Ross's view of things...
POLICYWATCH #618
April 19, 2002
ANALYSIS OF NEAR EAST POLICY FROM THE SCHOLARS AND
ASSOCIATES OF THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE
SPECIAL POLICY FORUM REPORT
THE POWELL MISSION AND THE BUSH SPEECH: MAKING PEACE POSSIBLE?
AMBASSADOR DENNIS ROSS
On April 12, Dr. Robert Satloff, executive director of The
Washington Institute, and Ambassador Dennis Ross, counselor
and Ziegler distinguished fellow at the Institute, addressed
the Institute's Policy Forum. Dr. Satloff's remarks were
published in PolicyWatch no. 616. The following is a
rapporteur's summary of Ambassador Ross's remarks. Please
note that these remarks were made on April 12, near the
beginning of Secretary of State Colin Powell's mission.
Secretary of State Colin Powell and Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon exchanged warm words regarding the U.S.-Israel
relationship at a press conference on April 12, but
underneath that they presented two distinct approaches to
stopping the current violence in the region. Sharon
emphasized that Israel is conducting a war on terror,
stressing that completing the ongoing military operation is
of the utmost importance. Powell was sympathetic to Israel's
need to defend itself, but he emphasized finding a political
answer to the conflict, one tied to a timetable for ending
Israeli military operations.
The next days will determine whether Powell can bring about
some semblance of relative calm, though it will be difficult
to achieve much more than that. Powell is not likely to get
a ceasefire without offering a political process, and such a
process is unlikely to begin while military operations
continue.
Form of Leverage Available to Powell
Powell has leverage with both parties. With Israel he has
not only the close U.S.-Israel relationship, but also the
fact -- apparent to both him and Sharon -- that the most
Israel's military operations can produce is a respite from
terror. The terrorist infrastructure in the West Bank is not
a highly sophisticated infrastructure dependent on
technology or large investments. It is a simple
infrastructure that can be disrupted for a period of time
but will likely be reconstituted. In order to turn the
respite into something more profound, Sharon will need the
United States.
Powell has leverage with Arafat as well, but this leverage
will be totally undercut if Arafat thinks that he is
indispensable and that the United Sates will save him, as
happened in 1982. He will respond to U.S. demands only if he
believes that Washington is prepared to sever ties with him
if he once again fails to perform. For this reason, Powell
should make clear that, from the Bush administration's
standpoint, this is Chairman Arafat's last chance with the
United States. It is time for him to discredit terror as
something that threatens the Palestinian cause. It is time
for him to give unequivocal orders and to use his standing
as the Palestinian leader in order to declare that those
using violence are enemies of the Palestinian people.
Powell also has leverage with Arab leaders, who are not
indifferent to the level of anger on their streets. These
leaders need sustained, not episodic, U.S. engagement.
Powell should emphasize that if Arab leaders want the United
States to play a sustained role, they must fulfill their
part by exhibiting a willingness to denounce terror and to
lean on the Palestinians more systematically.
Options for Israel and the United States
Israel and the United States face three basic options:
* Bypass or exile Arafat. Neither the United States nor
Israel can install a Palestinian leader; only the
Palestinians can decide who will lead them and what their
future will be. Yasir Arafat is a symbol of the Palestinian
movement and a fixture on the landscape. Attempts to bypass
or remove him would need to be accompanied by an offer of an
equally revolutionary political strategy. Let there be no
illusions that Israel or the United States could easily find
an alternative to him. If Arafat were bypassed now, no
Palestinian would step forward, for fear of being labeled
either a traitor or a lackey. If the Israelis want to pursue
this option, they must demonstrate unmistakably that Arafat
is the primary obstacle to peace -- they must persuade the
Palestinian people that a solution to the conflict exists,
but that Arafat blocks any possibility of realizing it. To
this end, Sharon should be prepared to adopt an approach
that is clear in terms of promising negotiations. Such an
approach must indicate that the Palestinians would receive
most of the territories, but only if their leadership is
prepared to fulfill its obligations and refrain from
resorting to violence whenever it is dissatisfied.
* Timeline of obligations: Security, confidence-building
measures, and political negotiations. In this option,
Palestinian and Israeli obligations would be spelled out on
a week-by-week basis. Political negotiations would begin by
a specified date, and the United States would put the agenda
of statehood, disengagement, and security arrangements on
the table. In order to invest this agenda with greater
meaning, the two sides could agree early on that a
Palestinian state will be established by a certain date,
after which negotiations about borders and powers vis-…-vis
Israel would be conducted between juridical equals. Security
and confidence-building obligations -including Palestinian
prevention of terror and incitement and Israeli pullback and
freeze on settlement activity -- would be required and
monitored. Consequences for nonperformance would be clearly
established; in Arafat's case, diplomatic ties with him
would be severed.
* Unilateral separation. This option is likely to emerge if
neither of the above options proves possible. Unilateral
separation represents the inability to conduct diplomacy. If
it is unable to negotiate directly with the Palestinians,
Israel would act unilaterally to improve its security
situation. Proponents of this option suggest that Israel
needs a coherent defense line. They critique a posture in
which large numbers of soldiers must protect small numbers
of settlers. Unilateral separation would involve withdrawal
from isolated settlements and construction of a wall with
buffer zones. In some places the wall would be consistent
with the Green Line, and in others it would not.
Although this option is appealing at one level, there is the
danger that it would confirm the Hizballah model that
violence causes Israeli withdrawal. Unilateral separation
can produce only a way station of sorts, wherein Israelis
have greater security and are increasingly removed from the
Palestinians and Palestinian life. If such a strategy is to
provide stability even for an interim period, the United
States must work with the Israelis as they shape a new
defense line and remove themselves from the Palestinians.
The objective must not be to make the new line permanent,
but rather to signal to the Palestinians that violence will
not create further Israeli withdrawal, and that they will
have to assume their obligations and responsibilities if
they want their aspirations to be addressed.
This Special Policy Forum Report was prepared by
Jacqueline Kaufman.
Copyright THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE for Near East Policy
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