stratfor.com RUSSIA 9 April 2002
Although fighting al Qaeda will remain the United States' top priority in the coming months, the Bush administration will take advantage of Russia's weakness by expanding into its traditional spheres of influence. History shows that this is natural geopolitical behavior for any power with such an opportunity, and the United States is no exception.
Washington appears to believe that a weak Russia is better than a strong Russia for its own geopolitical agenda. Manifestations of this belief will continue to chink away at President Vladimir Putin's power, which until now has been largely unassailable. The United States will reinforce and expand its deployments in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the Baltic states will begin their final sprint into NATO. Washington and Moscow will sign their nuclear disarmament treaty, only to have the United States store - not destroy - most of its warheads. With each concession, Putin will lose some of his luster.
As his star fades, the Kremlin too will change. The second quarter will not be revolutionary in Moscow, but it will witness a subtle change in the balance of power. The Communists are now fully in opposition and will attempt to rally popular disaffection against Putin's continuing pro-Western policies. However, they lack both a personality and organizational leverage to turn their patriotic-communist desires into a meaningful challenge.
Instead, the Putin government itself will generate its own mixture of political intrigue. The various camps that helped Putin attain power and have helped him implement his policy successes to date are becoming restless. Since the powerbrokers all broadly favor greater economic engagement with the West, they now find themselves with common interests -- even though their room to maneuver is somewhat limited by political niceties. The second quarter will be marked by government purges as Putin tries to defend his independence, and by slow moves from various oligarchs, powerbrokers and even government ministers to limit the president's power.
Putin is in no danger of losing his job in the next three months, but his autonomy is sure to suffer as the interests he has balanced for the last two years find more common ground against him than with him. |