policy. Therefore, the United States has, in recent months, created an asymmetric policy resting atop an asymmetric international system. By elevating the threat from al Qaeda and its supporters above all other issues, the United States has sought to suspend the normal functioning of the international system. The range of other bilateral and multilateral issues that would normally constitute the landscape of international relations has been dwarfed by and disconnected from this core issue. The United States judges the behavior of all other nations through this monochromatic lens.
Long-term processes have therefore been profoundly intensified. Since the end of the Cold War, two contradictory tendencies have torn the international system: great powers have created coalitions in efforts to limit U.S. power, while both great powers and lesser nations have sought to position themselves to take advantage of good relations with the United States. Sometimes nations have pursued both policies simultaneously, creating strange and unpredictable patterns of behavior.
Al Qaeda's actions have magnified this process markedly. The group's goal, as a non-state player, was to intensify the process of international resistance to U.S. power. Al Qaeda hoped to trigger the kind of asymmetric response the United States has given, in hopes that the response would generate a broad anti-U.S. coalition, particularly in the Islamic world. The great issue of the second quarter will be whether al Qaeda's strategy has succeeded.
The U.S. goal requires a global coalition. The United States says that al Qaeda is operating in 60 countries. It is Washington's clear intent to strike into each of these countries. In order to do this, it needs either the cooperation of these countries or that of neighbors prepared to host U.S. and coalition forces. The United States also says it will destroy all WMD sites that might provide technology or weapons to al Qaeda. Coalition partners are necessary to achieve this goal as well.
As has been the case for a decade, the United States' search for coalition has brought contradictory responses. Most countries have sought ways to cooperate, or at least appear to cooperate, with the United States. However, U.S. demands have posed extreme challenges for many countries. The United States has, in effect, demanded the right to enter countries and engage al Qaeda cells there, as well as demanding the right to conduct complete intelligence and military operations.
Advanced industrial countries perceive that Washington is asking them to forego important commercial interests, for example in Iran, in order to aid the United States. From the standpoint of Russia, the United States has demanded at least temporary rights within the Russian sphere of influence without clear compensation or indeed, without a clear commitment to withdraw. However, it is in Islamic countries - especially those that are Arab -- where resistance has been the greatest. The United States' demands on countries like Saudi Arabia could threaten the survival of the regime; therefore, resistance is substantial.
The United States is under great pressure to bring the war to a close. The longer al Qaeda survives, the greater the possibility that it will strike again, perhaps with nuclear weapons. The United States must begin moving decisively not only against al Qaeda but also against WMD facilities. It must move quickly and simultaneously against multiple targets. Certainly the United States must mount major operations prior to the first anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks.
This means that the second quarter will be a period during which major U.S. forces will be deployed around the world -- not necessarily in great numbers, but certainly to many places. It also will be the period in which the coalition crisis comes to a head. The United States must know definitively the geography of its coalition so that it can plan its operations. It must know whose intelligence service will provide information and in which countries it can base forces. The second quarter will be the period in which the United States extracts definitive answers and generates a strategy.
The coming quarter therefore will be a period during which the international system reshuffles itself. The world will be dividing itself between those countries that are prepared to cooperate fully with the U.S. war on al Qaeda, those that will be prepared to cooperate to a more limited extent and those that will resist absorption into the U.S. alliance system.
This process will be most volatile within the Islamic world, where al Qaeda is most deeply embedded and where WMD facilities that are liable to transfer technology to al Qaeda are present. As the United States increases the tempo of its operations in this region, the pressures between and within Islamic countries will become greater and even unbearable. Ultimately, the ability of regimes to resist U.S. power will be limited, but the consequences of collaboration will be substantial.
Therefore, we see this quarter as a period of significant preparations for military operations coupled with serious pressure on the U.S. alliance system. Friction between the United States and the rest of the world will be substantial. Ultimately, we expect the United States to be in a position to extract the concessions it requires, but it will be a tense period |
