A little cross reference: From Judt's article:
Most Israelis are still trapped in the story of their own uniqueness. For some, this lies in the primordial presence of an ancient Jewish state on the territory of modern Israel. For others it rests in a God-given title to the lands of Judea and Samaria. Many still invoke the Holocaust and the claim that it authorizes Jews to make upon the international community. Even those who reject all such special pleading point to geography in defense of their distinction. We are so vulnerable, they say, so surrounded by enemies, that we cannot take any risks or afford a single mistake. The French could withdraw across the Mediterranean; South Africa is a very large country. We have nowhere to go. Finally, behind every Israeli refusal to face the inevitability of hard choices stands the implicit guarantee of the United States.
The problem for the rest of the world is that since 1967 Israel has changed in ways that render its traditional self-description absurd. It is now a regional colonial power, by some accounts the world's fourth-largest military establishment. Israel is a state, with all the trappings and capacities of a state. By comparison the Palestinians are weak indeed. While the failings of the Palestinian leadership have been abysmal and the crimes of Palestinian terrorists extremely bloody, the fact is that Israel has the military and political initiative. Responsibility for moving beyond the present impasse thus falls primarily (though as we shall see not exclusively) on Israel.
But Israelis themselves are blind to this. In their own eyes they are still a small victim-community, defending themselves with restraint and reluctance against overwhelming odds. Their astonishingly incompetent political leadership has squandered thirty years since the hubris-inducing victory of June 1967. In that time Israelis have built illegal compounds in the occupied territories and grown a carapace of cynicism: toward the Palestinians, whom they regard with contempt, and toward a United States whose erstwhile benevolent disengagement they have manipulated shamelessly.
That all seems painfully familiar and accurate from the long running local dialog. Where do we go from here? From the last Economist piece that stockman_scott posted:
If this were just a case of refusing to bend under fire, Mr Sharon's failure might be forgivable; most Israelis believe that surviving depends on showing no weakness. The trouble with Mr Sharon is that he seems not to accept the principle upon which any imaginable peace must rest, namely Israel's evacuation of most of the land it conquered in 1967, so that a viable Palestinian state can arise in the West Bank and Gaza. Right now, he weeps crocodile tears over the collapse of the Oslo process he never supported. But under cover of fighting terrorism, he shows every sign of wanting to resurrect the vision of a “Greater Israel”, for ever in charge of the West Bank, which inspired Likud governments in the 1970s and 1980s.
In the Knesset this week, Mr Sharon promised to withdraw his army from the newly occupied territories, but only to “buffer zones”; to negotiate with a “responsible” Palestinian leadership, but not with Mr Arafat; and to seek a “long-term interim agreement”, not a final peace. He also expanded his government to take in the National Religious Party, led now by an ultra-nationalist who opposes any Palestinian sovereignty west of the River Jordan and predicts the eventual migration of the Palestinians out of the country. (http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfm?Story_id=1077489 )
From another Economist piece, linked from the above, maybe posted previously, or not:
After the war is over economist.com The ground has shifted since Taba, of course. Current Israeli thinking is to throw Arabs out of the country, not bring them in. Hard men have taken over both Israeli and Palestinian society. Peaceniks, and reason itself, are marooned at the margins. Can they be rescued?
That one covers a lot of history. I don't exactly see any way forward here. Israel can do what it wants, but it's not at all clear that what it wants is what it needs. |